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ABSTRACT  
 
JENNIFER DONNALLY: “The Politics of Abortion and the Rise of the New Right”  
(Under the direction of Jacquelyn Hall). 
 
 The Politics of Abortion and the Rise of the New Right argues that pro-life activists 
were pivotal to both the demise of the liberal New Deal Coalition and the rise of a 
conservative Reagan Coalition in the United States between 1973 and 1983. Prior to Roe v. 
Wade, the anti-abortion movement was single-issue. It sought to defend criminal abortion 
statutes and Republicans, Democrats, liberals and conservatives made up the small and 
predominantly Roman Catholic movement.  After Roe v. Wade, the United State’s largest 
anti-abortion organization, the National Right to Life Committee, pursued two campaigns to 
overturn the decision. One campaign sought to establish fetal personhood through a Human 
Life Amendment. This amendment granted fetuses the rights of citizenship from the 
moment of conception. Fetal personhood was a new legal concept that would revolutionize 
American law, science, medicine and society. The other campaign sought to restrict abortion 
access within the confines of the decision, narrowing the window in which a legal abortion 
could be performed with the ultimate goal of making most abortions illegal. This campaign 
drew on a longer history of abortion opposition that sought to regulate women’s bodies and 
sexuality.  
 The two campaigns generated a heated conflict over strategy within the National 
Right to Life Committee that propelled the movement’s growing alliance with conservatives 
mobilizing in the Republican Party. Using the Human Life Amendment as a campaign litmus 
test, one group created a single-issue anti-abortion voter constituency and used that 
 IV 
constituency to polarize the American party system. When the Republican Party endorsed the 
Human Life Amendment in 1976, these activists then sought to shift Roman Catholics and 
Evangelical Protestants out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party. The other 
pro-life activists championed abortion restrictions that regulated underage, single and poor 
women’s sexual practices and mobilized previously apolitical conservative Protestants. These 
two competing pro-life groups united to cut federal funding of abortions for women on public 
assistance. Through this anti-funding campaign, pro-lifers championed an anti-government 
ethos and defended their rights as taxpayers, paving the way for the social and economic 
conservative alliance that characterized the winning Reagan coalition of 1980.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Trying to pick up the pieces”1 
 
Stuck in Boston traffic, right to life activist Tom Connelly tuned in to a local news 
radio program on the frigid morning of January 22, 1973. Just after 10:00 A.M., he heard an 
announcement of the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton decisions. Shocked, 
Connelly pulled his car over to the side of the highway. “It was,” according to Connelly, “a 
day in which anything else I had on my agenda, everything was changed to be secondary.”2 
A tall, robust young man with a promising future as a physician, Connelly had dropped out of 
Vermont Medical School three years earlier and moved into his parent’s house after he failed 
to stop a friend from having an illegal abortion. Now he spent his time protesting abortion 
services outside Boston City Hospital. When he arrived home from his drive, he telephoned 
other right to life activists he knew as well as boyhood friends from his Catholic school 
years.3 He quickly learned that Dr. Joseph Stanton, an associate professor of Clinical 
Medicine at Tufts University, was organizing a state right to life group. Within seven days of 
                                                
1 Alice Hartle, “Don't Confuse us with facts,” NRL News 1 (August 1974): 8 
 
2Jennifer Donnally interview with Thomas Connelly, Jr., September 20, 2010.  
 
3 I use the terms anti-abortion, right to life, and pro-life interchangeably. While some scholars prefer to 
use the term anti-abortion to describe the movement, activists insist that their movement goes beyond the 
abortion issue to examine larger issues of personhood and the legal protection of life at its various stages. More 
recent histories have also begun to adopt the language of right to life and pro-life to describe this movement. 
See Sara Dubow, Ourselves Unborn: A History of the Fetus in Modern America (New York: Oxford University 
Press ,2010); Leslie J. Reagan, Dangerous Pregnancies: Mothers, Disabilities, and Abortion in Modern 
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). 
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Roe, Stanton and his anti-abortion allies founded Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.4  
Once incorporated, the organization's founders analyzed the Supreme Court decisions 
and debated movement strategies at meetings that, according to one of the male founders, 
“lasted so long that the shag carpet actually grew.”5 One passage in Roe v. Wade alarmed 
them most. The opinion read, “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
does not include the unborn,” thus the court “need not resolve the difficult question of when 
life begins.”6 To many right to life activists these two sentences went to the heart of the 
matter. They believed a fetus was a person from the moment of conception and held a 
hardline: abortion was murder, no exceptions. These pro-lifers believed the only way to 
remedy the Court’s decision was to pass a Human Life Amendment that would grant fetuses 
from the moment of conception the rights of Americans already born. 7  
Fetal personhood from the moment of conception, however, was a new and 
revolutionary legal concept that a majority of Americans had never encountered prior to 
January 1973.8 The small portion of the 209.90 million Americans who were familiar with 
                                                
4Jennifer Donnally interview with Philip P. Moran, September 10, 2010. 
 
5Jennifer Donnally interview with Philip P. Moran, September 10, 2010. 
 
6Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
   
7Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith: a Frontline History of the Abortion Wars (New York: Simon and 
Schuster,1988): 163 
 
8Americans’ relationship to and understanding of fetal subjects had been and continues to be fluid and 
ambiguous. This was due in part to the fact that humans lacked the technology to identify early fetal life until 
the twentieth century. For most of history, a pregnancy and therefore a fetus could only be proven to exist under 
the law at the point of quickening, when a fetal movement could be felt. Fetal movement often occurs in the 
second trimester, sometime after the fifteenth week of pregnancy. At the point of quickening, fetuses gained 
some legal rights under English Common law in the eighteenth century and in American law in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, foremost of which was the right to inherit property. At the time of Roe, the legal status 
of fetuses and their rights were in flux and differed from state to state. For instance, criminal cases involving the 
injury of and death of pregnant women raised a number of questions concerning the legal status of a fetus until a 
federal law made the intentional killing of a pregnant woman a double homicide in 2004. While Marvin Olasky 
has argued that American doctors lobbied to pass criminal abortion laws to protect fetal life, both in its potential 
and actual form, the legal campaign to establish and protect fetal rights and personhood from the moment of 
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fetal personhood prior to Roe v. Wade were likely Roman Catholics or Protestants affiliated 
with the right to life movement. In 1973, Roman Catholic Church membership numbered 
between forty-eight and fifty million while the right to life movement numbered at best in the 
thousands, with a dedicated core of activists that numbered in the hundreds. Yet, when the 
Supreme Court announced the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, a January 28 Gallup poll 
showed that as many as forty-five percent of Americans opposed legal abortion access 
compared to the forty-six percent of Americans who favored it.9 Clearly, some right to lifers 
observed, a set of issues beyond fetal personhood had informed American’s opposition to 
abortion during the criminal era and would continue to inform opposition to abortion in the 
legal era. Rather than championing fetal personhood, many Americans supported criminal 
abortion statutes because they believed such statutes discouraged a woman’s promiscuity and 
a litany of other undesirable behaviors that they associated with abortion while coercing a 
woman to accept what these Americans believed was a woman’s most important role, 
motherhood.10 
                                                
 
conception is grounded in the contemporary anti-abortion movement. Since Roe v. Wade, the campaign to 
establish fetal rights and personhood has touched upon many areas of science, medicine and law outside the 
abortion issue, including but not limited to in-vitro fertilization, birth control, artificial insemination, human 
cloning, surrogate motherhood, and research using fetal tissue. See Dubow, Ourselves Unborn; Cynthia 
Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993); Ed Doerr and James W. Prescott, eds,.,Abortion Rights and Fetal ‘Personhood,’ (Long Beach, 
California: Centerline Press, 1990); Barbara Duden, Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the 
Unborn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Steven Maynard-Moody, The Dilemma of the Fetus: 
Fetal Research, Medical Progress, and Moral Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Marvin Olasky, 
“The Doctor’s Campaign in Context” in Abortion Rites: A Social History of Abortion in America (Wheaton, Ill: 
Crossway Books, 1992), 131-149; James Davison Hunter and Joseph E. Davis, “Cultural Politics at the Edge of 
Life” in The Politics of Abortion and Birth Control in Historical Perspective, ed. Donald Critchlow (University 
Park, Penn: The Pennsylvania State University Press), 105-6; Daniel Williams, “No Happy Medium: The Role 
of American’s Ambivalent View of Fetal Rights in Political Conflict over Abortion Legalization,” The Journal 
of Policy History 25 (January 2013): 42-61. 
 
9 “Poll Reports Abortion Gains in Public Favor,” Los Angeles Times (Jan 28, 1973): 6. 
 
10Histories of abortion in the criminal era have focused on questions of access, availability and safety 
and how states used abortion laws to regulate women’s bodies and sexual practices. These same questions 
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This larger opposition to abortion for reasons other than fetal personhood led another 
contingent of pro-lifers to focus on Roe v. Wade’s division of pregnancy into trimesters. In 
the decision, the Court assigned each trimester of pregnancy a different legal frame for 
regulating abortion access. The court ruled that in the first trimester, “the abortion decision 
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
physician.” In the second trimester, “the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the 
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health.” And finally, at the time subsequent to viability when a fetus 
could survive independent of a woman’s womb, “the State . . . may . . . regulate . . . abortion 
except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”11 
Due to this trimester framing, the Court opened the possibility that state legislatures could 
continue to restrict abortion access at different stages of a pregnancy much as they had in the 
criminal abortion era. If pro-lifers pursued such restrictions, some movement leaders argued, 
they could test the limits of the court decision and build anti-abortion support amongst 
Americans who were tentative about establishing fetal personhood. These activists came to 
                                                
 
continued to animate the debate over abortion policy in the legal era following Roe v. Wade thanks to 
incremental right to life efforts to restrict access during different points in the pregnancy and to the joint efforts 
of incremental and hard-line activists to place as many barriers as possible between a woman and an abortion 
provider. See David Cline, Creating Choice: A Community Responds to the Need for Abortion and Birth 
Control, 1961-1973, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Carol Joffe, Doctors of Conscience: The Struggle 
to Provide Abortion before and after Roe v. Wade, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Ellen Messer and Kathryn E. 
May, eds., Back Rooms: An Oral History of the Illegal Abortion Era (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); 
James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978);  Leslie Reagan, When Abortion was a Crime: Women, Medicine and Law in the United 
States, 1867-1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Johanna Schoen, Choice and Coercion: 
Birth Control, Sterilization and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005); Ricki Solinger, The Abortionist: A Woman Against the Law, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994); Solinger, Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race Before Roe v. Wade (New 
York: Routledge, 2000); Solinger, Pregnancy and Power: A Short History of Reproductive Politics in America 
(New York: New York University Press, 2005). 
 
11Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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champion a pragmatic and incremental strategy.  
These differing reactions to the Roe v. Wade decision set up a strategy divide between 
hardline and incremental activists within the National Right to Life Committee, the nation’s 
largest anti-abortion organization. The conflict boiled down to a question over movement 
priorities. Was this a movement that wanted to establish fetal personhood and citizenship 
rights from the moment of conception, a view that not only criminalized abortion but also set 
a legal precedent that would have a radical impact on American law, science, medicine and 
society? Or was this a movement that sought to restrict access to abortion, a view that could 
gradually narrow the window in which a legal abortion could be performed with the ultimate 
goal of making all, or at least most abortions illegal? For many pro-life activists, the two 
questions were irreconcilable. In February 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life chose the 
incremental route. Tom Connelly, who held a hard line on fetal personhood, left the 
organization. Connelly believed that if the right to life movement accepted the legal 
terminology of Roe v. Wade and its trimester framing in order to pass abortion restrictions, 
“then what you are doing is [accepting abortion rights supporters’] definition of what is going 
on.”12 He would not violate the principle of fetal personhood to save some fetuses’ lives in 
the short term. These strategy divisions between incremental and hardline activists were so 
intense because both groups of right to life activists characterized abortion as murder. Put 
another way, pro-lifers couldn’t agree on the answer to the one question they used to judge 
any strategy choice: What was the best way to save the most unborn babies’ lives?13  
                                                
12Jennifer Donnally interview with Thomas Connelly, Jr., September 20, 2010. 
 
13 Oral histories and right to life organization papers show that activists themselves understood and 
continue to understand their movement and its alliance with the Republican Party in relation to the central 
tension between establishing fetal personhood and winning abortion restrictions. For three examples of National 
Right to Life Committee leaders reflecting on this division in the past and present, see Alice Hartle, “Don't 
Confuse Us With Facts,” NRL News, 1 (August 1974): 8 and Author’s notes from Burke Balch, “The History of 
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How pro-lifers answered this question at different times and places explains the 
movement’s political trajectory between 1973 and 1983. Prior to Roe v. Wade, the pro-life 
movement was single-issue driven, made up of Republicans and Democrats, conservatives 
and liberals. This self-described motley crew banded together to defend state criminal 
abortion statutes against a movement made up of medical professionals, lawyers, feminists 
and population control advocates who wanted to reform and repeal state criminal abortion 
statutes. No American political party was closely identified with an abortion position. When 
the court released Roe v. Wade in January 1973, few pro-life leaders could have predicted the 
Republican alliance that most Americans assume today. Activists such as Thomas Connelly 
in Massachusetts fully expected that the pro-life movement would align with the Democratic 
Party because in 1973 more Democratic politicians identified with the anti-abortion position 
than Republicans. Even in 1976, sixty percent of registered Republicans supported legal 
abortion access.14  
The division over fetal personhood and abortion restrictions that erupted in Roe v. 
Wade’s aftermath created two concurrent movement paths that had a direct impact on United 
States electoral politics. Hardline activists used the Human Life Amendment as a campaign 
litmus test for all politicians and created a single-issue anti-abortion vote constituency. 
During elections, they used this voting constituency to pressure politicians and parties to 
come out with a favorable anti-abortion position. Due to hardline pro-life organizing in both 
the Democratic and Republican Parties in 1976, the parties adopted competing abortion 
                                                
 
the Pro-Life Movement: Lessons of the Future- Part 1” at the National Right to Life Convention, 2009, and 
Daniel Becker, Personhood: A Pragmatic Guide to Prolife Victory in the 21st Century and the Return to First 
Principles in Politics (Alpharetta, Georgia: TKS Publications), 2011, 34-36. 
 
14 Daniel K. Williams, “The GOP’s Abortion Strategy: Why Pro-Choice Republicans became Pro-Life 
in the 1970s,” The Journal of Policy History 23 (2011): 213. 
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platforms. In pro-lifers’ own view, the Democratic Party became the party of death and the 
Republican Party became the party of life. Politicians and hardline pro-life activists then 
sought to realign the American electorate, shifting Catholics and Southern Evangelicals out 
of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party. In contrast, incremental leaders 
compromised on fetal personhood in order to pursue abortion restrictions at the local and 
state level and recruit Protestants who were reluctant to take a hard line position on abortion 
and fetal personhood. They focused on building conservative coalitions by forging anti-
abortion alliances across denominational lines, mobilizing previously inactive voting 
constituencies and cultivating ties with conservative leaders of the Republican Party. Thus 
both hardliners and incrementalists further propelled an alliance with the Republican Party, 
even as they attacked one another.  
Whereas strategy divisions helped fuel the initial pro-life alliance with the Republican 
Party, moments of unity between incrementalists and hardliners solidified that alliance and 
ensured its viability for the long term. Between 1974 and 1981, all pro-life activists rallied 
behind a campaign to cut government funding of abortion at the local, state and national 
level. Whether right to life activists prioritized a constitutional amendment to establish fetal 
personhood or pursued abortion restrictions, they agreed that the government and their tax 
money should be kept out of what they called the abortion business. While many historians 
of abortion and conservatism have acknowledged the anti-abortion funding campaign, they 
have not fully explored it or its ramifications.15 This dissertation places the campaign to cut 
                                                
15 For brief discussions of the Hyde Amendment, a ban on federal Medicaid funding of abortion and 
abortion referral services that first passed in 1976, see: Linda Gordon, The Moral Property of Women: A 
History of Birth Control in America, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), p 311-312; 
Connie Paige, The Right to Lifers: Who they are, how they operate and where they get their money (New York: 
Summit Books, 1983), 111-12; Robert Self: All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy Since 
the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012); 289-291. The Hyde Amendment has received more attention in 
histories of the pro-choice movement and the contemporary feminist movement. These histories credit the 
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government funding of abortion at the center of conservative coalition building efforts in the 
1970s. The campaign against government funding not only helped to indoctrinate single-
issue pro-life activists who had supported the liberal consensus and the Democratic Party into 
a larger conservative worldview, but also generated and expanded the rhetoric, political 
strategies and networks that would come to characterize the winning Reagan coalition of 
1980.  
To ban government funding of abortion, right to life activists deployed two 
arguments. First, they defended their rights as taxpayers not to pay for a procedure they 
equated with murder. Second, they defined government abortion funding for women on 
public assistance as a population control measure and as a form of genocide against poor 
minority communities. The federal government, right to life activists charged, was more 
interested in getting rid of the poor and minorities than it was in helping them. Because both 
hard line and incremental activists agreed to pursue prohibitions on abortion funding, almost 
all pro-life activists adopted these arguments against the government regardless of their party 
affiliation or political ideology. Through the campaign to stop government funding of 
abortions then, pro-life activists came to view the federal government as a corrupt and 
overbearing institution. They also learned to champion a conservative anti-tax and anti-elite 
ethos.  
These pro-life arguments against the government and in defense of taxpayer’s rights 
                                                
 
funding ban for mobilizing the contemporary pro-choice movement to defend abortion access in the aftermath 
of the Roe v. Wade decisions. See Merle Hoffman, Intimate Wars: The Life and times of the woman who 
brought abortion from the Back Alley to the Board Room, 2012; Jennifer Nelson, Women of Color and the 
Reproductive Rights Movement (New York: New York University Press, 2003), Dorothy Roberts, Killing the 
Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Vintage Books, 1997); Suzanne 
Staggenborg, The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). For a more in-depth treatment of the Hyde Amendment, questions of access and the 
politics of the Right see Rosalind Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and 
Reproductive Freedom (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990). 
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converged with the anti-busing and anti-welfare rhetoric that was sweeping through 
American cities and suburbs in the 1960s and the early 1970s.16 At the local level, many 
white Americans responded to school desegregation by defending what they considered to be 
their rights as property owners and taxpayers. These rights included determining who 
attended which public school in their communities, regulating what was taught in the public 
schools, and defending residential segregation.17 Increasing numbers of urban working-class 
whites and suburbanites viewed their rights as property owners and taxpayers as superseding 
the rights that poorer Americans and minorities had just gained as part of the President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty and the civil rights movement. These anti-government and pro-
taxpayer rights arguments also resonated with the defense of a free market economy by 
conservative American businessmen who were organizing against federal government 
regulations in the early 1970s.18 Through the campaign against Medicaid funding of 
                                                
16 The first scholarly accounts of the rise of the contemporary Right focused on the phenomenon of 
“backlash” politics and a “reactionary populism” of the white working class. These accounts examine how 
white working-class voters of the Rust Belt, Northeast and Deep South, once thought to be stalwarts of 
liberalism, increasingly voted for conservatives and the Republican Party in the 1970s and 1980s. For examples 
see: Ronald P. Formisano, Boston against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel 
Hill, 1991); Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes 
on American Politics (New York: 1991); Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of 
the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: 1995).  
 
17 In more recent histories of conservatism, scholars have focused on the phenomenon of conservative 
suburbanites in the Sun Belt states. These histories take conservatives at their word and explain the political 
strategies, ideas and organizations to better understand how the conservative movement coalesced in the post-
1945 period. For examples, see Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the 
Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: 
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Matthew 
Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). I’m drawing from both accounts to 
explain how the pro-life activists, who came from different class backgrounds and regions, began to adopt 
conservative arguments against the federal government and in defense of taxpayers’ rights. 
 
18 For histories of the economic right see Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making 
of Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009) and Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible 
Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York: Norton, 2009). 
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abortions, right to lifers further solidified alliances with conservative organizations 
mobilizing in the Republican Party and adopted the anti-tax and anti-government rhetoric 
that would come to characterize the Reagan Coalition.  
----- 
 
This dissertation traces the history of the National Right to Life Committee in order to 
map the strategy divisions and consensuses of the pro-life movement onto pivotal 
developments in the rise of American conservatism. While the National Right to Life 
Committee is the nation’s oldest anti-abortion organization and was its largest and best 
known anti-abortion organization throughout the 1970s, no scholar has written an in depth 
history of it.19 Founded in 1968 by a handful of Catholic right to life activists and two priests, 
the National Right to Life Committee was first housed under the Family Life Bureau of the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops. In the wake of Roe v. Wade, a group of state 
Protestant and lay Catholic leaders incorporated the National Right to Life Committee as a 
non-profit organization separate from the Catholic Church. In the 1970s, it evolved into one 
of the few social conservative organizations not led by conservative ministers or affiliated 
closely with any one religious institution or denomination. From 1973 on, its fifty-five 
member Board of Directors included a democratically elected representative from each of the 
fifty states and five at-large members from other national anti-abortion organizations. The 
                                                
 
Molly C. Michelmore, “What have you done for me lately? The Welfare State, Tax Politics, and the Search for 
a New Majority, 1968-1980,” Journal of Policy History, 24 no. 4, (2012) 709-740. 
  
19 While no study has focused on the National Right to Life Committee, scholars and journalists have 
paid particular attention to the National Right to Life Committee. See Paige, The Right to Lifers; Neil Young, 
“We Gather Together:” Dallas Blanchard, The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: 
From Polite to Fiery Protest (New York: Twayne, 1994). 
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National Right to Life Committee also maintained a non-partisan political stance even though 
it increasingly developed close ties with Republican politicians. Today it still serves as the 
flagship organization of the mainstream pro-life movement.  
By tracing the history of the National Right to Life Committee, I capture the strategy 
debates and pro-life campaigns from the grassroots to the national level. By focusing on 
developments in three states, Kansas, Massachusetts and North Carolina, I also compare and 
contrast state laws, political campaigns and political coalitions in a cross-regional context. 
The result challenges notions of Red State and Blue State divides while highlighting the 
importance of religion and local politics to the pro-life movement’s development and the rise 
of modern conservatism. For example, Kansas Right to Life championed the hard line 
strategy early on and was one of the first state affiliates to attack Democrats and champion 
Republican candidates. Massachusetts Citizens for Life and North Carolina Right to Life, on 
the other hand, pursued incremental initiatives but drew their membership from different 
populations and formed different political alliances. In 1973, Massachusetts had one of the 
highest populations of Roman Catholics in the country; North Carolina had the lowest. Thus, 
activists in North Carolina Right to Life focused on recruiting conservative Protestants into 
the movement. The group’s status and its ability to pass anti-abortion legislation at the state 
level rose with the consolidation of a pro-family social conservative base in the state’s 
Republican Party. North Carolina’s Republican Party, in turn, grew stronger as increasing 
numbers of former conservative Democrats joined its ranks and as increasing numbers of 
Southern Baptists became political. In Massachusetts, incremental activists built relationships 
with Roman Catholic Democratic politicians who ruled the state legislature. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life’s ability to pass legislation drastically decreased as feminists and Mass 
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Choice campaigned for Democratic candidates who supported abortion access. Feminists 
eventually won enough “pro-choice” Democrats to win the state party, forcing anti-abortion 
single-issue voters into the weaker state Republican Party.   
Between 1973 and 1983, these differences in political alliances and strategies 
between state affiliates of the National Right to Life Committee resulted in a fractious and 
highly contentious Board of Directors. Incremental and hardline activists built coalitions and 
voting blocks to push their respective strategy preferences through, while conservative 
Republican leaders had to contend with more liberal Democratic leaders when shaping policy 
statements, allocating money and backing candidates. To build movement consensus amidst 
these divisions, the Board of Directors often turned to the grassroots. They referred 
resolutions and deferred votes until activists at the local and state level could resolve the 
strategy conflicts and create a grassroots consensus that trickled up to the National Board. At 
the same time, National Right to Life Committee lobbying campaigns for national policies 
were often coordinated top-down. The Washington, D.C. staff directed which state lobby 
group should lobby who and when.  
A history of the National Right to Life Committee contributes to histories of abortion 
and scholarship on American conservatism in four significant ways. To date, histories of 
American conservatism have focused either on the grassroots and local contexts, telling a 
bottom-up story, or on the national organizations, institutions, think tanks and networks of 
conservative leaders, telling a top-down story. The unique organizational structure of the 
National Right to Life Committee allows for both bottom-up and top-down narratives that 
explain the shifting power dynamics between conservatives at the grassroots and national 
leaders in Washington, D.C. By telling local and state narratives in a comparative context 
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and integrating them into a national narrative, this dissertation provides a fuller, more 
complex and accurate accounting of conservative mobilization in America.  
A history of the National Right to Life Committee also sheds light on the history of 
other pro-life organizations and their political priorities as well. Many of the other national 
anti-abortion organizations formed as a result of unresolved differences within the National 
Right to Life Committee, including American Citizens Concerned for Life and American 
Life Lobby. Many of these organizations’ top officers found themselves out of favor with the 
grassroots and the National Right to Life Committee for championing a certain policy or for 
implementing a controversial strategy. In those cases, the Board of Directors voted the 
leaders out of office and out of power and those leaders responded by establishing their own 
national anti-abortion organizations. Other National Right to Life Committee leaders quit to 
found more autocratic organizations where power was more centralized and easier to wield. 
At the same time, many national leaders of other pro-life organizations found themselves on 
the National Right to Life Committee’s Board of Directors as one of the five at-large board 
members. They then became embroiled in the same debates and divisions plaguing the 
organization. An in depth history of the National Right to Life Committee thus provides a 
window into the history of the entire movement.  
Third, the National Right to Life Committee serves as an ideal case study to examine 
conservative organizations’ relationships with and their response to the more radical and 
violent fringes of their respective movements. Between 1973 and 1983, actions against 
abortion providers at the local level generated the grassroots consensuses that trickled up to 
the National Right to Life Committee board. Legal clinic protests and illegal clinic sit-sin 
helped fuel the movement’s growing focus on shutting down abortion providers in the mid 
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1970s. Beginning in 1976, these protests against providers encouraged a small group of 
activists to use violence to intimidate abortion providers. Rather than a source of division, as 
some scholars have argued, protests against abortion providers and illegal clinic sit-ins and 
violence served as a common ground for the right to life movement.20 The spaces outside an 
abortion provider’s doors, both literally and figuratively, were often the one place where 
grassroots right to lifers could meet, debate and agree. Outside clinics, pro-lifers could agree 
that they should do whatever was legally possible to save as many babies as they could in the 
here and now while others engaged in illegal activities. Thus as levels of illegal activity and 
violence increased, the National Right to Life Committee correspondingly increased legal 
pressure on providers, introducing laws and regulations aimed at putting them out of 
business. 
Finally, the story of the National Right to Life Committee highlights the important 
                                                
20 While scholars have argued that a proliferation of pro-life organizations and divisions fueled the 
national movement’s growth and increase in political power between 1976 and 1980, many have analyzed clinic 
protests and the clinic sit-in movement as separate from the mainstream movement’s focus on politics and 
education. These scholars correctly identify the impetus of the sit-in movement with a discontent over the 
mainstream movement’s embrace of incremental strategies in 1975 and the Republican Party alliance in 1976. 
They then trace internal tensions and divisions within the sit-in or “direct action” stream of pro-life activism in 
order to explain how some activists began to engage in acts of anti-abortion violence and terrorism in the 
aftermath of the human life amendment failure in 1983. See Patricia Baird-Windle and Eleanor J. Bader, 
Targets of Hatred: Anti-Abortion Terrorism (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Zaid Munson, The Making of Pro-
Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Jeffy 
Reiter, Live from the Gates of Hell: An Insider’s Look at the Antiabortion Underground (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2000), James Risen and Judy L. Thomas, Wrath of Angels: The American Abortion War, 
(New York: Basic Books,1998).These  analyses centered on either on the clinic sit-in movement or the 
mainstream movement has deepened a strategy division within the pro-life movement to a level that the 
testimony and actions of national pro-life leaders and grassroots activists complicate. Through in-depth local 
case studies of pro-life activism and actions against local clinics, other scholars have shown that clinic protests 
have been and continue to be pivotal in forwarding mainstream activism. They argue the clinics are the frontline 
of the abortion wars, both in terms of public policy and protest. See Alesha E. Doan, Opposition and 
Intimidation: The Abortion Wars and Strategies of Political Harassment (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2007); Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Cynthia Gorney, Articles of Faith; Sue Hertz, Caught in the 
Crossfire: A Year on Abortion’s Front line (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1991); Carol Joffe, Dispatches from 
the Abortion Wars: The Costs of Fanaticism to Doctors, Patients, and the Rest of Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2009); Carol Mason, Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-life Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2002); Stephen Singular, The Wichita Divide: The Murder of Dr. George Tiller and the Battle Over 
Abortion (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011). 
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contributions of conservative women to forging the winning conservative coalition under 
Reagan. Female National Right to Life Committee leaders such as Mildred Jefferson, Nellie 
Gray and Carolyn Gerster as well as state leaders such as Emma O’Steen and Patricia 
Goodson have been relegated to the margins of histories of American conservatism. While 
male leaders of the New Right, who authored some of the first histories of modern 
conservatism, acknowledged the contributions of conservative organizers and ideologues 
Phyllis Schlafly and Connie Marshner, they left out female leaders of the anti-abortion 
movement.21 This is so despite the fact that Mildred Jefferson and Carolyn Gerster often 
attended the same meetings and conferences as New Right leaders and were the brains 
behind the Hyde Amendment campaign, one of the most important social conservative 
policies and one of their few victories. In the same way, more recent histories of female 
conservatives have focused on all-female conservative organizations such as the women’s 
auxiliaries of the Republican Party, anti-communist organizations and the Eagle Forum. An 
in depth history of an organization jointly run by conservative men and women such as the 
National Right to Life Committees illuminates conflicts and negotiations between the sexes, 
the barriers conservative women broke through to gain leadership and power and how 
competing conceptions of gender roles informed the pro-life movement’s development.22  
                                                
21 Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America (New York: The 
Free Press, 1999), 183-193; Richard Viguerie, The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead (Falls Church, VA: 
Richard Viguerie Company, 1980), 51-81; George Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America 
since 1945 (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006). Even male right to life leaders overlook the important 
contributions of female leaders at the national level and cite the contributions of male lawyers, physicians and 
theologians. See Jack Wilke, “A History of Pro-Life Leadership: For Better or Worse,” Back to the Drawing 
Board: The Future of the Pro-Life Movement, ed. Teresa R. Wagner (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 2003), 123-136. 
 
22 Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Catherine Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and 
Conservatism From Suffrage Through the Rise of the New Right, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006); Ronnee Schreiber, Righting Feminism: Conservative Women and American Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Donald G. Mathews and Jane Sherron De Hart, Sex, Gender and the Politics of 
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To better highlight the contributions of conservative women and the pro-life 
movement, this dissertation employs specific terms to refer to different groups of 
conservatives that aligned with the Republican Party to form the winning Reagan coalition of 
the 1980s. These terms are not definitive and many scholars have used them interchangeably 
to describe a fluid network of social conservative people and leaders. Indeed, many of the 
men and women who make up the modern conservative movement belong to numerous 
organizations and champion different conservative causes.23 Other conservative organizers, 
however, are not so interchangeable. They may have begun their activism by championing a 
single cause and branched into other conservative activities, or they may not have. 
Employing terms such as the New Right, Christian Right and pro-family to refer to the same 
group of people has led some scholars to give modern conservatism a cohesion that does not 
accurately capture the conflicts and paradoxes undergirding various ideologies, belief 
systems and strategy priorities. Nor can such cohesion fully explain the differences and 
tensions between Republican Party leaders and conservative leaders. Moreover, blurring the 
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distinctions between the New Right, pro-family movement and the Christian Right, 
especially in the 1970s, has caused scholars to focus on male conservative leaders who have 
left more archival records and wrote the first histories of their movement, while paying less 
attention to conservative women and the male and female leaders of the pro-life movement, 
too few of whom have placed their papers in archives. In oral interviews, conservative 
women have charged correctly that they were partners with male conservative leaders and 
that conservative Christian ministers often followed them into political activism, not vice 
versa.24  
This dissertation thus limits the networks of people who fall under each term in the 
1970s, while also acknowledging that many conservative leaders came to see themselves as 
belonging to all three groups by the 1980s and 1990s. These terms thus refer to networks of 
people and a time and place between 1973 and 1983. Taken together, the New Right, pro-
family movement and Christian Right came to make up a social conservative base in the 
Republican Party and a core component of Reagan’s winning coalition. Thus by 1980, many 
journalists often saw these different groups of social conservatives as belonging to one “New 
Right” movement within the Republican Party.  
“New Right” in this dissertation refers to the baby boomer generation of conservative 
activists that set out to revolutionize American politics in the 1960s and 1970s.25 Many 
leaders of the New Right entered a larger conservative network through Young Americans 
for Freedom, a conservative organization founded in 1960 during a college students’ retreat 
                                                
24 Interviews with Mildred Jefferson by Jennifer Donnally, October 22, 2007 and 21 September 2010, 
Interview with Anne Fox by Jennifer Donnally, 20 September 2010, Interview with Eleanor Raferty by Jennifer 
Donnally, 16 September 2010, Interview with Madeline McCormish, 20 September 2010, Interview with Ellen 
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25 Rebecca Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s (Berkeley: 
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at the estate of conservative intellectual and commentator William Buckley, or through Barry 
Goldwater’s 1964 Republican presidential campaign. Indebted to an older generation of 
conservatives who had organized against the New Deal in the 1930s and sought to create a 
more consistent conservative political ideology in the 1940s and 1950s, this generation of 
conservative activists sought to make a mark on politics through a more pragmatic and less 
intellectual endeavor.  
They set out to create a conservative counterrevolution. To do so, they wanted to 
dismantle the New Deal political coalition that undergirded the Democratic Party’s 
overwhelming electoral successes since 1932 and to defeat a Cold War Liberalism that had 
permeated the Republican and Democratic Parties in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1973 and 
1975, leaders of the New Right founded and led a number of conservative institutions, 
organizations and political committees, including the Heritage Foundation in 1973, the 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress and the Conservative Caucus in 1974, and the 
National Conservative Political Action Committee in 1975.26 These organizations, along with 
a series of conservative media outlets, created a powerful conservative establishment that 
would help forge grassroots conservative groups across the United States into a national 
coalition between 1975 and 1980 and help ensure the conservative take over of the 
Republican Party.27 Kevin Phillips, a political columnist and former analyst for the Nixon 
presidential campaigns, dubbed the men and women who led these organizations the “New 
Right” in 1975.28 The term caught on and by 1980 became synonymous with Ronald 
                                                
26 Donald Critchelow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 129. 
 
27 Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, “Introduction,” Rightward Bound: Making American 
Conservatism in the 1970s, ed. Schulman and Zelizer, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 5-7. 
 
28 According to Richard Vigueire, the term “New Right” was first used by Lee Edwards in 1962 when 
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Reagan’s rise to power both in terms of the political coalition and conservative establishment 
supporting his candidacy. 
“Pro-family” applies to conservative organizations primarily led by women who had 
begun to organize around issues of gender and sexuality in the 1960s and early 1970s. These 
women consolidated their efforts into a coalition against the International Women’s Year in 
1977. At that time, the “pro-family” movement brought together Phyllis Schlafly’s “Stop 
ERA” campaign, Anita Bryant’s anti-gay “Save Our Children” campaign, the pro-life 
movement, state conservative women’s caucuses, and various women’s church groups. 
While conservatives had been rallying in defense of “family values” prior to 1977, women 
did much of the work in building a “Pro-family” movement with certain policy goals and 
political power in 1977 and 1978.29 Once organized, they partnered with many of the male 
leaders of the New Right to back certain political candidates and government policies. 
The “Christian Right” characterizes a group of evangelical and fundamentalist 
Protestant ministers who established a series of political organizations between 1975 and 
1980. While Protestant ministers’ engagement in politics had a long history in post-war 
conservatism due to their embrace of anti-communism, these ministers entered politics in a 
more overt way in the late 1970s at a time when evangelical and fundamentalist 
congregations were growing in popularity. To capitalize on the growing numbers of 
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evangelical and fundamentalist Christians and to exert influence in American society and 
politics, the ministers who made up the Christian Right led get-out the vote campaigns, 
organized rallies, and demanded that Republican politicians pay attention to the social 
policies and culture views they backed. Their issues included school prayer, abortion, gay 
marriage, pornography, and the Equal Rights Amendment.30  
Each chapter follows key moments of division and consensus in the National Right to 
Life Committee and follows the organization’s role in the formation of the winning Reagan 
Coalition within the Republican Party. The chapters show how the pro-life movement held 
together despite divisions over fetal personhood and abortion restrictions, and how those 
divisions and consensuses shaped alliances with leaders and organizations of the New Right, 
the pro-family movement and Christian Right. Focusing on the how of conservative political 
coalition building, the chapter organization captures the uneasy and tenuous alliance 
undergirding the Reagan Coalition while also explaining in part, why electoral victories came 
more easily than policy victories for social conservatives in the Republican Party.  
Chapter One, “The Disqualifying Issue,” analyzes the establishment of the National 
Right to Life Committee, Inc between 1973 and 1974. At this point, hard line activists won 
the day. They made a Human Life Amendment the organization’s top priority and directed 
state affiliates to use the amendment as the sole campaign litmus test for the upcoming 1974 
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elections. In response, a group of incremental activists broke from the National Right to Life 
Committee, causing the first movement fracture. Despite the divisions, hard line activists in 
Kansas achieved the pro-life movement’s first major electoral victory in 1974. Republican 
Senator Bob Dole defeated Bill Roy thanks in large part to the efforts of the state’s single-
issue anti-abortion voters.  
Chapter Two, “Defend Edelin, Defend Your Rights,” explores the re-unification of 
the pro-life movement through a series of campaigns against abortion providers, focusing on 
right to life activities in Boston, Massachusetts. In 1973, Thomas Connelly initiated a protest 
and secret investigation of abortion practices and medical research using fetal tissue at 
Boston City Hospital. This investigation of abortion providers generated two lawsuits in 
1974 that garnered national attention. The first charged four physicians and medical 
researchers with violating a grave robbing statute because they used tissue from aborted 
fetuses. The second charged black obstetrician and gynecologist Kenneth Edelin with 
manslaughter for taking the life of a twenty to twenty-eight-week-old fetus during a legal 
abortion. While these two lawsuits were representative of similar grassroots protests against 
abortion providers throughout the country, they did more than any other activities against 
abortion providers to advance and solidify an incremental consensus in the National Right to 
Life Committee.  
This consensus sought to restrict abortion access through three campaigns. First, pro-
life activists worked to pass a federal ban on medical research using fetal tissue. The 
campaign helped to emphasize issues of fetal personhood and assigned a new status under the 
law to fetal subjects by regulating their use in research. Second, pro-life activists began to 
launch lawsuits against abortion providers willing to perform later term abortions at or near 
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the point of viability. Through these lawsuits, right to life activists hoped to intimidate and 
harass physicians into limiting abortion provision. These two strategies, in turn helped the 
movement to unite quickly behind a campaign to stop federal Medicaid funding of abortion 
for women on public assistance. The campaign to cut Medicaid funding of abortion helped 
align the pro-life movement with other conservative causes mobilizing in 1974 and 1975, 
including the anti-busing movement. 
Chapter Three, “The Right to Life Revolution,” follows two anti-abortion initiatives 
directed by National Right to Life Committee President Mildred Jefferson. The first used the 
human life amendment as a litmus test to make abortion a pivotal electoral issue in the 
presidential primaries. This initiative helped to polarize the American party system. The 
second initiative united the movement to pass a federal ban on Medicaid funding of abortion. 
This campaign yielded the movement’s greatest legislative victory when the Hyde 
Amendment passed in September 1976 and further propelled the National Right to Life 
Committee’s growing alliance with leaders of the New Right. The Right to Life Revolution 
of 1976 thus succeeded in altering American politics by making the Republican Party the 
“party of life” and passing a funding ban that helped for further aligned social conservative 
organizations with one another and to the Republican Party. 
Chapter Four, “This is War!” traces the rise of a pro-life consensus against feminism. 
In the aftermath of 1976, the National Right to Life Committee fractured again. Some pro-
lifers wanted the movement to return its focus to issues of fetal personhood and the Human 
Life Amendment. Others resisted the alliance with conservatives mobilizing in the New 
Right. Two strategies emerged that undermined Mildred Jefferson’s presidency: a 
constitutional convention call for a Human Life Amendment and clinic sit-ins. In response, 
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Jefferson aligned the movement with an anti-feminist and pro-family coalition.  A united pro-
life movement emerged that applied the rhetoric of war and conflict generated by clinic sit-
ins to declare a war on feminism and ensure the enforcement of the 1976 Hyde Amendment 
banning federal Medicaid funding and to secure the passage of a second Hyde Amendment in 
1977. 
Chapter 5, “The Split,” explores the expansion of a social conservative base in the 
Republican Party and its limitations under the Reagan administration. In 1978, the National 
Right to Life Committee launched a three-year campaign to pass a Human Life Amendment. 
By 1980, numerous Protestant and conservative organizations had joined the campaign. This 
unity between leaders of the pro-life movement and social conservatives, however, proved to 
be tenuous. In 1981, the pro-life movement faced its biggest schism over the role and status 
of fetal personhood. This time, unity proved elusive. Leaders and organizations took sides 
over whether to back a Human Life Bill that established fetal personhood or a Hatch 
federalism constitutional amendment that returned the power to regulate abortions back to 
state legislatures. Different pro-life, pro-family, Christian Right and New Right organizations 
lobbied against one another and as a result, the movement failed to pass any anti-abortion 
legislation between 1981 and 1983. In the aftermath of the schism, the National Right to Life 
Committee Board and its leaders abandoned the Human Life Amendment as their first 
priority. They opted instead to pursue incremental legislation and court cases. The 
conclusion, “Personhood is the Pro-Life Battleground of the Twenty-First Century,” 
evaluates the recent return of pro-life efforts to establish fetal personhood through state 
constitutional amendments and new movement consensus over abortion clinic regulations. 
------ 
In 2003, Mildred Jefferson reflected on the turbulent years in which she presided over the 
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National Right to Life Committee between 1975 and 1978. She summarized the major political 
shift and voter re-alignment at the heart of this dissertation: “The left wing of the Democratic 
Party defeated us as we were beginning our political drive in the mid-1970s, and we eventually 
defeated the Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party to gain control.” After the parties adopted 
opposing abortion positions in 1976, Jefferson argued, “We joined the conservative coalitions 
(although a majority of our grass-roots are neither Conservative nor Republican) because that 
was the only place we could make coalitions and help elect pro-life President Ronald Reagan in 
1980.” “When a pro-life Republican sits in the White House, he does so because millions of pro-
life Democrats vote to elect him.”31  
Jefferson repeated a pro-life narrative that this dissertation both accepts and challenges. 
By placing Jefferson and other conservative female pro-life leaders at the center of the story, I 
show that it took a concerted effort on these women’s part to keep the movement united and 
moving in a conservative direction despite a central division over fetal personhood and abortion 
restrictions. As a result of these women’s efforts, pro-lifers who lacked a conservative 
background came to adopt a larger conservative worldview and non-political social conservatives 
became mobilized in the Republican Party. Together, this coalition of right to life activists led a 
conservative counterrevolution in America. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
“The Disqualifying Issue”32  
“Many things have been suggested which might diminish in some way the effect of 
the Court’s decision,” wrote Kansas Right to Life leader Patricia Goodson in January 1974. 
“Legislation to ensure that no one is coerced (such as welfare patients) or forced to perform 
or assist at abortions, or to pay for abortions through taxes.” Rather than pursue such 
strategies, Goodson argued, “the cause of the unborn will be better served . . . by expanding 
our efforts in a rigorous campaign to pass the Human Life Amendment to the Constitution.”33 
One year after Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, Patricia Goodson situated Kansas Right to 
Life clearly on the side of anti-abortion activists who sought to establish fetal personhood 
over and against activists who sought abortion restrictions. To establish fetal personhood, 
Kansas Right to Life joined the majority of state affiliates of the National Right to Life 
Committee in pursuing a Human Life Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
amendment granted all fetuses, from the moment of conception, all rights under the law, 
foremost of which was the right to life.  
The National Right to Life Committee’s decision to prioritize the Human Life 
Amendment initiated its own controversy. Since January 1973, leaders and activists within 
the organization had been fighting over priorities and strategies. The Roman Catholic 
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hierarchy and a number of Catholic activists fought to pass a Human Life Amendment that 
established fetal personhood and outlawed abortion with no compromises. Incremental 
activists, led by Protestant leader Marjory Mecklenburg, fought to build the movement at 
state and local levels. They pursued abortion restrictions and sought to recruit non-Catholics 
to the cause. These activists wondered whether Catholics could work alongside Protestants 
and whether Catholic leaders were capable of shifting strategies away from a Human Life 
Amendment in order to do so. When the National Right to Life Committee Board voted to 
pursue a Human Life Amendment, the movement fractured. Mecklenburg and her 
incremental allies broke away to form American Citizens Concerned for Life in August 1974.  
Out of this movement division came an agreement over political strategy which 
Kansas Right to Life worked to implement. Whether Kansas Right to Life leaders favored an 
incremental or hard-line strategy, they encouraged all grassroots activists to become single-
issue anti-abortion voters. In January 1974, the National Right to Life Committee ordered 
state affiliates to use the Human Life Amendment as a campaign litmus test for all 
politicians, regardless of party affiliation. Patricia Goodson of Kansas Right to Life took the 
directive to heart. She and Kansas Right to Life pressured state politicians into coming out 
for or against the Human Life Amendment. She also used any recorded votes on abortion 
legislation to place legislators within a pro-life/anti-life binary, polarizing politicians and the 
electorate.  
By rallying single-issue anti-abortion voters, Kansas Right to Life won the 
movement's first major electoral victory in November 1974. Human Life Amendment 
supporter and Republican Senator Bob Dole defeated Democratic challenger William Roy, a 
lawyer and obstetrician-gynecologist who had performed abortions. In the election’s 
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aftermath, Roy blamed his loss on Kansas Right to Life and the small number of dedicated 
single-issue anti-abortion voters. The Dole/Roy senate race was the first to make abortion a 
central campaign issue post-Roe and paved the way for pro-life electoral campaigns to come. 
Following the Roy/Dole race, any vote on any abortion legislation would become a crucial 
test for candidates. Right to life leaders then claimed that the votes they commanded, which 
made up roughly three to eight percent of the total vote in any state, would be pivotal in close 
elections. The threat of this anti-abortion vote gave the movement its first taste of political 
clout as politicians began to respond to the movement and its demands, whether for abortion 
restrictions or a Human Life Amendment.34 
 
“Not Just a Catholic Issue”35 
 Within two weeks of the 1973 Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton decisions, Marjorie 
Mecklenburg of Minnesota Citizens for Life called Dr. Carolyn Gerster of Arizona Right to 
Life. Would Gerster, Mecklenburg asked, be willing to sit on a committee to establish a non-
sectarian National Right to Life Committee, and “meet with eight others to do the 
groundwork?”36 At the time, the National Right to Life Committee was housed under the 
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Family Life Bureau of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Because it received all 
its funds from the Roman Catholic Church, the Church dictated how to spend those funds, 
and the anti-abortion movement’s political priorities followed the Catholic money.37 After 
the passage of Roe, the two women thought it was imperative for the nation’s oldest and most 
prominent anti-abortion organization to separate from the Catholic Church. The movement, 
Gerster and Mecklenburg argued, had to show that opposition to abortion was not just a 
Catholic issue if they had any chance of making abortion illegal once again. 38  
Mecklenburg and Gerster were among the right to life movement’s most prominent 
Protestant leaders at the state level in 1973. Mecklenburg had stumbled upon the right to life 
movement six years earlier. When she walked in on the founding meeting of Minnesota 
Citizen’s for Life at her back-door neighbor’s home in St. Paul, Mecklenburg was curious 
about the commotion there. The mostly Catholic organization welcomed Marjory and her 
husband, Fred, both Methodists, with great enthusiasm. Their denominational affiliation 
helped them rise to leadership positions quickly as the Catholic members looked to them to 
dispel the anti-abortion movement’s image as being a political arm of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Fred Mecklenburg was also an obstetrician-gynecologist, and as such he was a 
doubly useful. Not only could he affirm that opposition to abortion was not confined to 
Catholics, but he could also testify as a medical expert against any legal attempts to liberalize 
or repeal the state’s criminal abortion statute. Dr. Carolyn Gerster likewise rose to 
prominence as an Episcopalian church member and cardiovascular specialist in Arizona. 
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Marjorie, whose college degree was in Home Economics, had made her name by becoming a 
self-trained expert on teenage sexuality and pregnancy. She established and ran a crisis 
pregnancy center to aid women who decided to carry an unintended pregnancy to term.39 
Marjorie Mecklenburg’s efforts to create a non-sectarian National Right to Life 
Committee pre-dated the Roe decision. In the spring of 1972, she led a number of Protestant 
and lay Catholic members of the National Right to Life Committee who agitated for the 
organization’s break from control by the Roman Catholic Church. At a Board of Directors 
meeting in December 1972, Mecklenburg and other members of Minnesota Citizens for Life 
presented a plan for the incorporation of a non-sectarian National Right to Life Committee. 
These activists wanted to re-organize in order to foster a more democratic and decentralized 
decision-making process. In the current structure, power rested in a central Executive 
Committee compromised of five Catholic men based in Washington, D.C. Instead, 
Mecklenburg proposed a federation model. State chapter affiliates would elect 
representatives to serve on a Board of Directors. The Board, in turn, would nominate the 
Executive Committee. The existing Board of Directors tentatively endorsed her plan in 
December while the all-male Catholic Executive Committee tabled the measure until it could 
be studied in more depth.40  
Ed Golden of New York led the five-member Executive Committee. Under Golden’s 
leadership, New York State Right to Life had successfully pressured the 1972 state 
legislature to repeal a 1970 law that left the decision to terminate a pregnancy to doctors and 
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their female patients. Even though Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller vetoed the bill, 
right to life activists across the country considered the turn-around of the legislature an 
unrivaled success. As a result, they referred to Golden as the “Great Architect of the New 
York Experience” and often bowed to his political expertise and leadership.41 Likening 
himself to a battlefield commander, Golden expected activists to follow his orders without 
question. His leadership of the Executive Committee ensured that the National Right to Life 
Committee would continue its Catholic affiliation and pursuit of a hard-line constitutional 
amendment.  
Accordingly, the National Right to Life Committee placed significant resources 
behind a proposed amendment to overturn the Supreme Court decisions on January 30, 1973. 
In consultation with Catholic bishops, Maryland Representative and Catholic Lawrence 
Hogan proposed a constitutional amendment to the U.S. House of Representatives eight days 
after the Roe and Doe decisions. The draft read, “Neither the United States nor any State 
shall deprive any human being, from the moment of conception, of life without due process 
of law, nor deny to any human being, from the moment of conception, within its jurisdiction, 
the equal protection of the laws.”42 The National Right to Life Committee's Executive 
Committee and their Catholic allies intended to use the organization and the Church's 
resources to back this amendment and pass it as soon as possible. One Protestant leader 
reported to Marjory Mecklenburg that one of the Catholic Executive Committee members 
asked him, “If the Catholic Church could come up with 20 million dollars and could 
guarantee they could win an amendment, would the Protestants be willing to be window 
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dressing, no rocking the boat?”43 To most Protestants and many lay Catholics in the 
movement, the answer was an emphatic no.  
In contrast, Marjorie Mecklenburg responded to Roe by making her top priority the 
establishment of a non-sectarian National Right to Life Committee. Carolyn Gerster joined 
her with leaders from Washington, Texas, Vermont, and three other states. Together they met 
with Monsignor James McHugh, the head of the National Right to Life Committee, in a 
series of meetings in the winter and spring of 1973. The first bi-weekly meeting occurred on 
February 11 at the decidedly secular Chicago O’Hare Airport. There the leaders debated a 
number of questions concerning how to make abortion illegal once again, with little to no 
input from the Church hierarchy. What was the role of fetal personhood and the proposed 
Human Life Amendment? Was the National Right to Life Committee to be single-issue 
organization or would it embrace other life-related issues? If so, what issues: capitol 
punishment? Euthanasia? Should the National Right to Life Committee take a position on 
contraception? Many Catholic activists correctly believed that Roe was the outgrowth of the 
1965 Griswald v. Connecticut decision in which the Supreme Court ruled that state 
prohibitions on contraceptive access for married couples violated their right to privacy. To 
these activists, abortion and contraception were linked to a mentality that devalued fetal life 
and undermined what they considered the primary role of sex, procreation. Other right to 
lifers believed popular forms of contraception that prevented the implantation of a fertilized 
egg were abortifacients. These contraceptives included the intrauterine device and some 
forms of the birth control pill. Marjorie Mecklenburg argued that the right to life movement 
could not ban abortion without relying on contraceptives to prevent unwanted pregnancies, or 
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to recruit non-Catholics to the movement, most of whom overwhelming favored legal birth 
control. The point for these activists was that these decisions should be theirs to make, not 
the Roman Catholic Church’s.44 
The Catholic Executive Committee disagreed. At the February 11 committee meeting 
in Chicago, Monsignor McHugh threatened to withdraw the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops' funds. The Catholic Church, he argued, would no longer support the organization if 
it strayed from the Catholic model and the Catholic hierarchy’s constitutional amendment 
establishing fetal personhood. Regardless of what the board voted, McHugh claimed, the 
National Right to Life Committee was going to use its limited resources to back the strictest 
constitutional amendment possible. The rest of the Executive Committee backed McHugh.45 
Despite this open opposition from Catholic officials, Mecklenburg convinced the majority of 
lay Catholic and Protestant members on the Board of Directors to back her federated model. 
These lay Catholic and Protestant leaders thought it necessary to separate their movement 
from the Church hierarchy, thus freeing the national organization and its state affiliates to 
vote and debate strategy without accepting the hierarchy's dictates.  
Following the February 11 meeting, the Board of Directors and Executive Committee 
of the National Right to Life Committee found themselves in direct conflict with one another. 
A New Mexico Representative later summarized the division in what he termed a “simplistic 
overview”: 
A loose confederation of Mecklenburg adherents believes that right to life 
should be a 'grassroots' type of operation – ideas fed from the various states and 
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implemented by the office in Washington. The opposing view of Golden and 
his allies is that 'authoritarian” is the best way to begin, that is, chieftains in 
Washington instructing those in the boondocks.46 
 
The conflict between Mecklenburg and Golden reached a boiling point in the spring. Fed up 
with the resistance of the Catholic Executive Committee, Mecklenburg the majority of lay 
Catholic and Protestant members of the National Right to Life Committee's Board of 
Directors threatened to leave and form their own organization if the Executive Committee 
continued to ignore the Board of Director’s wishes. Under this threat, Golden and the other 
Executive Committee members backed down. Four new Protestant members joined the 
Executive Committee, including Marjory Mecklenburg. The additions checked Golden and 
the other members’ authoritarian influence. The interim Executive Committee set the first 
Board of Directors meeting of the non-sectarian National Right to Life Committee, Inc. to 
coincide with the National Right to Life Convention in Detroit on June 8, 1973. There the 
details over incorporation would be hammered out and the board would adopt a charter.47 
 
“Defining the commencement of personhood can be a difficult problem”48 
The Catholic Church hierarchy’s and hard line activists' attempts to prioritize a fetal 
personhood amendment revealed a second set of competing beliefs within the movement, and 
these competing beliefs intensified the strategy divisions between hardliners and 
incrementalists. As many scholars have noted, a right to life activist's religious affiliation 
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informed his or her attitudes about fetal personhood and abortion restrictions.49 The Catholic 
hierarchy and many hardliners favored amendments that declared that a fetus was a person 
from the moment of conception, when the sperm fertilized the egg.  
This equation of biological fetal life with actual human life was a relatively new 
Catholic tenet, even if opposition to abortion was not. Since the first centuries after Jesus 
Christ’s death, Catholic theologians had held that the physical body and biological life were 
separate from the soul and spiritual life. This belief in spiritual and physical separation was 
and is pivotal to the Catholic understanding of Christ’s dual divinity and humanity. Because 
the body and soul are separate, Catholic theology held that at some unknown point in time 
during a pregnancy a soul entered into the physical body of a fetus to generate a human 
being. Ensoulment thus marked the boundaries of personhood and governed the Church’s 
approach to abortion. For instance, in the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas believed that 
ensoulment occurred during quickening, when a woman could first detect fetal movement. 
Terminating a pregnancy prior to quickening was acceptable to Thomas Aquinas because the 
fetus lacked a soul and therefore was not a human being. Pope Sixtus V embraced Aquinas’ 
position concerning quickening and abortion restrictions in 1588. In the papal bull, 
Effraenatam, Sixtus V ruled that the Catholic Church should excommunicate any woman 
who had an abortion after quickening. The bull, however, did not gain acceptance by 
contemporary theologians, and the succeeding pope, Gregory XII, repealed it two years 
later.50 
Two theological doctrines informed the Catholic shift to embracing fetal personhood 
from the moment conception and the Church’s characterization of abortion as homicide. In 
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1701, Pope Clement XI declared the immaculate conception of Jesus a holy feast. In 1854, 
Pius IX ruled that Jesus’ mother Mary was without sin from the moment of her conception. 
The church now celebrated the conception of Jesus and Mary as the beginning of their lives 
and ministry on earth rather than their birthdays. Both doctrines thus underlined the belief 
that personhood began at conception by moving up the potential time of ensoulment. The 
scientific discovery of fertilization in the late nineteenth century seemed to provide support 
for this emerging Catholic belief. As scientific understanding of pregnancy evolved and the 
fetus emerged as a subject of study and debate, Catholic belief on abortion likewise shifted. 
In the 1869 papal enactment, Apostolicace sedis, Pope Pius IX abandoned the Church’s use 
of quickening as a marker of ensoulment and laid the foundations to consider any termination 
of a pregnancy as murder.51 In the 1960s, the Second Vatican Council classed abortion with 
infanticide as “abominable crimes.”52  
Today, the Catholic Church continues to hold to the separation of biological and 
spiritual life. Because the time of ensoulment is a mystery that only God can know, however, 
the Catholic Church has chosen to protect biological life at every stage. Better to err on the 
side of safety and protect all fetuses, the Catholic hierarchy claims, than to risk terminating a 
fetus with a soul. While this continues to be the official position of the Catholic Church, 
increasing numbers of priests, theologians and lay Catholics have blurred the separation 
between body and spirit when discussing fetal personhood, due in large part to the politics of 
abortion and birth control and recent scientific developments. Many right to life activists hold 
that the discovery of DNA in 1953 and the complete mapping of the genetic code in 2003 
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prove that all the traits that make a distinct individual human being are present from the 
moment of conception. What Catholic theologians in the past had claimed was a mystery – 
the time of ensoulment – has been and is becoming more of a certainty in Catholic belief: 
personhood begins when biological life begins.  
For activists who truly believed that a fetus was a person from the moment of 
conception, abortion was murder, and no exceptions or compromises were possible. As 
Catholic Archbishop Dyer of North Carolina wrote, “Abortion is killing, naked and 
bloody.”53 These activists favored the most restrictive amendment versions that allowed 
abortion only if a pregnancy threatened a woman’s life. To them, abortion in such 
circumstances constituted self-defense; and then a small number of activists thought that 
even it was unacceptable. 
 Mormons, unlike Catholics, were in the midst of theological debates surrounding 
personhood and ensoulment when the Supreme Court released Roe v. Wade. In the nineteenth 
century, Church of Latter Day Saints founder Joseph Smith placed ensoulment at quickening 
just as Thomas Aquinas had done seven hundred years earlier, but in the 1950s Mormon 
theologians argued for birth as the marker of personhood. Whatever Mormon leaders’ 
position on ensoulment and fetal personhood, most did not equate abortion with murder. 
Their arguments against it therefore did not pack the same emotional power as Catholic 
arguments did.54 
Historically, most Protestants lacked the foregoing theological grounds for opposition 
to abortion. Few Protestants defined fetuses as persons who should be protected from the 
moment of conception. Their approach to abortion was based on questions of sexuality, 
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women’s welfare, and parenting and in the 1960s and 1970s, Protestant denominations’ 
positions on abortion varied. Liberal Protestant denominations had been at the forefront of 
efforts to legalize abortion in the 1960s and 1970s. They included the United Church of 
Christ and the United Methodist Church as well as other religious groups such as the 
American Jewish Congress and the Unitarian Universalist Association. Only one Protestant 
denomination joined the Catholic Church in opposing abortion prior to Roe: in 1971, the 
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod issued a statement that abortion violated God’s will, but its 
opposition was not based on fetal personhood. At the time of Roe, most conservative 
Protestant denominations expressed tentative support for legal abortion access and the 
Supreme Court decisions. The men and women who made up these denominations’ 
governing bodies wanted abortion to be available to women in the exceptional cases of rape, 
incest, fetal deformity, and threats to maternal health. Post Roe, some of these Protestant 
leaders began to criticize “abortion on demand,” an anti-abortion term to describe legal 
abortion access. For instance, the president of the Southern Baptist Convention criticized the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the summer of 1973 because the decisions placed no limits on 
abortion in the first three months of pregnancy. Unlike many Catholics who held an 
uncompromising hard line on abortion, the Southern Baptist Convention President continued 
to advocate for abortion access in exceptional cases.  
Fundamentalists, Southern Baptists and Christian evangelicals came to more actively 
oppose legal abortion in the mid-to-late1970s. When more single women and younger 
women sought abortions than older married women, Protestants linked the medical procedure 
to sexual promiscuity. Women, they claimed, were using abortion as a form of birth control 
and treating sex, their bodies, and fetal life callously. To them, restricting abortion access 
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was a way to regulate sexual behavior and to promote respect for marriage, family and fetal 
life.55  
Not all Catholic right to life activists shared the Church’s beliefs on abortion and fetal 
personhood, either. A significant number of lay Catholic lawyers and physicians in the 
movement questioned the Church’s preferred amendment alongside Protestant leaders.  
Catholic professionals and Protestants who favored the incremental approach understood that 
the Catholic definition of personhood was just one of many beliefs in a pluralistic American 
society. These leaders questioned the biological moment that defined the start of personhood. 
Why fertilization? they asked. Medical technology at the time could not detect signs of fetal 
life until approximately four to six weeks after conception. While the possibility existed, it 
was not likely that medical technology would ever be able to determine pregnancy until a 
fertilized egg implanted into the uterine lining, seven to ten days after fertilization. To 
enforce a criminal abortion statute, incrementalists pointed out, a court would need to 
establish that a pregnancy existed in the first place. Protecting a fetus from the moment of 
conception would have no impact on the enforcement of criminal abortion statutes because 
no one could determine the existence of fetal life until after implantation. By insisting on 
fetal personhood at conception, hard line activists seemed to be intentionally seeking 
restrictions against contraceptives at the expense of pursuing criminal abortion statutes. They 
were also reviving an earlier political battle over contraception that the Catholic Church had 
lost: the Griswald v. Connecticut decision of 1965 and Baird v. Eisenstadt decision of 1972 
ruled that state bans on contraceptives, whether for married or unmarried people, were 
unconstitutional.  
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Incremental leaders, moreover, believed that an amendment that protected fetuses 
from the time of conception rather than implantation could not pass in Congress. Judy Fink, 
the wife of an independent Baptist minister from Philadelphia and a member of the Executive 
Committee with Marjorie Mecklenburg, wrote: 
If the 'contraception opposition' trap is sprung on us, it will undoubtedly count 
out the participation of 12 million Southern Baptists in the nation, the 8 million 
American Baptists; the huge (and uncounted) rapidly growing Independent, 
Fundamentalists and Pentecostal Protestant groups, the 11 million Methodists, 
the 8 million Presbyterians; untold numbers of Catholics; and need I go on?57 
 
If the amendment by some miracle passed Congress, Catholic and Protestant incremental 
activists charged, the American people would not ratify it. For the right to life movement to 
succeed, these leaders believed, it must abandon any efforts that would make birth control 
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illegal. 
These debates over fetal personhood and contraceptive access almost tore apart the 
National Right to Life Committee before it formally incorporated as a non-profit 
organization. Between April and May 1973, the state affiliates of the National Right to Life 
Committee elected new representatives to the Board of Directors. In Pennsylvania, Randy 
Engel challenged Judy Fink. Engel was a devout Roman Catholic housewife who 
championed fetal personhood from the moment of conception. She was also the president of 
the newly formed U.S. Coalition for Life, an organization that not only lobbied for a 
constitutional amendment but also against all contraception access. In a statewide election 
that tallied the votes of members of competing Pennsylvania anti-abortion organizations, 
Fink edged out Engel for the Board of Director's position. However, Engel refused to 
concede the election. She showed up at the first meeting of the Board of Directors on June 8, 
1973, claiming she was the true board member from Pennsylvania. She then presented 
evidence of election corruption and voter fraud to challenge Fink for her position. Her 
challenge was the first issue on the Board of Director's agenda.58   
 Thanks to Engel, the National Right to Life Committee’s Board found itself fighting 
over the definition of life and fetal personhood and how those definitions related to 
contraception access and the role of Protestants in the movement. It was an irony not lost 
upon leaders that they were fighting over a truth most of them claimed was self evident to the 
general American public: the moment when a fetus became a person. Because they could not 
reach a consensus, they could not resolve who should be Pennsylvania's board member. In 
the early hours of Saturday June 9, board members reached a compromise that pleased few 
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leaders but allowed the organization to function. Fink retained her position as Pennsylvania's 
representative, while the Board created four new Board of Directors at-large positions, most 
going to hard line national leaders such as Engel. The new positions helped give these leaders 
more power on a board that had been favoring Mecklenburg's incremental approach 
throughout the spring. The Board then voted not to take a position on contraception in order 
to get to what many considered the meat of the agenda, adopting a version of the 
constitutional amendment the movement could rally around, and the elections of a new 
Executive Committee. 
 Tensions continued to run high around fetal personhood, birth control and the role of 
Protestants in the movement. Monsignor James McHugh, who had led the National Right to 
Life Committee, stopped Marjorie Mecklenburg in a hallway during the convention. Furious 
at her work to separate the organization from the Catholic Church, he cursed her out. On 
Saturday, heated debates broke out when Mecklenburg and her allies attempted to pass a 
Board of Director's resolution endorsing a constitutional amendment that did not reference 
fertilization or conception as the start of personhood. Patricia Goodson of Kansas, one of the 
most vocal hardliners on the board, gave up her seat at a late night Saturday meeting so that a 
non-board member could represent her in proxy. She ran out of the board meeting in search 
of John Short, a professional lobbyist for Human Life Lobby and one of the most articulate 
supporters of an amendment establishing personhood at conception. She found him leaving a 
late night Catholic mass, and together they rushed back to the board meeting to stop the vote 
on endorsing the constitutional amendment. Short gave an impassioned three-minute speech 
that brought the board to a unanimous vote in favor of an amendment that protected life 
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“from fertilization and at every stage of their biological development thereafter."59 
Reflecting on the June convention, Goodson later wrote, “I am positively amazed that 
anyone would expect to resolve a dilemma such as this – where such total disagreement 
exists – by presenting one end of a complete polarity as a solution. There is no 
compromise.”60 While the board endorsed defining fetal personhood at conception, it could 
not reach an agreement on the exact wording of a constitutional amendment. There was too 
much contention over the implications of such an amendment on contraception access, 
American law, medicine, and science as well as doubts about the probability of such an 
amendment passing in contemporary American society. Instead, the Board set up two sub-
committees, a legal advisory committee and a policy committee, that together would reach a 
consensus on the best wording of an amendment and a strategy on how to pass it. The 
National Right to Life Committee Board then planned to endorse the subcommittee's 
resolutions at a later date.   
 Marjorie Mecklenburg then challenged her hard line rival, Ed Golden of New York, 
for the presidency of the National Right to Life Committee. Mecklenburg compromised her 
bid for the presidency by admitting to the board that she did not oppose intrauterine devices 
that prevented the implantation of a fertilized egg. Golden announced his unequivocal 
opposition to IUDs as a form of “early abortion.” The election was still close. With the 
addition of the three at-large votes, Golden won the presidential election by a vote of 22 to 
18, solidifying the National Right to Life Committee’s Catholic orientation. The Board of 
Directors, however, balanced this hard line position by electing Mecklenburg chairman and 
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approving her democratic committee system over Golden’s centralized model. The new 
Executive Committee consisted of three Catholics loyal to Golden, three Protestants loyal to 
Mecklenburg, and two Protestant and Catholic members independent of the Golden/hard line 
and Mecklenburg/incremental divide. 
  
“Radically varying philosophies”61 
Mecklenburg grew even more convinced that her strategy of focusing on the 
grassroots and recruit Protestant churches was better than Golden's approach when 
Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life's Vice President, David O'Steen, Jr. shared a report 
about right to life mobilization in North Carolina. In August 1973, O’Steen visited his 
parents in Greensboro, North Carolina for his annual vacation. When O'Steen discovered 
there was no right to life organization in North Carolina, he started one. Five friends of 
O’Steen and his parents met in Greensboro to establish North Carolina Right to Life, Inc and 
nominated David's mother, Emma O'Steen, president. Emma O'Steen later recalled that she 
grew interested in the movement “when I discovered to my dismay that many of my friends 
and acquaintances not only were undisturbed by abortion-on-demand but that most of them 
agreed with the Supreme Court decision.” A graduate of University of North Carolina 
Greensboro, Mrs. O'Steen was a junior high school language and social science teacher. 
Active in the Presbyterian Church, she had three sons; David was her oldest, and a college 
math professor in Minnesota. The O’Steens understood that North Carolina would not 
become an anti-abortion state without targeting “a wide spectrum of religious denominations 
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including Baptist, Methodist, Catholic, Episcopalian, Mormon, Greek Orthodox and non-
denomination Christian.”62 David O’Steen Sr. asked Jesse Helms, a freshmen senator from 
North Carolina and devout Southern Baptist, to join the executive board of North Carolina 
Right to Life. At the time, Helms had already made a name for himself as a champion of the 
right to life movement. He had backed the Human Life Amendment and was working to cut 
U.S. Aid funds that supported abortion services in foreign countries. Helms agreed to serve 
on North Carolina Right to Life’s Executive Board. The O’Steens’ plans to mobilize 
conservative Protestants in the state were of particular interest to Helms.63 North Carolina 
joined a series of newly organized states in the south and west in the summer and early fall of 
1973, including South Carolina, Mississippi, Nevada, Idaho and Alaska.64  
During his vacation, David O’Steen Jr. also learned that North Carolina was a 
different kind of state than others in the country. Roman Catholics constituted only three 
percent of the state's population, the smallest proportionate Catholic population in the 
country at the time. To win in North Carolina and other states in the Southeast, he claimed, 
national leaders had to take Protestants seriously.65 Mecklenburg and her allies agreed and 
used O’Steens report and the North Carolina example to further their arguments for their 
incremental strategy. O'Steen's report also coincided with the efforts of National Right to 
Life's Intergroup Liaison subcommittee. Run by Judy Fink and her husband, along with 
Robert Holbrook, a prominent Southern Baptist minister from Texas, the committee explored 
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how to expand the movement within non-Catholic circles.66  The sub-committee's first 
priority was to create a "program of building bridges to certain Protestant religious groups."67 
The Executive Committee of the National Right to Life Committee gave the sub-committee 
$2,000 to develop a report that included recommendations by the end of 1973.68  
Throughout the summer and fall of 1973, a growing number of Protestant leaders of 
the National Right to Life Committee believed that efforts to recruit Protestants and build 
local chapters should take priority over efforts to pass a constitutional amendment. They 
were not alone. Dr. Jack Wilke, a physician and one of the independent votes on the 
Executive Committee, was the only Catholic member of the Intergroup Liaison Committee. 
One of the movement's foremost educators, Wilke championed incremental efforts to recruit 
more people and to reach out to non-Catholics even as he paid close attention to other 
subcommittee's efforts to draft a constitutional amendment. In 1973 at his education talks 
across the country, he passed out bumper stickers stating, “We're Protestant: Protesting 
Abortion.”69 
These incremental initiatives exacerbated the tensions between Ed Golden and 
Marjory Mecklenburg in the summer and fall of 1973.  During an Executive Committee 
phone conference in July, Golden cursed at Mecklenburg and then hung up in an attempt to 
prevent the board from appointing an executive director he opposed and Mecklenburg 
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favored. Golden also countered board-approved efforts to set up a series of national 
committees to divide the work between state leaders. In August, Mecklenburg wrote,  
It is not clear to me whether radically varying philosophies – one based on 
control, certainty, conservatism and desire for uniformity, and another which is 
more free wheeling, based on openness, involvement of all comers and 
encouragement of individual initiatives – can co-exist in the leadership of an 
organization.70  
 
Mecklenburg and other Protestants once again found themselves at an impasse with Ed 
Golden and his Catholic allies on the National Right to Life Committee Executive 
Committee.  
 At the same time, Mecklenburg and Judy Fink began to think that what they had 
perceived as the Catholic-Protestant philosophical divide over strategy failed to completely 
explain the animosity among the Executive Committee members. Ed Golden and his male 
allies were not just Catholics, but conservative men backed by a centuries-old patriarchy and 
hierarchy. Fink and Mecklenburg chaffed under his presidency. Mecklenburg charged, 
“Leaders are facilitators in a movement, not careful controllers. A successful leader has 
enough strength . . . to not be threatened.” In turn, Golden expressed outrage that 
Mecklenburg “pushed on him” a “democratic type of grassroots approach” and a system in 
which “Every time you want to cough, you have to get committee concurrence.”71 In another 
letter to her Protestant supporters, Mecklenburg asked, “Is a conservative Catholic male a 
desirable image of [the National Right to Life Committee]?”72  
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Mecklenburg’s charges against Ed Golden also pointed to misogynistic tendencies in 
National Right to Life Committee chapter affiliates across the country. At all levels, it 
seemed to her, Catholic male leaders expressed a general lack of concern, awareness, and 
sensitivity to female activists and their positions in the movement. In Massachusetts, Catholic 
men and priests dominated Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s Board of Directors, often to the 
increasing frustration of the women who did a large amount of the work.73 When Claire 
Smith resigned from that board in 1975, she cited troubles with the other Catholic male 
leaders. "I do not believe that an authoritarian type of leadership is what the cause needs to 
strengthen itself for the tough days ahead."74 Smith's charges echoed Marjorie Mecklenburg's 
earlier criticisms of Ed Golden.  
Mecklenburg and Fink began to confront Catholic men about the lack of female 
leaders in the National Right to Life Committee. In July 1973, Judy Fink sent a memo to the 
National Right to Life Committee Board that questioned recent sub-committee appointments. 
The fact that no women served on the policy sub-committee disturbed her. Fink wrote, “I feel 
that properly-credentialed women do exist that could serve on this Committee” and 
questioned “whether [the policy committee was] constituted with a fair cross-section of 
prolife mainstream thought.”75 Fink then pointed out that the policy committee also lacked a 
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Protestant or Jew. In the same memo, Fink noted that only one woman sat on the legal 
advisory sub-committee for the organization. The Board had charged both sub-committees to 
work together to write a constitutional amendment the National Right to Life Committee 
could sponsor, making them the most powerful committees of the organization. According to 
Fink, appointing only one woman to the committees was unacceptable. 
Fink and Mecklenburg were not the only ones to notice the gender disparity in 
leadership. Catholic men made sure to publicize the leadership of Protestant women to 
deflect criticism of what some Americans and the press considered an anti-woman social 
movement. Press releases following the June National Right to Life Convention hailed the 
role of women in the movement. Most coverage focused on the fact that five Protestant 
women held the six top offices of the National Right to Life Committee.76 Some journalists 
went so far as to refer to the National Right to Life Committee as a woman’s movement. It 
rankled Fink and other female national anti-abortion leaders that Catholic men made sure to 
publicize their leadership roles to the press, but often failed to acknowledge the women's 
authority as actual leaders. Fink, Mecklenburg and other women activists did not wish to be 
tokens that appeared at publicity events with a few well-rehearsed lines. The women fought 
to become truly powerful in the movement. 
Mildred Jefferson 
One of the key national Executive Committee members Mecklenburg and Fink 
sought as an ally was Dr. Mildred Jefferson. The daughter of an American Methodist and 
Episcopalian minister and teacher in rural Texas, Jefferson was the first black woman to 
graduate from Harvard Medical School. Like Mecklenburg, she rose quickly in the right to 
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life ranks. Dr. Joseph Stanton recruited her to the Value of Life Committee in 1970. Prior to 
that, Jefferson was not particularly concerned about abortion. Newly married at forty-six to a 
real estate broker, she was enjoying her faculty position in General Surgery at Boston 
University School of Medicine and skiing with her husband on the weekends.77 After facing 
discrimination in medical school and completing three general residencies before obtaining 
her medical license, Jefferson was ready to enjoy the rewards of her hard work. Then Roe 
happened and changed everything for her. She rearranged her life to make the anti-abortion 
movement her priority.78  
In the months following the Roe decision, Dr. Jefferson gave a number of speeches in 
Boston and the surrounding areas defending fetal life. Described as “at once tender and 
unyielding,” she captivated audiences with her wit and grace. Right to life activists 
acknowledged her as the best extemporaneous speaker in the movement because she could 
“exhort for an hour without notes.”79 Her very presence spoke volumes to an audience. As a 
black Protestant woman, Jefferson defied the stereotypes of a white male Catholic right to 
life movement. At the same time, she fit within the right to life movement despite the marked 
difference of her race and gender. She also made herself highly acceptable to the movement 
by dressing and acting the part of a conservative lady, wearing gloves, hats, suits and 
carefully-coifed hairstyles that complemented her petite frame. Jefferson attributed her dress 
and manners to her conservative upbringing in Depression era rural Texas, and in particular 
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to her mother, who was a stickler about such things. Her demeanor and charm helped put 
white audiences at ease. Jefferson also had a mischievous streak that right to life activists 
loved. Like any accomplished Southern lady, she could say the most awful things about an 
opponent in a sweet voice and with a smile on her face.80  
In June 1973 Jefferson gave the opening address at the National RTL Convention. 
Characteristically outspoken and witty, she told the audience, “Abortion-promotion in this 
country proves that a good sales campaign can sell the shoddiest product. With consumerism 
rampant everywhere in the marketplace, many put more critical thought into buying a box of 
detergent or tube of false-eyelash glue than into buying the death of an unborn baby.”81 
Following her address, the fifty-five member National Right to Life Committee Board 
elected her Vice Chairman, the third most powerful position in the organization. Having 
missed too many workdays for speaking engagements, Jefferson refused to become a voting 
member of the Executive Committee; she could not miss any more work to attend mandatory 
Executive Committee meetings in Washington D.C. without endangering her livelihood. 
Despite her decision, Jefferson still struggled to balance her career and right to life activism 
as demand for her at speaking and fundraising events increased in the summer and fall of 
1973.  
In late October, Jefferson delivered the keynote address at the largest right to life 
protest in 1973. Organized by Missouri Citizens for Life, the gathering drew attention to an 
analogy that was becoming popular in right to life circles comparing abortion and slavery. 
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According to this analogy, just as the Supreme Court ruled that enslaved blacks were not 
persons under the law in Dred Scott v. Sanford, it also ruled that fetuses were not persons 
under the law in Roe. The National Right to Life Committee passed a resolution at the June 
convention citing the Dred Scott case as the only legal precedent for the Roe decision. It was 
one of the few resolutions about which there was no debate.82 An estimated thirty thousand 
activists gathered to hear Jefferson speak at the footsteps of the St. Louis Courthouse, the 
location of the original Scott hearings on the anniversary of the decision. Activists 
appreciated the symbolic choice of the location, date and speaker. As a descendant of slaves, 
Jefferson was a tangible, physical link between the injustice of slavery and what activists 
considered the new injustice of legal abortion. Jefferson also understood that her physical 
being and heritage framed and positioned her with special authority to launch the slavery -
abortion analogy and gave her a degree of legitimacy within the movement that other 
national leaders lacked. At the same time, her race marked her as an “other” in a 
predominantly white movement, something against which Jefferson struggled.  
A combination of intersecting traits further complicated Jefferson’s position in the 
right to life movement and her relationships with other activists. Unlike the majority of 
female right to life activists, Jefferson had a successful career and had garnered important 
professional accolades. Though married, she had no children, which made it difficult for her 
to relate well to those whose activism and authority often stemmed from their domestic roles 
as mothers and caretakers.83 Moreover, as an AME Church member, Jefferson did not share 
the same religious traditions, practices and beliefs as Catholics or even white Protestants. 
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While acknowledging that she was an outstanding speaker and organizer in her own right, 
some white activists also believed she rose to national leadership so quickly because she was 
a black Protestant woman.  
Mecklenburg and Fink saw a natural ally in Jefferson, who like them, was a woman 
and a Protestant. Jefferson, however, refused Mecklenburg’s overtures. She wanted to be a 
leader in her own right in the national movement and objected when other activists called her 
a follower of Mecklenburg. In an astute power move, Jefferson became one of the two 
Executive Committee members who refused to side with Mecklenburg or Golden. She 
believed in Mecklenburg’s incremental style but backed a hard line constitutional 
amendment, matching the board’s June goals. She wrote, “It is my firm belief that only a 
strong, effective, democratically-structured, broad-based organization will have the appeal 
that can reach the uncommitted public and mobilize its support to save the unborn.”84 
Because of this stance, Jefferson often sided with Mecklenburg during Executive Committee 
meetings but maintained her independence. Jefferson also began to eye the presidency of the 
National Right to Life Committee. Unlike Mecklenburg and Fink, who had begun to criticize 
Roman Catholic Bishops and male activists, Jefferson praised the work of the Catholic 
Church in her speeches and correspondence. She understood that she could not function from 
her base of power without the support of the Catholics who dominated Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life’s executive board. She saved her criticism for Mecklenburg and Golden, 
whose infighting in the fall of 1973 had become embarrassing and infuriating to a large 
number of grassroots activists. She reprimanded the two national leaders to “keep the issue, 
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not personalities, on the table.”85  
 
“The Constitutional Amendment and the National Right to Life Committee” 86  
 By January 1974, the National Right to Life Committee’s Board of Directors had 
grown tired of what Massachusetts leader Joseph Stanton described as the “continuous 
cacophony of bickering” between Golden and Mecklenburg.87 Instead of using precious 
funds to lobby for federal anti-abortion legislation, Mecklenburg and Golden squandered 
resources on mailings discrediting each other’s leadership. In protest, many states refused to 
send promised funds to the national office and the organization was in dire financial straits.88 
In response to these criticisms, the antagonists prepared to put their leadership up for a vote 
at a January 1974 Board of Directors meeting. The board backed Golden. It also embraced 
Golden’s central control model in order to push a constitutional amendment through 
Congress, prioritizing the amendment strategy over the work of Judy Fink, Robert Holbrook 
and Mecklenburg on Protestant recruitment. Robert Greene, the acting executive director and 
a Protestant lawyer from Kentucky loyal to Mecklenburg, resigned. He criticized the strategy 
to pursue an amendment because it focused the full resources of the organization on a 
political campaign with a weak foundation. “I have never believed that a Human Life 
Amendment standing alone would solve all the problems,” wrote Greene. “I do not believe 
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that it can be obtained quickly.”89 Mecklenburg and Fink agreed to stay on, setting their eyes 
on the upcoming June convention and Executive Committee elections where they hoped to 
regain power. Board members returned to their states with a single goal: passage of any 
constitutional amendment granting the rights of personhood to fetuses.  
As part of the National Right to Life Committee’s strategy, activists used sponsorship 
of a constitutional amendment as a deciding test for campaign endorsements in the upcoming 
1974 elections. A National Right to Life Committee memo instructed activists to study a 
candidate’s “voting record, his committees, his source of campaign funds, his basis of 
political support, his family, his constituency, his district and anything else that will give us 
an advantage in influencing his vote.”90 From Washington, D.C. Golden organized state and 
local activists into electoral districts. To pressure national politicians, he urged the creation of 
new chapters in key districts during the upcoming elections.  
Patricia Goodson and Kansas Right to Life followed Golden and the Washington 
D.C. office’s instructions to the letter. They placed Republican Senator Robert J. Dole at the 
top of a national list of vulnerable politicians. At the time, Dole was a freshmen senator and a 
rising star in the Republican Party. However, when the Washington Post broke the Watergate 
scandal in spring 1973, his star began to dim. As the public became more dubious about 
Nixon’s actions in 1974, they began to associate Dole with Nixon’s illegal activities. How 
much did he know as the head of the GOP in 1972? Dole’s re-election, which had seemed a 
certainty in 1973, was now in jeopardy. Kansas Right to Life saw an opportunity and took it. 
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Dole could be the first prominent state Republican to convert to the anti-abortion cause. To 
win Dole they threatened him: either he could endorse a Human Life Amendment and gain 
their support, or they would work against him in his re-election bid.  
Dole responded to the Kansas Right to Life’s ultimatum by stalling. To ease pressure 
from right to life activists, he wrote to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
urging hearings on the proposed anti-abortion amendments in February 1974. He then used 
the possibility of the hearings as an excuse to not declare his position on abortion to his 
constituents.91 While Dole awaited the announcement of the Senate committee’s decision 
about any judiciary hearings, he and his staff calculated the political advantages and 
disadvantages of supporting a fetal personhood amendment.  
At the time, most Kansans supported the Roe v. Wade decision. In a poll of Dole’s 
constituents in October 1973, he found that fifty-four percent of respondents believed 
abortion should be permitted “based on a medical decision reached between a woman and her 
doctor” while twenty-one percent responded that abortion should be allowed “upon demand.” 
Only twenty-five percent favored Kansas Right to Life’s position to protect fetal personhood. 
Of that twenty-five percent, five percent responded that the state should “never” allow 
abortions while twenty percent believed that the state should permit abortion “only to save 
the life of the mother.”92 Dole and his campaign staff weighed the October poll results 
against the support of sixty-four dedicated anti-abortion activists who wrote the office 
routinely and for whom Dole’s staff had created a special anti-abortion mailing list.93  
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Democrats and Republicans of all stripes faced similar pressure from grassroots right 
to life activists across the country following the January National Right to Life Committee 
Board Meeting. In February 1974, Senator Birch Bayh, the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, announced hearings on the proposed anti-abortion amendments on March 6 and 
7. The National Right to Life Committee’s lobbying efforts and the announcement of the 
hearings thrilled all right to life activists for two reasons: first, the hearings were the initial 
step toward passing a constitutional amendment; second, many politicians had set the 
hearings as a tentative deadline for declaring their positions on abortion. Activists, whatever 
their strategic preferences, needed to know politicians’ abortion positions for use in the 
upcoming 1974 elections In February 1973 Mecklenburg had written, “We must arouse and 
educate the public on pro-life issues and then polarize and mobilize enough people to enable 
us to wield political power sufficient to make ours a country in which human life is again 
revered and protected.” In order to do this, she suggested activists work for the “passage of 
memorializations to Congress, ancillary pro-life legislation at state and federal levels, 
election of pro-life candidates and defeat of other candidates who do not share our views.”94 
Right to Life celebrations over the upcoming hearings did not last long. On March 7, 
four Catholic cardinals testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the proposed 
constitutional amendments. Never had so many Roman Catholic Church officials of such 
high rank appeared before the U.S. Congress. Dressed in their bright red regiments, the 
cardinals presented a unified front. They not only opposed abortion in all cases, but also 
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opposed any amendment that failed to protect fetal personhood from conception. The 
Catholic Cardinals created a media bonanza. The New York Times reported, “4 Cardinals 
Urge U.S. Abortion Ban” while The Washington Post ran “Senators Hear 4 Cardinals Argue 
for Strict Abortion Ban.”95  
Mecklenburg and Fink were furious. Fink told a Washington Post reporter that “The 
overbearing and separatists attitudes of the Catholic hierarchy can only serve the purpose of 
abortion groups who want to prove once and for all that abortion is truly a Catholic issue.”96 
Warren Schaller, a Protestant National Right to Life Committee staff member in Washington, 
D.C. wrote, “If I might use an analogy from the game of chess, in their opening gambit, [pro-
abortionists] ‘captured’ four Cardinals.” The Cardinals, Schaller argued, proved the abortion 
rights argument “that abortion is a religious, and especially a Roman Catholic issue.”97  
Adding salt to Schaller’s wound, the press rarely mentioned the testimony of the four leading 
Protestant theologians who he, Mecklenburg, and Fink recruited for the hearings. Instead, the 
press reported on the reaction of the American Baptist Churches, USA and its 1.5 million 
members. Leaders of that church released a letter charging the Catholic cardinals with 
seeking “laws which violate the theological and moral sensitivities, and hence the freedom of 
other church bodies.”98 Many Catholic right to lifers agreed with Fink and Schaller’s 
criticism and acknowledged that the Catholic Cardinals’ testimony hurt efforts to pass a 
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constitutional amendment. The National Right to Life News reported that, “it should have 
become clear that pro-life activities are not dictated by a Catholic autocracy.”99 Still, these 
Catholic activists expressed dismay when Fink, Mecklenburg and Schaller attacked the 
Catholic hierarchy outright in national newspapers and aired what many considered the 
movement's dirty laundry. 
Tensions between Golden and Mecklenburg only escalated in the aftermath of the 
March senate hearings. Golden refused to consult Mecklenburg and her Protestant allies on 
the Executive Committee for any decisions. He consolidated his power base at the national 
level, determined to oust Mecklenburg and her followers in June.100 Randy Engel, female 
leader of U.S. Coalition for Life who had challenged Judy Fink in 1973, aided Golden in his 
efforts. In March, she attacked Mecklenburg in a memo to all members of the National Right 
to Life Committee Board of Directors. “By using her Protestantism as a battering ram to hit 
Catholics over the head and cow them into silence lest they be labeled ‘anti-Protestant’ or 
‘radical conservative Catholic’,” she charged, “[Mecklenburg] has successfully muzzled 
some of her opponents.” According to Engel, Mecklenburg's attacks were even more 
effective because she was “a Protestant (and a woman to boot).” Engel then articulated the 
feelings of many Catholics in the movement: “The business of attempting to LABEL people 
either by sex or by religion or political persuasion has had a very bad effect on the National 
Right to Life Committee morale by creating an artificial division where no division should 
exist.” For Engel and Catholics of her persuasion, Mecklenburg’s recognition of a diverse 
right to life movement was detrimental to the cause. Instead, Engel argued, “all that should 
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matter is that a person is pro-life in deed as well as word.”  Mecklenburg's support of birth 
control, according to Engel, disqualified her from being truly pro-life. Mecklenburg, Engel 
wrote, “share[d] her husband's sentiments although she [was] somewhat more discreet in 
conveying the Sangerite message which she knows most pro-life people find repulsive.”101 
Mecklenburg too began to rally her base. Responding to Engel’s memo, she shot 
back, “I do not consider my husband or myself or the countless others who share our views 
as second class members of the movement.” She reiterated what she and her Protestant allies 
had argued since Roe v. Wade. “People like us are necessary to attract the mainstream of 
America to [the right to life] position.” Emma O’Steen, the president of North Carolina Right 
to Life, encouraged Mecklenburg, advising her “not to be discouraged by the few destructive 
elements within National Right to Life Committee and continue capable leadership for the 
organization.” “You have our prayers and wishes,” she concluded in an April 1974 letter.102   
Further adding to pro-lifer’s woes, Senator Bayh announced in May that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearings on the anti-abortion constitutional amendments would 
continue throughout the year. Bayh told a Washington Post reporter, “This is probably the 
most volatile issue in American politics – or it will be before it’s over.” For that reason, he 
argued “A lot of my colleagues don’t want it to come to a vote before November.” 103 Bayh 
delayed the next round of Judiciary Committee hearings until August, after most state’s 
primaries. He then scheduled the final hearings after the general election in November. The 
delayed hearings frustrated right to life activists’ strategies in three ways: there would be no 
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major Senate floor vote on abortion prior to the election; the lack of a floor vote ensured a 
number of politicians would not take a position on abortion; and abortion would not be a 
major issue in most if not all the upcoming electoral campaigns.  
Bayh’s decision to delay hearings also created difficulties as the National Right to 
Life Committee’s June 1974 convention and Executive Committee elections approached. The 
strategy of pushing through a constitutional amendment had not succeeded or failed. Instead, 
it had experienced a serious setback that had only intensified the debate over strategy. Should 
the movement continue to direct most of its resources to establish fetal personhood, or 
allocate more resources to restrict abortion access and build the movement? Mecklenburg 
and her allies squared off against Golden and his allies. This time, both leaders argued that 
compromise between the opposing sides was not possible. Either the National Right to Life 
Committee was a grassroots organization dedicated to an incremental and accommodating 
approach, or a centralized and authoritarian one pursuing a constitutional amendment. One 
camp had to win or lose at the convention.  
Mecklenburg and her incremental allies lost. While Golden did not maintain the 
presidency, Ken Van Derhoef, one of his conservative Catholic allies from Washington State, 
won. The Board of Directors chose working for an amendment in large part due to the 
ongoing Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. Many board members concluded that after 
putting so many resources into the amendment campaign, it should remain the National Right 
to Life Committee’s priority. Dr. Mildred Jefferson replaced Marjory Mecklenburg as the 
chairman of the National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors.  
On August 19, Mecklenburg resigned from the National Right to Life Committee to 
form American Citizens Concerned for Life, an organization aimed at helping states develop 
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incremental strategies. Judy Fink joined her the next day.104 Ray L. White, a conservative 
Mormon and the newly appointed executive director of the National Right to Life 
Committee, told a Catholic reporter that the organization was “happy to see the ladies go.”  
The break, according to White, “in a nutshell revolv[ed] around one woman’s ego.”105 His 
use of ladies and charges of female egotism underscored that male leaders of the Executive 
Committee were not comfortable with Mecklenburg or her assertions of power as a woman 
and as a Protestant. When possible they demeaned her. By equating the conflict to one of 
personalities, White was also attempting to smooth over the very real divisions over strategy 
and religion in the National Right to Life Committee. Warren Schaller, a Mecklenburg ally, 
retaliated that the women left due to “differences of philosophy about the movement and 
administration of the corporation.” White, Schaller argued, “should make no judgments about 
the ‘ladies’” if he didn’t “know what the basic questions [were].” 106 By the end of the 
summer, the split between the conservative male hard liners and female incrementalists on 
the Executive Committee seemed irrevocable. The national anti-abortion movement's 
leadership was in shambles.107 
Dr. Mildred F. Jefferson stepped into the void. She called National Right to Life 
Committee Board members loyal to Mecklenburg and convinced them and their state chapter 
affiliates to remain loyal to the organization. Even Mecklenburg and Fink's respective state 
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chapters in Minnesota and Pennsylvania remained affiliated with the National Right to Life 
Committee. After ensuring that Mecklenburg and Fink’s followers would remain part of her 
organization, Jefferson wished the American Citizens Concerned for Life luck in its future 
endeavors. “I consider it a blessing that no single charismatic ‘leader’ has appeared to 
convert the pro-life forces into a herd of sheep blindly following along seeing only as far as 
the sheep’s tail ahead,” wrote Jefferson. She then encouraged grassroots activists to stop 
yearning for a single savior to deliver the movement. Instead, Jefferson urged, grassroots 
should use their frustration to forward local campaigns and anti-abortion activities.108 
Grassroots activists paid heed to Jefferson’s advice. As the leadership fractured in the 
summer and constitutional amendment hearings dragged on in the fall, the movement’s 
momentum turned back to the states as activists prepared for the elections.   
 
“We NEED your public pro-life statement” 109 
In Kansas, Patricia Goodson and Kansas Right to Life Affiliates set out to make 
abortion a key electoral issue in the upcoming Robert J. Dole senate race. As Dole continued 
to stall on stating his abortion position throughout the spring of 1974, Kansas Right to Life 
Affiliates leaders stepped up the pressure. They began to meet with Dole in earnest in March 
and April when he returned to the state for various Republican fundraising events. During 
these meetings, the right to lifers presented a unified front. No anti-abortion activist would 
endorse Dole until he released a public statement opposing abortion and stated his support of 
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a constitutional amendment recognizing the “unborn” as persons under the law.110 Patricia 
Goodson turned to Catherine Orth, the president of the Hays Right to Life chapter, to convert 
Dole to the cause. Orth a registered nurse, a fellow devout Catholic, and mother of nine 
children, wrote to Dole in May, “I felt by this time, busy as you are, you'd have learned 
enough about the abortion issue, that you'd come out with a public pro-life statement.” She 
re-iterated the same threat that Kansas anti-abortion activists had used since February: “I 
know you are very concerned about your future political life . . . We NEED your public pro-
life statement.”111 In a series of meetings in June, Orth offered a deal to Dole: if he supported 
an amendment, she and a core contingent of anti-abortion women would organize Kansas’s 
precincts, their churches and neighborhood networks on his behalf in the fall election. Dole 
did not respond. The best course, Dole believed, was to remain uncommitted as he weighed 
the effect of abortion on his re-election campaign. 
As summer approached, one question plagued Goodson and right to life activists 
across the country. How could they make a politician take a position on abortion before the 
1974 elections without a constitutional amendment vote or any anti-abortion legislation vote? 
Grassroots activists in California provided one answer: increase pressure by picketing 
politicians. A collection of California right to life activists had paraded outside the offices of 
Representative Don Edwards every day since March. Edwards was targeted as the chairman 
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. In an astute political 
move, the California pro-lifers’ signs not only opposed abortion but also campaigned for his 
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opponent in the upcoming California Democratic primaries. Unlike Edwards, his opponent 
had come out in support of a Human Life Amendment. The protests against Edwards turned 
into a successful national letter writing campaign after Bayh announced the Senate hearings 
would drag on past the November elections. Some right to life activists even went so far as to 
send campaign donations to his primary opponent.  
Following the California organization’s example, Patricia Goodson and a collection 
of Eastern Kansas Right to Life activists staged their first anti-abortion protest on June 23, 
1974. Piling out of their cars on an early Saturday morning, they gathered with signs outside 
the campaign headquarters of Dole's opponent, Democratic Representative William Roy. 
Roy was an obstetrician-gynecologist and lawyer who had been pivotal in reforming Kansas 
criminal abortion statute in 1968. He won election to the U.S house in 1970. Roy’s campaign 
staff was busy decorating the office red, white and blue with banners, signs and balloons for 
the grand opening of his Kansas senate campaign headquarters. They were not expecting a 
contingent of right to life activists with signs claiming Roy was “pro-abortion” and “anti-
life” to grace the headquarters’ doorsteps. Goodson and her fellow activists stayed put 
despite pleas from campaign staff that they were souring the festive atmosphere and 
offending potential donors.112 
Upon hearing of the protests and Kansas Right to Life efforts to label him as pro-
abortion, William Roy was furious. On June 26, 1974, he wrote, “I absolutely reject any 
attempts to label me as pro-abortion or anti-life.” Instead, Roy stated he was “personally 
opposed to abortion as a birth control measure,” but he “would not presume to impose [his] 
views on others who do not share this viewpoint.”  Roy then reminded readers that, “laws 
                                                
112Dorothea Warren to WRR. June 28, 1974. Box 38 f. “Leg/Jud/Anti-RTL” William Roy Papers,  
Kansas State Archives. 
 
 65 
prohibiting abortion are difficult, if not impossible, to enforce,” because “a substantial 
number of American citizens, perhaps even a majority, consider abortions to be a matter of 
individual conscience and medical advice.” Moreover, Roy had witnessed abortions 
“performed illegally and brutally in great numbers” in his thirty-year obstetrics and 
gynecology career. He knew women would have abortions whether it was legal or illegal.113 
While his response to Goodson’s protest was prompt, he had a hard time believing Goodson 
would make abortion a pivotal issue in the upcoming senate race. But Goodson was not 
deterred and soon discovered a different type of anti-abortion legislation would aid her in her 
struggle. Pro-life activists did not need a vote on the Human Life Amendment after all. 
 
The “Blunderbuss Restriction” 
On June 27, freshman Representative Angelo Roncallo of New York, an Italian 
Catholic Republican, introduced an anti-abortion amendment to the Health, Education and 
Welfare Department’s Appropriations Bill for 1975. The amendment read: 
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used in any manner 
directly or indirectly to pay for abortions or abortion referral services, 
abortifacient drugs or devices, the promotion or encouragement of abortion, 
or the support of research designed to develop methods of abortion, or to 
force any State, school, or school district or any other recipient of Federal 
funds to provide abortions or health or disability insurance abortion benefits. 
As used in this section, abortion means the intentional destruction of unborn 
human life, which life begins at the moment of fertilization.114 
 
There were no exceptions for pregnancies that threatened maternal life or health, or for cases 
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of rape, incest or fetal deformity. It was a sweeping amendment, taking the hard line right to 
life position and applying it to federal appropriations for abortions and abortion-related 
services. Roncallo was so confident the amendment would pass that he did not deliver a 
speech introducing the amendment to his fellow representatives. He handed the text to the 
clerk and sat down.115 
Bella Abzug, a fellow representative from New York and a national feminist leader, 
was the first representative to speak against the amendment. Abzug called it a “blunderbuss 
restriction” that would limit a teenage girl’s ability to abort a pregnancy resulting from rape 
and undermine all women’s access to contraception, including the eight million American 
women who were using intrauterine devices. “Those who are personally opposed to abortion 
are free to model their own lives on that precept,” Abzug charged. “But they have no right to 
demand that all Americans conform to their particular beliefs. They have no right to punish 
women who disagree with them.”116 A number of representatives opposed the amendment 
along with Abzug. Some, like Abzug, were offended that the amendment discriminated 
against the poor, restricting indigent women’s access to abortion disproportionately to middle 
and upper class women.  
Most representatives, however, opposed the amendment for its restrictions against the 
vaguely worded “abortifacient drugs or devices.” Unsure what forms of birth control and 
family planning the amendment would stop funding, representatives turned to the two 
physicians who served in Congress for answers. Democrat Dr. William Roy of Kansas and 
Republican Dr. Tim Lee Carter of Kentucky teamed up to defeat the bill. Roy rose first. He 
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told his fellow representatives that, “I personally feel that the State should not be in the 
position of either favoring or opposing abortion, and I do not feel that we should be paying 
for abortions.”117 After stating his general support of the Roncallo anti-abortion amendment’s 
intent, he opposed it for a single reason. He told the House in his expert opinion as an 
obstetrician and gynecologist that the amendment’s vague use of “abortifacient drugs or 
devices” not only included IUDs and the morning-after pill, as representatives feared, but a 
number of popular birth control pills that “act by not permitting the fertilized ovum to 
implant.” In short, Roy believed the amendment threatened the $287 million allocated for all 
family planning programs in the United States. Tim Lee Carter and Roy then led a joint 
discussion before their fellow representatives, arguing that if Congress wants to prevent 
abortions, it had better fund family planning and women’s access to contraceptives. The 
debate raged on for another hour or so, but Roy and Carter’s arguments carried the day. 
Minutes before midnight, the House rejected Roncallo’s amendment, 123 for it and 247 
against it.  
The amendment and its defeat astonished right to life activists across the country. 
Many of them first learned of the budget amendment in national headlines on June 28 and 29 
after the vote had already occurred; their reactions were mixed. On one hand, Patricia 
Goodson of Kansas was thrilled. Even though six months earlier she had thought such 
legislation a distraction to efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment, now she considered it a 
boon. She was determined to turn what she considered Roy’s “pro-abortion” vote against the 
Roncallo amendment against him during the upcoming elections. Roncallo, on the other 
hand, was furious at the amendment’s defeat. He told the press that the “lateness of the hour” 
increased representatives’ misplaced fears over family planning programming and that Roy 
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and Carter’s interpretation distorted the intent of the bill. Simply put, he said, “The 
amendment was bastardized” by family planning debates.118 Ray White, the newly appointed 
executive director of the National Right to Life Committee, told reporters that his 
organization “was taken by surprise,” Since he and the National Right to Life Committee’s 
Washington D.C. staff had been focused on the ongoing hearings on the constitutional 
amendment. John Short of Human Life Lobby took a different approach. While the Roncallo 
amendment and vote also surprised him, Short told reporters that any congressional attempts 
to ban federal funding would be his organization’s top priority from that moment on.  
 
Kansas Voters for Life 
In the aftermath of the Roncallo defeat, Goodson’s top priority remained making 
abortion a key campaign issue in the Kansas senate race between Dole and Roy. Over the 
fourth of July weekend, Kansas Right to Life leaders met to form nineteen precinct, town, 
and county “Voters for Life” organizations. Five women oversaw the voter mobilization as 
congressional district heads, including Catherine Orth and Patricia Goodson. Orth had 
fulfilled her end of her promise to Dole. She and other activists had created a statewide 
infrastructure posed to make abortion a key electoral issue in every district. Kansas Right to 
Life also had expanded beyond the core sixty-four anti-abortion activists Dole’s staff had 
identified in February. Now, activists agreed, Dole should to live up to what they believed 
was his end of the deal. In a series of letters drafted at the meeting, they demanded a public 
statement from Dole endorsing a Human Life Amendment. 119 
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Devastated by the ongoing Watergate investigation, Dole was trailing in the polls 
behind Roy and needed more endorsements and devoted campaign foot soldiers. He still felt 
a Human Life Amendment endorsement was a political risk given Kansans’ support of legal 
abortion, but it was a risk he was increasingly willing to take as the summer wore on. On July 
18, Dole finally released his statement on abortion. “I . . . support an amendment to the 
Constitution to nullify the Court’s decision because I cannot condone the taking of life 
simply because it has not been born.”120 Kansas Right to Life Affiliates pressure tactics had 
paid off. In their minds, they had a clear “pro-life” candidate to run against Roy, who they 
labeled as “pro-abortion” or “anti-life.”  
Kansas Right to Life made this pro-life/anti-life binary explicit in handouts for the 
upcoming August 6 Kansas primaries. The organization instructed voters, “On this issue 
there are only two choices – LIFE or DEATH. A legislator faced with a vote on the Human 
Life Amendment has only two choices – YES or NO! He cannot vote maybe – or 
sometimes.” The same voter guide wrote, “Bill Roy claims to be personally opposed to 
abortion, although he has personally performed many abortions. He does not believe that the 
lives of the unborn children should be protected by law, and was a moving force in passing 
the Kansas abortion law.”121 In 1974, however, the American public and most politicians did 
not accept the simple binary that the activists had asserted. In fact, Bill Roy fought hard to 
prevent the anti-abortion movement’s adoption of the terms “pro-life” or “right to life.” In 
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speeches and letters, he argued that criminalizing abortion would cause the deaths of women 
from illegal and unsafe abortions. Moreover, Roy believed the term pro-life should also 
apply to a number of other issues dealing with the quality of life. To be pro-life, Roy argued, 
meant to support welfare for American citizens in economic distress, to want universal health 
care, and to oppose capital punishment. 
Goodson was equally determined that Roy and politicians like him would not take the 
label “pro-life” from her movement. Of particular importance to her was the fact that Roy 
had performed abortions. She used his own words to condemn him. In the Shawnee Right to 
Life August primary pamphlet, Goodson quoted from Roy's “Abortion: A Physician's View,” 
which he published in the Washburn Law Journal in spring 1970. In it, Roy candidly 
admitted to performing some abortions for the wives and daughters of fellow physicians. 
Because of their husbands and fathers, these women had enough influence with the hospital 
abortion board to obtain a legal abortion under Kansas law. In the article, Roy’s admission 
was used to critique the disparities between rich and poor women's access to safe abortion 
procedures during the illegal era. Roy expressed his own discomfort over the fact that poor 
women overwhelmingly were the victims of unsafe illegal abortion providers. Goodson lifted 
his admission to performing abortions out of the context of the article. Using his own words, 
she painted Roy not only as an abortion rights supporter but an abortion provider. The 
pamphlet asked Bill Roy, “How many babies have you aborted?”122123   
Patricia Goodson’s primary guide was read in four Catholic Churches the Sunday 
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before the Democratic primaries in August. The Eastern Kansas Right to Life pamphlet and 
others like it were so incendiary that Archbishop Strecker of Kansas City banned Kansas 
Right to Life from passing out campaign literature in any of his diocese’s Catholic Churches 
for the November election. Strecker reprimanded the organization for publishing “grossly 
inaccurate” charges against William Roy.124  
Roy was not too troubled by the Kansas Right to Life handout and Archbishop 
Strecker’s reprimand of the organization cheered him; he and his staff interpreted Strecker’s 
ban on Kansas Right to Life pamphlets as a declaration of Catholic neutrality that would play 
to Roy’s favor in the election.125 They also continued to believe abortion would not be a 
major issue in the senate campaign, and instead they focused on what they considered more 
pertinent topics. At the time, Roy was leading a resurgence of the Kansas Democratic Party. 
America was in the midst of an economic downturn that hit Kansas’s farmers in particular, so 
Roy’s campaign focused on the economy and agriculture policy. Following his primary 
victory, Roy told reporters, “In the next three months I ask Republicans and independents to 
join with us in bringing our message of fiscal responsibility and progressive government, 
within the limitation of a balanced budget, to all Kansas voters.”126  
Then on August 8, 1974, two days after the Kansas primaries, President Nixon 
resigned from office. The recent release of White House tapes indicating Nixon’s knowledge 
of and potential participation in the Watergate cover up prompted his resignation. Dole 
remained loyal to the end; he was one of a handful of politicians who stayed with Nixon in 
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the Oval Office during his final hours as president. Dole’s loyalty and the electorate's general 
distrust of the Republican Party gave Roy a lead over Dole in public opinion polls following 
Watergate. Roy continued to increase his lead to eight percentage points in September 
despite the fact that Dole was outspending him almost two to one.127 For Dole to make the 
election a contest, not only in Kansans' minds but also in the minds of the press and national 
Republican donors, he had to bring the election to within five percentage points.128 Instead, 
Roy’s lead in the polls only increased in the aftermath of Watergate.  
Dole was not resigned to his fate. If he lost, he was going to go out fighting.  
On September 23, Dole and Roy debated each other at the Kansas State Fair in Hutchinson, 
Kansas. From the stage, the two men looked down upon the three hundred plus Kansans 
sitting in the late summer sun, glimpsing green John Deer hats scattered through the 
audience. The televised debate, a first in Kansas history, reached voters all across the state as 
they listened to Dole and Roy discuss the economy, Watergate, tax revenues and agricultural 
policy. Then Dole introduced a new topic and attack in his final words: “Dr. Roy, how many 
babies have you aborted?”129 Shocked, Roy had no time to respond as the cameras panned 
out and the debate ended. For Roy, Dole's abortion question came out of nowhere. Moreover, 
the question’s effect on the campaign was difficult to measure. No one knew if Dole's 
abortion question changed any voters' minds. Plus, the local and state press chose not to 
cover Dole's abortion question and opted to focus on agricultural policy differences between 
the two candidates instead.  
At first, abortion seemed to continue its marginal status in the race. For most Kansans 
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abortion was not as important as other issues. On September 30, one week after the state fair 
debate, the two men appeared on “Face the Nation” together for a second debate. This time 
coverage was national. Dole told the reporter, “There were three chief issues in the 
campaign: 'The rise and fall of Richard M. Nixon.'” Instead of using abortion to attack Roy's 
character, Dole charged him with running a Watergate-style campaign. In Dole's framing, 
Roy and the press were hitting him below the belt when they asked questions about how 
much he knew as the GOP chairman in 1972. Instead, Dole wanted the campaign to be “a 
classic contest between a known conservative . . . and a known liberal.” Abortion, it seemed, 
had dropped out of the race.  
The day before, however, Dole had fired his campaign manager and overseen a major 
overhaul of his election campaign. He fired all but one of his Washington, D.C. staff 
members, flew them to Kansas, and re-hired them as temporary campaign workers. Dole 
planned to spend the last five weeks of the campaign in Kansas, vowing to return to 
Washington, D.C. only for key votes on legislation. To close the eight-point gap, Dole 
looked for any and every negative thing he could fling Roy's way. Amidst this shift in tactics, 
abortion re-emerged as a key issue. On October 4, a political consultant wrote Dole, “the 
basic difference between you and Roy on abortion is that you are consistent and Roy is 
schizophrenic on the issue.” The Republican consultant criticized Roy's “Abortion and the 
Law,” which he had released the previous June to clarify his position. According to this 
Republican political consultant, Roy examined abortion from three perspectives, “as an 
individual, as a doctor, and as a legislator” and came to three distinct and contradictory 
positions.130 As an individual, he opposed it. As a doctor, he performed it. As a legislator, he 
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supported abortion rights. Dole's strategists would use abortion to launch a character attack. 
According to them, Roy's statements demonstrated that he was inconsistent and played both 
sides of the issue. In doing so, Dole painted Roy as the tricky politician emulating Nixon, 
while Dole had integrity and the courage to stand up for his convictions.  
Dole's September 29 campaign overhaul and abortion repositioning began to pay off 
within two weeks. While Roy stayed in Washington, D.C. to help push the federal budget 
through, Dole was campaigning non-stop. By October 15, Dole had closed Roy's eight-point 
lead in public opinion polls;131 the Topeka Capital-Journal placed Dole and Roy in a dead 
heat. Both had forty-six percent of the vote, with eight percent undecided. The undecided 
vote was concentrated in the northeast corner of the state between the metropolitan areas of 
Kansas City and Topeka. Both campaigns zeroed in on Johnson County, the location of the 
rich and densely populated suburbs of Kansas City. Kansas Right to Life also focused its 
energies on Johnson County. 
On October 23, Patricia Goodson’s Eastern Kansans for the Right to Life paid for a 
series of advertisements featuring a skull and crossbones. The ads reminded voters that Dr. 
Roy not only supported access to legal abortion, but had also performed abortions. The 
Kansas City Star, the Sun Newspaper of Metcalf and Overland Park, the Johnson County 
Herald, the Topeka Capital Journal and Seneca Courier all carried the ads. David Brock, the 
Kansas Democratic Party chairman told reporters that the images must “shock the sense of 
fair play important to Kansas voters,” and that it was “disgusting that so many newspapers 
would accept outrageous ads of this type so late in the campaign.”132 Dole's campaign staff 
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denied approving or certifying any of the ads even though reporters later found that Dole’s 
campaign had paid for them.133  
Meanwhile, Dole launched a character attack against Roy. “He accuses Roy of taking 
two positions on abortion, busing and revenue-sharing,” one reporter noted, in order to 
persuade Kansas voters that Bill Roy “waffles too much.” Dole compared Roy's complex 
stands to his own simple ones. “At least you know where I am,” Dole told audiences, “And 
why should people have to guess? After all this is an important election.”134 A member of 
Dole's campaign staff told a reporter, “Congressman Roy attempts to be on both sides of 
every issue. His record and statements on busing, Federal spending, campaign reform and 
abortion are just a few examples.”135 
 Dole and Kansas Right to Life Affiliate's negative campaign tactics paid off.  The 
race was neck and neck heading into the final week. A Topeka Central Research Corp poll on 
October 29, 1974 gave Roy a two percentage point lead over Dole with six percent of the 
Kansas voters undecided.136  The same week, another poll placed Dole in the lead. This 
survey distributed 7,000 ballots in 67 counties in the central, western and southeastern 
Kansas. Dole led Roy by 698 votes, 2,533 to 1,835.137 Both surveys indicated that northeast 
Kansas continued to be the pivotal area for both campaigns; it was the one area where Roy 
continued to lead, and it was the most populous area of the state. Accordingly, anti-abortion 
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activists also focused their efforts on northeast Kansas.    
In the final week of the campaign, Sterling Lacy, a Protestant minister with no formal 
ties to Kansas Right to Life Affiliates, distributed 50,000 anti-abortion pamphlets in 
Northeastern Kansas. Independently, Lacy had collected $3,480 from friends and family to 
fund the production and distribution of an anti-abortion and anti-Roy pamphlet. Lacy mailed 
the pamphlet to friends and family in rural northeast Kansas. He and a handful of volunteers 
also left the pamphlets on the windshields of cars parked outside church services in the 
Johnson County suburbs on Sunday, November 3, two days before the general election. The 
outside of the pamphlet was a large photograph of three aborted fetuses in a steel trashcan. 
On the inside was a long essay, written by Lacy, urging Kansans not to vote for Roy. “While 
Dr. Roy would undoubtedly make a good next door neighbor,” Lacy wrote, “I wouldn't want 
his confusion over and unconcern for when life begins, to be sent to Congress as 
representative of the views of the majority of Kansans.” He then launched the same attack 
and listing of facts that the Eastern Kansas Right to Life Affiliates had collected, citing Roy's 
Washburn Law Journal article to point out that Dr. Roy had performed abortions. A key 
difference between the Right to Life Affiliates pamphlet and Lacy's pamphlet, however, was 
the inclusion of the shocking photograph. The photo, according to Lacy, revealed, “Bill Roy's 
real position on abortion” after “all the election rhetoric [was] stripped away.”138  
The exact impact of Kansas Right to Affiliate's skull and crossbones ads and Lacy's 
50,000 pamphlets was impossible to measure. Roy supporters hoped the distasteful 
pamphlets would turn voters against Dole. The press reported that Lacy's pamphlet “stamped 
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the campaign . . . as one of the more offensive in state history to some people.”139 The day 
before the election, however, Dole led for the first time in most public opinion polls. The 
Topeka Capital Journal poll placed Dole ahead by three percentage points, 48 to 45 with 
seven percent of Kansas voters undecided.  
Democrats and Republicans prepared for heavy voter turn out on November 5 and 
crossed their fingers for good weather. On Tuesday, they awoke to a gorgeous fall day. Clear 
skies and temperatures in the 50s helped staff and volunteers work in neighborhoods across 
most of Kansas, but clouds and cold weather greeted volunteers working in the key northeast 
corridor.140 The election set a Kansas voter-turn out record for a non-presidential election. As 
the polls closed, Dole and Roy awaited the results in hotels in downtown Topeka along with 
their supporters and campaign staff. For most of the evening, the election was too close to 
call. Then Walter Cronkite predicted Dole's victory on CBS news. Supporters surrounded 
Dole as he entered the Topeka Ramada Inn ballroom to the tune of “Cabaret.” Dole greeted 
most supporters in attendance by first name. Over the last six weeks, he had become close to 
everyone involved in his comeback. “I think we won the election,” he told the cheering 
crowd. Still amazed by the turnaround, he added, “I'm trying to figure out if I really won.”141 
When election officials tallied the final votes the next day, Dole had eked out a victory by a 
little over 7,000 votes. He won the election with fifty-one percent of the vote compared to 
Roy’s forty-nine percent.142     
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 In his concession speech, Roy identified the anti-abortion literature and Kansas Right 
to Life Affiliates late-campaign ads as the “telling blow” to his candidacy.143 He believed 
anti-abortion efforts were a key factor for voters in Leavenworth, Atchison, Topeka and 
Hays, all communities with large Catholic populations and organized National Right to Life 
Committee affiliated local chapters. Melvin A. Kahn affirmed Roy's analysis the day after the 
election. The political scientist from Wichita State University told Kansas reporters that 
“mudslinging charges, abortion and Kansas conservatism” were the major factors 
contributing to Roy's loss. He explained, “Roy never developed an effective counterattack on 
the abortion issue.” Rather than explain his position, Kahn thought Roy should have “faced it 
head-on by discussing all the ramifications of the Right-to-life amendment.”144  
For Kansans who supported access to legal abortion, Roy and Kahn's analysis of the 
election was infuriating. Biddy Hurlbut, a feminist from Tonganoxie and the treasurer of the 
National Abortion Rights Action League, wrote to other national leaders, “Our dear friends 
in Kansas report that it was Dr. Roy's acceptance of labor money, not his abortion stand, that 
defeated him.” Kansas Right to Life Affiliate leaders also qualified what Roy perceived to be 
their pivotal role in Dole's victory. Martha T. Evans of Topeka Right to Life said, “The 
degree of political clout the pro-life movement entertained in the elections is and may remain 
an unknown factor, but the fact that many Kansans were concerned with the wholesale 
slaughter of innocent human life when they cast their votes cannot be overlooked.”145  
 Roy and Kahn's analysis of Dole's victory and the role abortion played fed growing 
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fears of politicians surrounding abortion's impact on electoral campaigns. It seemed that the 
right to life movement was a political force to contend with despite its small numbers. As a 
Wall Street Journal reporter predicted in October, “Even if they're a tiny percentage of the 
electorate – and most politicians and pollsters insist they are – [pro-life activists] still could 
be critical in a tight race.” The reporter concluded that, “office-seekers are always unsettled 
by such single-minded commitment,” particularly if that single-minded commitment could be 
decisive in a close election. Dole’s victory was the first such case after Roe v. Wade, and it 
proved that abortion mattered in electoral politics.  
 However, the Dole/Roy Senate race was one of eight national races where abortion 
was a campaign issue; in the other 494 races, it had no impact. Of the campaigns in which 
abortion was an issue, Dole was one of two pro-life candidates to win.146 In the larger 
picture, the 1974 elections slowed ongoing right to life congressional efforts. Most of the key 
representatives and senators who supported anti-abortion legislation lost, including Senator 
James Buckley of New York, Representatives Lawrence Hogan from Maryland, Angelo 
Roncallo from New York, and Harold Froehilch of Wisconsin. The press and the Republican 
politicians blamed these congressmen’s defeat on Watergate. In contrast to Roy, the 
staunchest pro-life allies in Congress never mentioned to the press that they believed their 
abortion positions were detrimental to their campaign efforts. Thus while Dole's victory was 
important, Roy's decision to credit right to life efforts for his loss was exceptional. In 
December, the National Right to Life News acknowledged that Senator Dole's victory and 
Roy's acknowledgement of the movement’s impact on the campaign focused “nationwide 
attention on abortion as a political issue” for the first time.  
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 National abortion rights supporters were more dubious. Jeannie I. Rosoff of Planned 
Parenthood argued that abortion's role in the 1974 national elections revealed that it was not 
the political issue the post-election analysis framed it to be. “All but one of the 62 members 
of Congress who had consistently voted in support of legal abortion were re-elected,” wrote 
Rosoff. “One cannot help but wonder whether the legalization of abortion has in fact 
achieved such a high level of support among the general population that the issue continues 
to be of key importance only to a small, albeit vociferous, anti-abortion minority, the 
politicians they frighten and manipulate, and the media in search of news.” Rather than focus 
on the one right to life success, Rosoff suggested that the bigger news was, “Support of legal 
abortion does not constitute political suicide.”147  
Both Rosoff's and the National Right to Life News’ interpretations of the Dole/Roy 
race argued that Kansas Right to Life Affiliates, under Goodson's leadership, managed a 
major publicity coup that gave abortion far more political power in elections than expected. 
The election was a boon for pro-life activists across the nation, and the campaign illuminated 
where activists wanted to go in future elections.  
 
Conclusion 
On September 17, 1975 the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments voted not to report to the full committee the four versions of the Human Life 
Amendment presented to them. The drafts, first introduced eight days after Roe, had come to 
nothing, and along with them the hard work of the National Right to Life Committee's 
leaders who had made the amendments their first priority. Grassroots right to life activists 
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across the country had watched the subcommittee hearings stall in an exhaustive study of the 
potential amendments' effects on American law, medicine, and women. Over the course of 
seventeen months, the subcommittee collected 3,233 pages of testimony from over fifty 
expert witnesses. Then in a closed vote, the senate subcommittee members tabled the 
amendment. The drawn out hearings had already fractured the right to life movement at the 
national level over strategic priorities in August 1974. By June 1975, the National Right to 
Life Committee's continued emphasis on the amendments had almost bankrupted the 
organization.  
As the Senate Judiciary committee hearings on a Human Life Amendment dragged on 
in 1974 and 1975, local and state pro-life activists turned away from what many considered a 
weak and quarrelsome national leadership and sought inspiration from other grassroots 
organizations’ strategies and successes. Dole's senate race was one of only a handful of 
hardline victories in the years after Roe. As the number of abortions in America increased 
and women's health clinics spread, however, even the most hard line activists grew 
concerned about the increasing availability of abortion. From the grassroots, activists of all 
backgrounds and strategic preferences initiated a re-orientation of the National Right to Life 
Committee that shifted the movement away from the constitutional amendment campaign 
and debates over fetal personhood to an approach that sought to restrict abortion access 
instead.  
Even as the division between hardliners and incrementalists faded, many of the 
essential questions over strategy that activists raised and debated in 1973 and 1974, 
especially those around a potential constitutional amendment's wording, remained 
unresolved. Simply put, movement priorities shifted, and with that the contentiousness of the 
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first two years lessened. Of the original fifty-five board members of the National Right to 
Life Committee, only six would be leaders at the end of the decade. Dr. Carolyn Gerster later 
reflected that she was “one of those battle scarred veterans of those early years.”148 She 
survived, in large part, because she had always championed the incremental strategy favored 
by Mecklenburg. While Mecklenburg's American Citizens Concerned for Life never 
achieved the power or notoriety of the National Right to Life Committee, her efforts paved 
the way for a series of strong female Protestant leaders, including Gerster and Mildred 
Jefferson, who would prove pivotal to the development of the American pro-life movement. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
“Defend Edelin, Defend Your Rights”149   
Pushing up against the doors of Courtroom 906 in downtown Boston, a crowd 
gathered to hear the jury announce its verdict in the Edelin manslaughter trial on February 
15, 1975. The prosecution accused Dr. Kenneth C. Edelin, a black obstetrician-gynecologist, 
of taking the life of a twenty-four to twenty-eight-week old viable fetus claimed to be born 
alive during a legal abortion Edelin had performed on a teenager on October 3, 1973. Edelin 
held that he had aborted a twenty-one-to-twenty-two-week-old non-viable fetus that he 
declared dead after checking for signs of life following the procedure. The trial's verdict 
would be the top story across national news programs that night, and headline the next 
morning's Sunday newspapers.150 
The anticipation in the courtroom intensified as the all-white jury entered, rising to a 
high pitch as the jury foreman stood to announce the verdict: “Guilty!” The courtroom 
erupted in shock, disbelief, joy and sorrow. Half of the journalists at the press table left the 
room immediately to report the verdict. The other half sat, stunned. Edelin later recalled, 
“Like a jolt of electricity to my ears, the words burst through my brain, down my spine, 
through my arms, hands, and fingers and into the table.” His lawyer, William P. Homans, 
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shook with rage. Shouts of “Injustice!” “That nigger is guilty as sin!” and “He is guilty of 
sin!” reverberated off the courtroom walls. One of the jury alternates rushed out of the 
courtroom in tears. Incredulous, the judge called the room to order and polled the jury. Not a 
single member of the all-white jury changed his or her vote. After dismissing the jurors 
without so much as a thank you for their service, the judge sent them into the echoing marble 
hall of Suffolk County Courthouse, and a wall of flashing cameras and shouting journalist.151 
Tom Connelly, the right to life activist responsible for the Edelin trial, sat back in the 
courtroom and watched a victory two years in the making unfold. He had begun a secret 
investigation into abortion practices at Boston City Hospital within days of Roe v. Wade in 
1973.152 That investigation led to two separate legal cases and grand jury indictments in April 
1974. One charged Kenneth Edelin with manslaughter for taking the life of “baby boy Roe.” 
The other case charged four doctors of violating an 1827 grave- robbing statute when they 
used the tissues of aborted fetuses in government-sponsored research.153 The two cases raised 
a different set of legal questions over a physician's obligations to fetuses as patients and as 
research subjects than the right to life movement’s ongoing Human Life Amendment 
debates. In doing so, Tom Connelly had found a strategy that could unite the right to life 
movement amidst the movement’s intense infighting over fetal personhood and the Human 
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Life Amendment in 1973 and 1974.  
The anti-abortion activities surrounding the Edelin manslaughter trial exemplified 
larger initiatives across the United States. As the numbers of legal abortions increased, 
grassroots right to life activists began to target abortion providers, and to find ways of 
speaking up for fetal rights. To these activists, it was one thing for abortion to be legal; it was 
an entirely different matter to have abortions offered in their own communities. To stop 
abortion providers and to save as many fetuses as possible, grassroots right to life activists 
initiated a strategic turn away from the Human Life Amendment and to the pursuit of 
abortion restrictions. They re-united the movement from the bottom up.  
The foremost restriction the activists sought was a ban on government funding of 
abortion, which, if passed, would limit poor, minority and underage women’s access to 
abortion. At the time, the federal government subsidized roughly thirty percent of the 
abortions performed in America. Right to life activists deployed two arguments against this 
government funding. First, they insisted on their rights as taxpayers to refuse to pay for a 
procedure they equated with murder. The activists claimed that federal funding was an 
encroachment on their rights by the federal government. This argument helped align the right 
to life movement with other conservative campaigns, such as the anti-busing and anti-tax 
movements. Secondly, they charged that federal government funding of abortion was a form 
of coercive population control, arguing that elite and racist abortion rights supporters were 
more concerned with eliminating the poor than helping them. Through these efforts and a 
national anti-abortion campaign to stop medical research that used fetal tissue, right to life 
activists increasingly came to characterize the federal government as corrupt and filled with 
elitists.  
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Right to life activities surrounding the Edelin manslaughter investigation drew on and 
inspired grassroots campaigns to establish fetal rights and restrict abortion access. The trial 
crystallized the conservative rhetoric and tactics that would unify the movement and align it 
with broader conservative concerns. National anti-abortion leaders not only united in the 
midst of the trial, but also came to defend the white jurors against charges of racism, using 
the same arguments they had honed in their campaigns against Medicaid funding of abortion.  
 
Tom Connelly and the Secret Investigation into Boston City Hospital 
Following the passage of Roe, Massachusetts right to life activist Tom Connelly set 
himself a simple goal. Abortion might be legal in America, Connelly thought, but he could 
make his predominantly Catholic city an abortion-free zone. Without the knowledge of 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Connelly came up with his own two-step plan to stop 
abortion provision in Boston. First, he began a secret investigation into Boston City 
Hospital’s now legal abortion practices. The investigation was an extension of a protest 
Connelly had already begun; throughout the fall of 1972, he had picketed the hospital with 
Richard Carey and Dr. Joseph Stanton. At that time, the men were upset that Boston City 
Hospital allowed two to four medically indicated abortions a week. Following Roe, they 
watched in horror as abortion rates in the hospital rose tenfold to meet the demand of the 
hospital's largely urban and poor clientele. Connelly had also prepared to run as a single-
issue anti-abortion candidate for Boston City Council in the primaries that spring. Though he 
failed to win his election, Connelly continued to lobby for city ordinances banning or 
severely restricting abortion access.154  
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Two things quickly caught Connelly’s attention as he began the investigation. Nurses 
and hospital personnel mentioned Dr. Kenneth Edelin’s name frequently. Edelin was a black 
obstetrician-gynecologist, and he was one of two doctors in the hospital who performed 
abortions, due to his fervent belief “that poor, black women should have that choice, too.”155 
Connelly also learned of medical research at Boston City Hospital that involved tissues from 
aborted fetuses. A group of four Boston City Hospital staff had applied for and had received 
funding from the National Institute of Health as well as the approval of the hospital’s review 
board in 1971. Their study sought to determine the effects on fetuses of the drugs 
erythromycin and dyndamycin, both commonly prescribed antibiotics for women allergic to 
penicillin.156 
Such studies on the effect of drugs on fetuses were common after a much-publicized 
series of iatrogenically induced birth deformities. In the mid-1960s thalidomide was 
prescribed in Europe to pregnant women with severe migraines. Due to the drug's unexpected 
effect on fetuses, many of these women's babies were born with severe physical 
abnormalities. Since the Thalidomide disaster, medical researchers across America had 
wanted to ensure that any drugs physicians administered to pregnant women would not 
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damage their fetuses.157  
To test the effects of erythromycin and dyndamycin, the Boston researchers identified 
women who were seeking medically indicated abortions in their second term of pregnancy 
and recommended them to the study. They explained the study, obtained the patient’s written 
consent to participate, and administered the antibiotics prior to ending the pregnancy. 
Following the abortion, the doctors studied the tissue of the fetuses for traces of the 
antibiotics to determine whether the drugs crossed into the fetal blood stream. Depending on 
the results, they would then determine the safety of the two drugs for women who wished to 
carry their pregnancies to term.  
In an interview, Connelly recalled when he became aware of the research and use of 
fetal tissue. A hospital staff member told him: “They are doing more than that. They are 
killing large babies.” Connelly said, “I got to the phone immediately and called Dr. Joseph 
Stanton and he started things rolling.”158 Connelly and Stanton prepared a press conference 
and a local anti-abortion campaign to coincide with the publication of the four doctors’ 
findings in the June 1973 New England Journal of Medicine. At the press conference, 
Connelly claimed that city officials were dragging their feet in declaring their opposition to 
abortion and halting research on aborted fetuses. In July, Massachusetts Citizens for Life and 
Stanton’s Value of Life Committee also demanded an official investigation into how the 
twenty-two-week-old fetuses used in the research “died” and whether proper death 
certificates had been filed by the city.159  
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The Massachusetts right to life activists then turned to politics. Sister Sheila, a nun 
from South Boston and good friend of Thomas Connelly, organized a citywide letter -writing 
campaign. The letters brought the New England Journal of Medicine article to the attention 
of state representative William Delahunt and Raymond L. Flynn. In August 1973, Flynn 
forwarded the article and a letter to city council member Albert “Dapper” O’Neil.160 In 
Flynn’s letter he recommended that Boston “hold public hearings with a view toward 
drafting suitable criminal abortion legislation for the City of Boston and model legislation for 
the entire Commonwealth.”161  He also added that he shared O'Neil’s views and “the views of 
all right-thinking people that abortions should not be permitted under any circumstances.”162  
To tap into right to life political support, O’Neil called a hearing before the Committee on 
Public Health and Hospitals on September 18, 1973 to review abortion practices and fetal 
research at Boston City Hospital. Local activists packed the hearing, and Dapper O’Neil 
promised them he would take action. On September 19, he sent the testimony from the 
hearings to the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office, urging him to look into abortion 
practices at Boston City Hospital and the improper use of fetal remains in medial research.163 
On September 21, three days after the city hearing, a black seventeen-year-old high 
school student of West Indian descent visited Boston City Hospital seeking an abortion.164 
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Despite her insistence that she had conceived eighteen weeks beforehand, the physician 
concluded that she was twenty-one to twenty-two weeks pregnant. He scheduled a saline 
abortion for her on October 2, 1973 and assigned it to Dr. Edelin. On the morning of her 
scheduled abortion, Dr. Enrique Giminez, a Catholic and first year resident from Mexico 
City, examined “Alice Roe.” After examining Roe, Giminez estimated the pregnancy to be at 
twenty-four weeks, introducing the possibility that the fetus was viable. He did not 
communicate his estimation to Edelin, who believed that the young woman was twenty-one 
to twenty-two weeks pregnant.165  
Edelin then attempted saline induction on Alice Roe two to three times, but due to 
complications he could not complete the procedure. The next day his supervisor also tried 
and failed the induction. At that point, Edelin and his supervisor scheduled Alice Roe for a 
hysterotomy on October 3, 1973. Giminez, who refused to perform abortions, asked Edelin 
for permission to watch the procedure. Edelin agreed. Edelin began the hysterotomy by 
making an incision into Roe’s uterus large enough to extract the fetus and placenta.166 When 
the amniotic sac ruptured, Edelin removed the fetus by pulling its lower extremities through 
the incision. He separated the fetus from the placenta and amniotic sac. Using his fingers, he 
checked for a fetal pulse and found none. He then removed the fetus from the uterine cavity 
and placed it in a steel bin. He recorded the aborted male fetus to be twenty-two-weeks old 
and sent him to the hospital pathology lab, where a pathologist preserved the fetus in a bottle 
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of in formaldehyde.167 
Shortly afterwards, a hospital employee approached Connelly and told him about 
“babies in bottles” in the hospital morgue, and the rumor that some doctors considered 
Edelin’s actions questionable in Alice Roe’s October 3 abortion. Connelly immediately 
tipped off the District Attorney’s office through anonymous phone calls. He then worked 
with Jackie Halley, the daughter of a Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice and right to life 
sympathizer, to lay the foundations for a criminal investigation into abortion practices and 
related fetal research at Boston City Hospital. In a 2010 interview, Connelly recalled an 
undocumented private meeting at Dr. Joseph Stanton's house attended by lawyers from the 
D.A.’s office, right to life activists, and hospital personnel. Halley laid out the Edelin 
manslaughter case using testimony from hospital staff. She convinced the D.A.’s office to 
begin an official investigation in November 1973; that investigation re-traced the steps of 
Connelly’s earlier secret research. On December 3, a city investigator found the preserved 
fetus from Alice Roe’s October 3 abortion, and named it “Baby Boy Roe.”168  
In order to charge Edelin with manslaughter for taking the life of “Baby Boy Roe,” 
Assistant D.A. Newman Flanagan had to prove three things: that the fetus under question had 
to be at least twenty-four-weeks-old and therefore viable, or capable of independent life; that 
the fetus was born, and thus entitled to the legal rights of a person under the law; and that 
Edelin willfully sought the destruction of said fetus. To establish the first two conditions, 
Flanagan introduced the possibility of a live birth abortion. He claimed that Edelin had 
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successfully performed an abortion protected under Roe v. Wade when he separated what 
Flanagan argued was a twenty-four to twenty-eight-week-old fetus from the placenta. At that 
point, he charged, the fetus also had been born because he was no longer dependent on the 
life system of Alice Roe. Flanagan then held that the fetus under question was now a baby in 
utero and legally a person.  
To prove that Edelin took active steps to take the life of “Baby Boy Roe,” Flanagan’s 
case relied heavily on the testimony of eyewitness Dr. Enrique Giminez. Giminez testified 
that Edelin caused the fetus’s death when he stood with his hand in the uterus after he 
separated the placenta from the lining of the uterus, staring at the clock for three to five 
minutes. The fetus-now-baby, Giminez asserted, lived for at least a few seconds and died due 
to a lack of oxygen caused by Edelin’s failure to remove the fetus quickly from the uterus. 
On April 11, 1974, a Grand Jury indicted Edelin for manslaughter, and the four Boston 
doctors who participated in the entrymycin and dedymycin study for violating a statute that 
banned the improper use of human remains.169 
After a year and a half of protest, Connelly had achieved part of his original goal. 
While abortions still occurred in the city, Boston City Hospital temporarily stopped provision 
after the April 1974 indictment. The Boston City Hospital Board had already halted the 
construction of a planned outpatient abortion clinic, and it banned all research involving fetal 
tissue in December 1973. Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s political momentum accelerated 
with the Edelin indictment. By the end of April, the Massachusetts House Committee on 
Judiciary Affairs moved to pass legislation that restricted abortion access and dealt explicitly 
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with legal issues introduced by the Edelin investigation and indictment. The proposed 
legislation limited women’s access to abortions by requiring parental consent for minors and 
spousal consent for married women. Under the new law, “Alice Roe” would have had to 
receive her father’s consent for the abortion. While her mother had assisted Alice in 
terminating the pregnancy, both women had kept the pregnancy a secret from Alice’s 
authoritarian father. The law also prohibited research on fetal tissue and criminalized 
abortions after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy except in medical emergencies. The 
legislation also required doctors to “take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and 
health of the aborted fetus,” something right to life activists believed Edelin failed to do 
during the October 3 surgery. By August, the state senate and house had passed the parental 
consent statute over the Republican governor’s veto. Massachusetts became one of fourteen 
states to pass new criminal abortion statutes in response to Roe. With its passage, the 
legislation made performing an abortion on a minor in her second trimester of pregnancy a 
crime.170 
The Massachusetts law made the front page of the September 1974 National Right to 
Life News. The National Right to Life Committee held it up, along with the two Boston City 
Hospital court indictments, as models for other state right to life groups to achieve.36 But in 
the fall of 1974, Tom Connelly’s investigation into Boston City Hospital’s abortion practices 
and the Massachusetts restrictive abortion statute were only two of many varied campaigns 
against abortion providers in the United States. 
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Clinic Protests at the Grassroots 
On the first anniversary of Roe v. Wade, a group of twenty pro-life activists gathered 
on the grounds of the construction site for the proposed Forsyth Clinic in Winston-Salem, 
North Carolina. The Forsyth Clinic was slated to open in April 1974 and would become the 
state’s fourth freestanding facility to offer abortions.  When seven women from St. Leo’s 
Catholic Parish found out about the clinic, they organized a protest and silent prayer vigil. 
The women shared Thomas Connelly’s goal in Boston: they wanted to keep their hometown 
abortion-free. Their priority was not a Human Life Amendment, as Edward Golden of the 
National Right to Life Committee had pronounced in January 1974n the first anniversary of 
Roe v. Wade, they did not join the one hundred or so activists from North Carolina Right to 
Life for a day of lobbying and protest at the state capital, but instead went to what would 
become their town’s abortion clinic.171 
The women from St. Leo's parish soon incorporated as Winston Salem Citizens for 
Life. In February 1974, they became a local chapter affiliate of North Carolina Right to Life.  
Winston Salem Citizens for Life soon became one of the state's most innovate and active 
chapters. On February 17, 1974, Citizens for Life held a “Pro-Life Rally” at South Park 
Baptist Church. Eight hundred people from Winston Salem attended the rally and listened to 
North Carolina Senator Hamilton Horton and Dr. William Rabil, physician and founder of 
North Carolina State Right to Life, speak against abortion and the proposed Forsyth clinic. 
The sale of three hundred “human life bracelets” at the event funded the distribution of 
16,000 fact sheets on abortion to over one hundred churches in the area. The pamphlet urged 
the churches to protest the opening of the Forsyth clinic. In March 1974, the seven Catholic 
                                                
171“NC Abortion Clinics,” found in Takey Crist Papers, Box 13 Takey Crist Papers 1969-2002 and n.d. 
Ascension 2003-0118, “folder Correspondence, 1974” Sally Bingham Center, Duke University. 
 
 95 
women from St. Leo's parish invited thirty people from North Carolina Right to Life to a 
chapter meeting and rally at their church. They instructed Emma O'Steen, the state 
organization's president, to bring an assortment of activists from various denominations in 
order to show local press that opposition to the clinic was not simply a “Catholic affair.”172 
  During the last week of March, Winston-Salem activists also attended a medical and 
theological debate at Wake Forest University to hear their very own Fr. William Wellein, the 
pastor of St. Leo's Church, debate the morality of abortion and the proposed Winston-Salem 
Women's Health clinic. Wellein told the audience that “When we hear arguments about 
aborticide and abortion clinics, they are always physiological, psychological, and 
sociological.” He then listed those arguments: “to save the physical and mental health of the 
mother; not to bring unwanted and unloved children into the world; that an abortion after all 
is only removing tissue, a glob of protoplasm; to keep down population; to avoid quackery 
and 'kitchen table' unantiseptic abortions, etc.” He thought these were highly “emotional 
arguments” that failed to address the central question, “is this new life truly a human 
being?”173 In his presentation, Fr. Wellein pitted social planners who needed to control and 
improve American society against what he considered the fundamental right to life. Wellein 
also described abortion as a conspiracy of elite doctors and social workers to solve large 
social problems by eliminating babies.  
 Capping off all this activity against the Forsyth clinic, the female leaders of Winston 
Salem's Citizens for Life arranged a countywide rally on April 7, 1974, two days before the 
announcement of the Edelin indictment in Boston. Dr. Jack Wilke, an executive committee 
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member of the National Right to Life Committee and an internationally renowned speaker, 
gave the keynote address alongside his wife Barbara.174 The outburst of anti-abortion activity 
failed to stop the clinic from opening on April 1, 1974, but it was typical of grassroots 
campaigns against abortion providers across the United States in 1974. For example, 
Missouri Citizens for Life successfully prevented the opening of an abortion clinic by a New 
York doctor that same spring. There, they targeted businesses and banks to stop the 
establishment of the clinic in a shopping center. After a major business owner threatened to 
re-locate and a bank refused a business loan, the New York physician had no choice. He 
pulled out of the clinic venture.175  
These local activities against abortion providers united right to life activists who had 
previously disagreed over Human Life Amendment wording and strategy in 1973 and the 
winter of 1974. Even Patricia Goodson took time away from Kansas Right to Life’s anti-
abortion campaign efforts in the upcoming Bob Dole senate race to try to stop the opening of 
women's health clinic in Kansas City. “We need your help immediately,” wrote Goodson to 
the Board of Directors in April 1974. “What legal tactics have been employed to prevent-
delay-or restrict the operation of abortion clinics?” She then inquired into statutory solutions 
such as “zoning prohibitions or regulatory, or taxing measures that have been effective 
elsewhere.” Finally, Goodson offered to keep a file on any accumulated knowledge on efforts 
to stop the spread of clinics so that she could provide such information to any “bona fide pro-
life organization” that wished to employ such tactics.176  
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 Grassroots mobilizations around the clinics continued into the summer of 1974. In 
Illinois, Joseph Scheidler worked with state officials to set up a sting operation of an abortion 
provider who had failed to obtain a medical license as required by state law. Chicago pro-life 
activists used money from Illinois Citizens Concerned for Life to pay for an abortion for a 
woman who was not pregnant; police then arrested clinic staff after they committed the crime 
of accepting money for an unlicensed medical procedure.177 In California, local right to life 
activists initiated a criminal investigation over the disposal of two hundred fetal remains 
found by activists outside a California medical waste facility.178 In Arizona, a group of 
Arizona Youth for Life picketed in front of a clinic, causing numerous disturbances. While it 
was not the first and only clinic picket occurring in America, the National Right to Life News 
reported on it due to the novelty of teenagers engaging in the activity. An eyewitness account 
reported that, “the abortion patients possibly surprised by the protestors, walked away around 
the corner as I photographed the beginning of the orderly sign-carrying demonstration.”179 
(There was no mention that perhaps the women going to have abortions did not want their 
photos taken by the protestors.) 
 In the spring of 1974, The National Right to Life News also began to track grassroots 
investigations and lawsuits. In May, the newspaper reported the indictment of Kenneth 
Edelin on manslaughter charges. At the time, the Edelin case was only one among many 
legal cases against an abortion provider that national and state leaders followed. Activists in 
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Pittsburgh had instigated a similar investigation against Dr. Laufle of West Penn Hospital, 
claiming that Laufle had allowed a twenty-seven week old fetus to die on the operating table 
following an abortion. In November 1974, a coroner’s jury exonerated Laufle of all charges, 
but West Penn Hospital doctors had grown reluctant to provide abortions in the interim. As a 
result, one of Pittsburgh’s largest abortion providers cut back its operations.180 In 
Bakersfield, California, Dr. Xavier Hall Ramirez was found not guilty of murder charges 
after he ordered that oxygen be withheld from a four-pound, eight-ounce fetus that had 
survived an abortion in October 1973. Activists also instigated criminal investigations and 
attempted to bring manslaughter charges against an abortion provider in Minnesota.  
All of these activities against abortion providers demonstrate that an important 
strategy shift was emerging from state and local groups. While National Right to Life 
Committee leaders bickered over constitutional amendments and strategy in Washington, 
D.C., grassroots activists were finding common ground and working together against 
abortion providers. As an anonymous North Carolina Right to Life member wrote in 
February 1974, "What comment can any God-fearing Christian, be he Catholic or Protestant, 
Democrat or Republican, Black or White say when you receive the shocking news that 
another murder-mill . . . is being established.”181 The protests against providers helped unite 
the movement, and re-orient the National Right to Life Committee away from the Human 
Life Amendment campaign. The Edelin manslaughter case, and others like it, helped 
convince National Right to Life Committee leaders that stopping the spread of abortion 
provision was the way to advance the movement and gain its first victories in 1975. What 
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made Tom Connelly’s investigation into Boston City Hospital exceptional, however, was the 
fact that it involved and helped to fuel a national debate over fetal research as well. 
 
The Right to Life Campaign Against Fetal Research 
On April 10, 1973, the Washington Post broke a series of articles on the National 
Institute of Health’s internal deliberations over the regulation of fetal research. Doctors and 
ethicists had started these deliberations in 1971. Now, the Washington Post series made what 
had been an internal debate over the status of fetuses as research subjects an issue of national 
importance, portraying fetal research subjects as defenseless victims of the medical 
professionals who were supposed to protect them, including pediatricians, obstetricians, and 
gynecologists. The right to life response to the stories was immediate. On April 11, a group 
of Catholic high school students from Washington, D.C. protested outside the National 
Institute of Health, urging a halt to all fetal research.182  
Two weeks later, Congress began a series of hearings on fetal research that became 
proxy arguments on abortion. Senators and representatives sympathetic to the right to life 
movement developed a series of provisions to ban research on fetuses and cut federal funding 
for research involving fetuses. Senator Ted Kennedy proposed amending the bill so that it 
ended fetal research temporarily until a commission could establish guidelines. Over the 
course of the year, the bill evolved into the National Research Act, which President Nixon 
signed into law on July 12, 1974. The bill established the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. That committee, in 
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turn, would determine federal regulations concerning fetal research.183  
To stop fetal research, right to life activists linked their battle to the American 
public’s growing anxiety concerning human experimentation. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s a series of medical scandals broke that undermined the public’s confidence in the 
medical profession and in scientific research. In 1966, Henry Beecher, a professor of 
anesthesiology at Harvard Medical School, published a report exposing what he believed to 
be abuses in clinical research. He called attention to the exploitation of servicemen, 
prisoners, and vulnerable populations such as the elderly and mentally disabled in medical 
research and clinic trials. The revelation of a series of disturbing cases proved many of the 
reports claims true. In 1972, The Washington Post reported on the notorious Tuskegee study, 
a forty-year study overseen by the Center for Disease Control, in which African American 
men were left untreated for syphilis so that scientists could track the course of the disease. 
Similarly, at Willowbrook State School for the Retarded in New York, doctors and medical 
researchers injected institutionalized children with the hepatitis virus between 1956 and 
1971. They too wanted to better understand the course of a disease. As a result of cases like 
these, the public’s confidence in the medical community fell from seventy-three to forty-two 
percent favorable ratings between 1962 and 1972.184  
Right to life activists portrayed fetal research as barbaric, and likened it to the 
unethical cases above by creating a common victim: a fully formed and baby-like fetus on 
the verge of birth. In order to generate this fetal victim, right to life activists blurred the 
distinction between biological and actual life; they interchangeably cited medical research on 
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live babies and dead fetuses, and non-viable and viable fetuses. They asserted that abortion 
providers and medical researchers who used fetal tissue became torturers of innocent babies 
regardless of the fetus’s gestational age. For example, Dr. Joseph Stanton testified at the 
Boston City Council hearing on September 18, 1973 that, “The unconscionable use of fetuses 
whose death is directly planned as subjects for experimentation is repugnant.” He then 
compared the four Boston City Hospital medical researchers to the medical sadists who 
conducted unethical experiments on prisoners in Nazi Germany.185 In the right to life 
movement’s version, medical researchers had abandoned the common decency and shared 
morality of average Americans in their quest for knowledge. By attacking fetal research, 
right to life activists championed an anti-elitist ethos that pitted a privileged and corrupt 
medical community against the hardworking and moral average Americans.186  
This anti-elitism directed towards the medical and scientific communities resonated 
with a populist revolt occurring in American cities and suburbs. At the beginning of the 
1970s, millions of white homeowners’ visions of what historian Matt Lassiter called a 
“residentially segregated and federally subsidized version of the American Dream” had come 
under siege.187 While these suburban white homeowners believed that they had earned their 
middle-class and suburban status on their merits as individuals, they depended on a series of 
federal government initiatives to maintain their lifestyle. Starting with the New Deal in the 
1930s, the Federal Government had offered a series of tax incentives and benefits that 
disproportionately gave white communities advantages over and above non-white and lower 
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class communities. For example, federally guaranteed low-interest mortgages and tax 
deductions were made available to predominantly white neighborhoods between the 1930s 
and 1960s. The Federal Housing Administration did not extend these benefits to black and 
mixed-race neighborhoods because the government agency considered them “high risk.” 
Federally backed residential segregation between the 1930s and 1960s then supported school 
segregation; neighborhood schools were segregated de facto because neighborhoods were 
segregated. 188  
In the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights activists looked to the federal government to help 
solve some of the inequities between black and white communities that the federal 
government had helped to produce. At the forefront of the conflict at the local level was the 
question of neighborhoods and schools. Civil rights organizations and groups filed lawsuits 
against school systems that were segregated by neighborhood and school district divisions. In 
recognition of the fact that residential segregation led to school segregation, federal courts in 
a number of cities ordered school districts to come up with student allocation programs that 
would integrate students across neighborhood and racial lines. Many school systems opted to 
bus students out of their neighborhoods in order to achieve integration. 
In October 1972, a group of black parents and the NAACP filed a lawsuit against the 
Boston school system. They charged that the school system violated the federal 1965 Racial 
Imbalance Act. Eighteen years after the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education decision, black 
students in Boston still attended mostly black schools that had fewer amenities and 
opportunities than those in predominantly white neighborhoods. In response to the court case, 
the Boston anti-busing movement, which had begun in the mid-1960s, grew in size and 
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power. The anti-busing movement drew from the largely white and ethnic neighborhoods of 
Charleston and South Boston. Men and women from these communities rightly feared that 
any new desegregation plans in the wake the court's decision would disproportionately affect 
their communities compared to the wealthier white communities in the Boston suburbs.189  
Anti-busing activists in Boston, and in cities and suburbs across America, rallied 
around a constellation of rights and privileges they sought to protect. These included the right 
to select their neighborhood, their employees, and their children’s classmates. They also 
increasingly lobbied for a negative right: to remain free of what they saw as the 
encroachment of the federal government in their communities and lives. The federal 
government, on the other hand, was under pressure from a race and class-conscious liberal 
movement that urged government officials and administrators to address the structural 
inequalities in American society. Even though most leaders of the Boston right to life 
movement, including Dr. Joseph Stanton, resided in the Boston suburbs, where mandatory 
court busing orders would not apply, they linked abortion and fetal research to this larger 
opposition to the federal government and to elites in scientific, research and university 
communities. In contrast, they believed themselves to be champions of local communities 
under siege by the federal government.190 
Boston politicians, right to life activists, and anti-busing activists alike attacked both 
abortion services at Boston City Hospital and forced busing as a breach of the local 
community’s values. They were, according to these activists, a violation of the traditions of 
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the city’s Catholic, Democrat-backed institutions. Dapper O’Neil stood in front of his alma 
mater, South Boston High School during his 1973 re-election campaign and stated: “I’m not 
going to stand by and let those niggers take over this school.” Raymond Flynn argued that 
South Bostonians “must stick together” and resist busing so that “No one will beat us.”191 A 
Catholic monsignor from Boston regarded abortion in a similar way. At the September 18 
hearings, he stated, “We cannot allow the Boston City Hospital and its staff to succumb to 
the pressures posited by some expectant mothers and certain social reformers,” who “turn[ed] 
their back on the hallowed history and tradition of this great municipal institution and 
violate[d] the sacrosanct ideals, goals and objectives of medicine and good hospital care.”192 
 
“It is past time to . . . end the spending of the taxpayers’ dollar for the procuring of an 
abortion”193 
 
Two months after Edelin’s April 1974 indictment, a federal court ordered Boston 
schools to desegregate in order to comply with the 1965 Racial Imbalance Act. At 7:00 AM 
on September 13, 1974, the first day of school, men, women, and young adults from the 
three-decker wooden tenements surrounding South Boston High School started to gather 
across the street from the school's entrance. They watched as police removed “nigger go 
home” graffiti from the school's front doors. Meanwhile, the school staff prepared to 
welcome nine hundred and forty-one black students, a dramatic increase from the fifteen 
“non-white” students who had enrolled the year before. As buses filled with black students 
rolled up to the high school, the crowd began to yell the high school football chant, “Here we 
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go Southie, Here we go.” Police held back a group of white mothers screaming racial slurs at 
the students exiting the bus. A stone flew. Police quickly moved to escort the students into 
the school's sparsely populated hallways.  
White public school attendance in South Boston was down thirty-five percent that 
day. Parents resisted the court order by keeping their children at home. Many teenagers and 
young adults took to the streets instead of attending school. When the school bell rang that 
afternoon, three hundred people had gathered to harass the buses along their return routes. 
Two miles down the road from South Boston High School, the black students ' parents from 
the Roxbury neighborhood waited anxiously for their sons and daughters to return. By day's 
end, the angry white mob had thrown stones and bricks at the buses, injuring eight students 
and one bus monitor. When school resumed on Monday, eight hundred Boston police 
officers patrolled the streets of South Boston; despite the police presence, crowds continued 
to roam the streets. Again, the crowds took their ire out on buses, throwing stones and bricks. 
On Monday evening, Boston Mayor Kevin White ordered all liquor stores and bars closed in 
South Boston, set a curfew, and banned all public gatherings for the upcoming week.   
 The following afternoon, Tuesday September 17, the U.S. Senate debated the final 
version of the Health, Education and Welfare Department’s appropriations bill for 1975. Two 
amendment riders took center stage on Capitol Hill. The first rider, introduced by Senator 
Jesse Helms of North Carolina and co-sponsored by Robert Dole of Kansas, banned the use 
of federal funds to support court ordered busing programs “aimed at overcoming racial 
imbalance.”194 Helms rose to defend his amendment by pointing to Boston. “This city is 
known as one of the cradles of our basic liberties,” he said, “yet, the people of that city see a 
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fundamental right being taken away from them -- the right of parents to direct the educational 
future of their children.” Helms continued, “The question is whether the State is supreme in 
our society or whether the rights of humanity are supreme."195 Time and again, Senators 
Helms and Dole pointed out that, “the vast majority of American parents, black and white, 
are opposed to forced busing.”196 In a close vote, senators approved the amendment, 44 to 42, 
While the press characterized it as a symbolic vote – few school systems drew on any federal 
funds to aid in school busing programs, and so the amendment's impact was negligible – the 
senators’ arguments constituted a critique of government and a defense of average American 
taxpayers’ rights that pro-life activists would also use. 
The second amendment, introduced by Republican Senator Dewey Bartlett of 
Oklahoma, banned the use of federal funds to support abortion and abortion referral services 
except in cases where the pregnancy threatened the life of the mother. Since the Roe v. Wade 
decision, the federal government had spent $50 million to help pay for 278,000 abortions 
requested by women on public assistance. Bartlett and his allies rose to defend this proposed 
cut to Medicaid funding of abortion. Their arguments departed from previous House and 
Senate debates surrounding abortion funding that had focused on contraceptive access and 
fetal personhood. Now, Bartlett and his allies followed the path of arguments made just 
minutes before around busing; they placed the wants and attitudes of the average American 
taxpayer front and center.197 Bartlett charged, "The action taken here will decide whether the 
Federal Government will continue to make available funds for states, funds that come from 
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all the taxpayers, to pay for the desires of 14 or 15 states' taxpayers.”198 Senator Joe Biden of 
New Hampshire identified what he considered was the essential issue in the Bartlett 
amendment. “If abortion is as personal a matter as the proponents say it is,” Biden said, “they 
should recognize [that] the taxpayers who feel very fervently about this issue . . . should not 
be put in the position of having their tax dollars used for something which they feel so 
strongly and adamantly against.” Biden then took it one step further, pleading for 
“proponents of the pro-abortion position to be consistent and to keep the Federal Government 
out of this issue, keep it a personal matter.”199 Senator Pastore of Rhode Island put it more 
succinctly: “Do you think it is right to use the taxpayers’ money to resolve this issue?”200  
 The new framing set the rights of American taxpayers against the rights to equal 
health care of indigent women. In doing so, the new arguments for the amendment fit within 
a larger conservative shift occurring in American cities and suburbs. Right to life activists 
were seeking to protect their rights, and the rights of average American taxpayers and 
homeowners, against the newly formulated right to equal access to health care for poor and 
minority communities. At the time, the federal government had supported this right to equal 
access of health care through the nine-year-old Medicaid program.  
 Moreover, Joe Biden’s arguments focused attention on whether the right to abortion 
was what scholars have characterized as a negative or positive right. If abortion was a 
positive right, the federal government should assist citizens in exercising that right through 
state action. In the case of abortion, reproductive choice advocates argued, the government 
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should provide public funds to those women who would otherwise be unable to afford an 
abortion. If abortion was a negative right, where citizens were left to pursue or oppose 
abortions unhindered by any public policy, then the government had no business providing 
funds. Right to life activists argued that citizens should be left to their own “private” capacity 
to pursue or oppose an abortion according to their own beliefs.201  
 Abortion rights proponents in the Senate quickly grasped the significance of this shift 
away from fetal personhood to a defense of taxpayer’s rights, and the identification of 
abortion as a negative right. “I do not feel the way to deal with this emotional, constitutional 
issue is by an amendment which discriminates against poor people,” Senator William 
Hathaway of Maine argued. Hathaway further asserted that the ban on Medicaid funding of 
abortion went against the fundamental purpose of the Labor-HEW appropriation bill: “the 
equalization of access to education and health services.”202 Bartlett replied, “I feel that . . .the 
existing laws [discriminate] against the unborn,” adding: “I think that they are discriminating 
also against the poor. My amendment advocates the right of the fetus of the poor woman to 
live."203 After an attempt to table the amendment failed in a vote of 50 to 34, Bartlett's 
amendment quickly passed the Senate in a voice vote.  
In early October, a joint committee sought to reconcile the differences between the 
Senate and House versions of the Health, Education and Welfare Department’s 1975 
appropriation bill. While the Senate had passed an amendment that cut federal funding of 
abortion, the House had voted down a similar measure in June. The majority of House 
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members believed that the abortion funding ban threatened contraception access, thanks to 
the arguments of Representative and obstetrician -gynecologist Bill Roy from Kansas. To 
resolve the impasse between the Senate and House’s versions, the joint committee asked Dr. 
Louis Hellman, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to issue a 
memorandum on the possible effects of the abortion funding ban. Hellman  did so on October 
5, 1974: “For each pregnancy among Medicaid eligible women that is brought to term,” the 
report stated, “it is estimated that the first-year costs to federal, state and local governments 
for maternity and pediatric care and public assistance is approximately $2,200.” The report 
then compared this cost to the average $180 it cost if a physician terminated a pregnancy 
within the first three months. At a press conference accompanying the memorandum’s 
release, Hellman further called attention to the fact that the government and taxpayer might 
have to provide federal aid and assistance for the next eighteen years to children whose 
mothers would have aborted them. Like earlier pro-abortion rights literature, the memo first 
recognized a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, and followed with a cost-benefit 
analysis of the funding decision. By protecting abortion as a positive right, Helman said, the 
government saved money.204  
The right to life reaction to the report was damning. Bartlett told the press, “I find it 
most disturbing that HEW would put a price tag on human life.” Bartlett believed that such a 
utilitarian analysis was dangerous in a Democratic society. “It would also be cheaper to 
eliminate persons on welfare and Social Security,” he quipped. “But thank God, we value life 
more than the dollar.”205 An activist echoed his charges of population control and euthanasia 
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in The Baltimore Sun: “When a high government official says that taking the life of an 
unborn baby is a 'bargain,' it is time for a change.” “Unless we get our government out of the 
population control business,” she wrote, “we shall all be 'bargains' to be eliminated, sooner or 
later.”206  
To attack Medicaid funding of abortion as coerced population control, right to life 
activists linked abortion funding to ongoing feminist and welfare rights organizations’ efforts 
to stop coerced sterilizations performed on indigent women. Right to life activists charged 
that government abortion funding, like coerced sterilization, was a dangerous and 
discriminatory form of population control. Stories of forced sterilizations shocked the public 
in 1973 and 1974, much as the Tuskegee syphilis and Westbrook Hepatitis experiments had  
done and were continuing to do. The case of twelve-year-old Minnie Lee Relf, in particular, 
captured public attention and outrage in 1973. Staff at the Montgomery Family Planning 
Clinic in Alabama diagnosed Relf as mentally incompetent, and deemed her unfit to make 
decisions concerning her sexuality and reproductive capabilities. The clinic then gave Relf 
Depo-Provera shots to prevent conception. When researchers found Depro-Provera caused 
cancer in lab rats and discontinued the drug, the clinic sterilized Relf. Her semi-literate 
mother signed the consent form for her daughter’s sterilization with an X; she mistakenly 
believed she was authorizing the continuation of the Depro-Provera treatments.207 Following 
her sterilization, Relf and her mother launched a class-action lawsuit against the Health, 
Education and Welfare Department. In response to the Minnie Lee Relf case, the National 
Welfare Rights Organization also filed a suit against HEW for violating regulations created 
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under the Nixon administration that prohibited sterilization of minors using federal funds. 
The courts ruled in favor of Relf, banning federal funding of sterilizations for minor girls and 
the mentally incompetent.  
At the same time, the National Welfare Rights Organization fought punitive 
sterilization laws that state governments had passed in the 1960s and 1970s. These laws 
sought to reduce the numbers of illegitimate and poor children by forcing women on welfare 
with two or more children to be sterilized or to use birth control. Under these laws, doctors in 
over thirteen states had performed sterilizations on thousands of women without their 
consent. A 1972 Center for Disease Control report supported the National Welfare 
Associations’ claims that women from poor and minority communities were 
disproportionately targeted for coerced sterilizations. The report found that black women, 
public assistance recipients, and women of Latin American descent were sterilized in higher 
numbers than white women and women who had never received public assistance. 208  
Pro-life activists linked these cases to abortion funding in order to accuse abortion 
rights supporters and government officials of elitism, racism, and classism. The argument to 
substantiate these charges had three parts: by defending the right of poor and minority fetuses 
to be born, pro-life activists believed themselves to be race champions. This argument also 
helped to deflect any charges of racism against the almost entirely white anti-abortion 
movement. Unlike abortion rights advocates, right to life activists claimed, they valued the 
potential offspring of poor and minority couples. For example, Senator Bartlett wrote, “I do 
not believe in discrimination against anyone – including very, very small human beings.”209 
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The activists then placed what they believed to be their racial progressivism in contrast to 
what they characterized as an elite and uncaring abortion rights opposition. “Where else 
would you find farm wives, ghetto dwellers, peaceniks, John Birchers, Catholic bishops, 
Mormons, psychiatrists, Jewish rabbis, lawyers, feminists, Baptist preachers, scientists?” 
asked one right to life activist in 1974. “Strongly pro-abortion organizations are composed of 
persons with similar backgrounds . . . the leaders are educated people who ‘have made it.’” 
According to this activist, right to lifers were "not motivated by any self-serving purpose or 
partisan political or economic gain.”210  
The National Right to Life Committee and a number of other pro-life organizations 
collected and publicized any Planned Parenthood and Zero Population Growth materials that 
said that when the government respected indigent women's reproductive choices, the 
government saved money. “Planned Parenthood Federation of America has demonstrated in a 
brochure how legal abortion has contributed to the decline in costs of public assistance,” 
wrote a National Right to Life News reporter in 1974. “This appeal to a Congress which has 
spent billions of dollars . . . indicates how the population planners want to reduce their tax 
bills!”211 Right to life activists also collected any literature from black and welfare rights 
activists critiquing such government family planning programs as coercive and 
discriminatory, especially when dealing with sterilization.212  
Finally, right to life activists pointed to the growing cuts in welfare spending initiated 
by various state governments and the Nixon White House. Why, right to life activist asked, 
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was the government spending money on abortions at a time it was cutting education, food 
and health care programs for indigent communities? Wasn’t there a better way to spend the 
taxpayers’ money than on abortions? If so, the activists charged, the government placed a 
higher priority on eliminating the poor than on helping them. In doing so, the federal 
government became corrupt and repugnant. “Social pressures against the poor but pregnant 
woman [are] now geared more to getting rid of poor babies than assisting their mothers with 
their economic problems wrote National Right to Life News editor Alice Hartle.213  
It is important to note that right to life activists made this three-part argument against 
government funding of abortion as a form of population control despite the fact that a 
number of them believed in cutting government welfare programs. Moreover, a majority of 
right to life activists also held this population control argument while they defended their 
right as taxpayers not to fund a procedure they equated with murder. Thus by championing 
taxpayers’ rights, even activists who did not want to cut welfare programs found themselves 
more closely aligned with conservatives and Republican politicians who were pursuing 
welfare cuts. Taken as a whole then, right to life argument against government funding of 
abortion centered on conservative ideas concerning taxpayer's rights, the limits of privacy 
when considering abortion, and a view of government as oppressive and corrupt. Dr. Joseph 
Stanton of Massachusetts, a former Catholic Democrat, exemplified this trend. In December 
1974, he wrote that Dr. Hellman’s “cost benefit analysis shows some inconvenient lives are 
better disposed of because it’s cheaper that way.” He then asked, “Is this what the abortion 
elitists had in mind all along for the poor, the disadvantaged and minority groups?” He 
concluded his editorial, “It is past time to clean the abortion elitists out of the Department of 
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Health, Education and Welfare and end the spending of taxpayer’s dollar for the procuring of 
abortions over the deep conscientious objection of the taxpayer.”214  
Right to life activists thus departed from the majority of black feminists and women 
leaders of the National Welfare Rights Organization, the very women they claimed to be 
protecting. In 1974, these women held that a woman had an inalienable right to choose to 
bear children or to limit the number of her children. They advocated for government funding 
of abortion.215 Moreover, poor women’s actions challenged this right to life population 
control argument. The Alan Guttmacher Institute, a research institute founded with funding 
by Planned Parenthood Federation of America in 1968, reported that in 1973, “Crude 
estimates of the number of Medicaid-financed abortions throughout the nation fell 136,000-
356,000 short of the estimated number of low-income women in need.”216 This evidence 
suggests that contrary to right to life claims poor women were not coerced into abortion, 
appreciated the financial help in terminating their pregnancies and if anything, wanted more 
money set aside for women dependent on public assistance. Reproductive choice advocates 
thus argued that not providing public funds for abortions coerced these women into having 
babies they did not want.  
By December 1974, the joint House and Senate committee dropped the amendment 
banning abortion funds. The black newspaper Afro-American noted that it was only a 
momentary victory. “A majority of the conferees strongly support the apparent intent . . . to 
prohibit the use of public funds to pay for or encourage abortions,” a reporter wrote. The 
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same reporter also noted that the only reason the bill failed was that abortion rights 
supporters and sympathetic politicians had been “persuaded that an annual appropriations bill 
is an improper vehicle for such a controversial and far reaching legislative provision.”217  
 In the aftermath of the federal Medicaid funding debates, the joint defense of 
taxpayer’s rights and critiques of population control trickled back down to state right to life 
organizations. On December 31, 1974, the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a 
Missouri statute that excluded abortion and abortion referral services from state Medicaid 
benefits was unconstitutional. Mary Ann Johanek, the president of Missouri Citizens for Life, 
declared the court’s decision was an attack on the poor because the same state legislature 
failed to increase welfare funds. “There will be subtle and perhaps not-so-subtle pressure on 
these welfare mothers to have their unborn babies destroyed because it will be economically 
enticing Johanek.218 A month later, in January 1975, the Chicano Welfare Rights 
Organization of Denver and the Colorado Right to Life Committee released a joint statement 
objecting to the fifty million dollar Health, Education and Welfare Department fund for 
family planning that also paid for the abortions and sterilizations of women on public 
assistance. Patricia Estrada, the director of Chicano Welfare Rights, told local press that, 
what the poor welfare mothers needs is financial aid to assist her.” As a result of HEW’s 
funding of abortions and sterilizations, Estrada believed, the government was “more 
interested in eliminating the poor than in eliminating poverty.219 While the Denver alliance 
between a right to life and welfare rights organization was a rare exception, it helped to 
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legitimate the right to life rhetoric that positioned the movement as defenders of racial 
minorities and poor communities. In doing so, the right to life movement had found a way to 
restrict poor, underage and minority women’s access to abortion while positioning 
themselves as race champions.  
The Edelin Trial  
On January 10, 1975, the Edelin manslaughter trial began. In their opening 
statements, defense attorney William Homans and prosecutor Newman Flanagan made clear 
the stakes of the trial: the legality of abortions close to or past the point of fetal viability. 
They laid out two competing definitions of medical terms and standard medical practices 
backed by two different sets of physicians and medical researchers. The prosecution’s 
witnesses, on one hand, were made up of a pro-life network of obstetric and pediatric 
specialists and medical researchers in addition to pro-life general practitioners and members 
of the Boston City Hospital staff. From these witnesses’ testimony, the prosecution built a 
case that showed the fetus under question was viable, alive and capable of breathing when 
Edelin separated it from Alice Roe’s placental sack during the legal abortion on October 3, 
1973.220 Flanagan then argued that because Edelin failed to remove the fetus and administer 
life saving care, “baby boy Roe” died. The defense, on the other hand, gathered together the 
leading medical experts in obstetrics and gynecology to “testify that the manner in which Dr. 
Edelin performed the hysterotomy for the purpose of the abortion was in accordance with 
sound medical practice.” 221 From these witnesses’ testimonies, the defense showed that the 
                                                
220 Opening Statement of Newman Flanagan, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin, 
Suffolk SS. Superior Court No. 81823, Vol. 1; 17, 20, 37. Harvard Law Library, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
221 Opening Statement of William Homans, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin, 
Suffolk SS. Superior Court No. 81823, fifth day of trial; Vol. 1, 33, 37-40. Harvard Law Library, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 117 
fetus was not viable, at no point was a person under the law and that Edelin had acted as any 
responsible physician would have.222 
The prosecution’s witness list of pro-life physicians showed that a unified right to life 
movement. The grassroots initiative to restrict abortion access and move away from the 
Human Life Amendment had made its way up to the top leaders of the movement. Six 
months prior to the Edelin trial in August 1974, leaders of the National Right to Life 
Committee had fractured over what seemed irrevocable strategy differences. Marjory 
Mecklenburg left the National Right to Life Committee with a number of Protestants to form 
the American Citizens Concerned for Life. The National Right to Life Committee and its 
prioritization of the Human Life Amendment, Mecklenburg charged, would never allow the 
organization to embrace initiatives from the grassroots that sought to restrict abortion access. 
Upon her resignation, Dr. Mildred Jefferson replaced her as the chair of the National Right to 
Life Committee’s board of directors. Now, in January 1975, Mildred Jefferson testified for 
the prosecution with Marjory Mecklenburg’s husband Fred, who was a specialist in obstetrics 
and gynecology in St. Paul Minnesota. Denis Cavanagh, a leading member of Missouri 
Citizens for Life and an obstetrician and gynecologist, joined them as star witnesses for the 
prosecution. While Cavanagh’s organization was a state affiliate of the National Right to Life 
Committee, it championed incremental efforts to restrict abortion access. The Edelin trial 
therefore healed the wounds that national right to life leaders inflicted on each other in 1974 
and signaled to grassroots activists that leaders were willing to follow their lead.  
Mildred Jefferson led the prosecution. Flanagan asked her “to explain and define the 
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terms that would come up in the trial in a way that would be understandable to someone 
without a scientific background.”223 She defined birth as the moment when the fetus detached 
from the placenta, not its exit from the uterine cavity. She also defined abortion as the 
termination of a pregnancy, not the termination of a fetus. Both of her definitions allowed for 
the rare instance of a live birth abortion, a case in which a viable fetus survived the abortion. 
The defense objected vehemently to Jefferson’s testimony. Defense Attorney William 
Homans argued that she was not a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology and was politically 
biased due to her National Right to Life Committee and Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
affiliations. By Jefferson’s own admission, she had received no training in proper abortion 
techniques. Still, Judge McGuire allowed Jefferson’s testimony on the assumption that she 
was able to separate her moral judgments and pro-life politics from testimony as to how the 
medical profession determined what it considered good medical practice. Absent during the 
arguments over her status as an expert witness, the jury never knew about Jefferson’s 
political background and listened intently as she defined fetal personhood, abortion and birth.  
Through testimony such as Jefferson’s, the trial became a venue for lawyers, 
physicians, and the general public to debate the status of the fetus in American society. 
Within the first week of the 1975 trial, The Boston Globe headlines cried “Definition of fetus 
is issue in Edelin trial,” and “Edelin trial trying to define birth” while the New York Times 
noted “Abortion Trial’s Crucial Issue: When does life begin?”224 The press’s focus on the 
fetus and the beginning of its life was a huge and unforeseen victory for Tom Connelly. He 
                                                
223Mildred Jefferson interview by Jennifer Donnally, October 2007. 
 
224See “Definition of fetus is issue in Edelin Trial” The Boston Globe, 11 January 1975, 3; Nils J. 
Burzelius, “Edelin trial semantics crucial” The Boston Sunday Globe, 12 January 1975, 29, 34; Robert 
Reinhold, “Abortion Trial's Crucial Issue: When Does Life Begin?” New York Times, 12 Jan 1975, 34; Alan 
Sheehan, “Edelin trial trying to define birth,” Boston Globe, 20 Jan 1975, 1, 4.   
 
 119 
argued in a 2010 oral interview that the trial shifted the national press’s framing of abortion. 
Connelly remembered that “The reporters started adopting the terminology of the whole 
thing,” adding that[t]heir point of view went from hostility of some sort to 'Wow these are 
important questions' to considering things from the right to life perspective.  
Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s analysis of the press coverage of the trial buttressed 
Connelly’s conclusion. A spokesperson for the organization reported to the National Right to 
Life News that the trial“marked a possible turning point in the media’s coverage of the 
abortion issue.225 This was particularly important because Connelly and many right to life 
activists believed that the only reason why abortion became legal was“because the victim 
[was] not seen” and “it was allowed to go forward because people couldn't identify with” the 
fetus. As the trial continued, the press coverage and testimony increased the likelihood that 
more Americans would equate the fetus with a baby, and therefore make abortion illegal. 
This occurred despite the fact that the judge and the defense objected to the prosecution’s 
continual use of the word “baby” in reference to the fetus.226 
While the prosecution relied on the expert testimony of right to life physicians, its key 
piece of evidence was a photograph of “baby boy Roe” as city investigators had found him in 
December of 1973, resting in a bottle of formaline solution. Flanagan insisted that the jury 
see the picture of the fetus in order to understand that the fetus was not a “subject,” 
“specimen,” “blob,” or “bunch of mucous” but an “independent human being.” The picture, 
according to Flanagan, showed that the fetus was viable and “human like you or me.”227 
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Contending that the photograph was not medical evidence, defense attorney Homans 
objected to it as inflammatory evidence. “The jury,” Homans argued, lacked “the background 
to be able to assess what they s[aw] in these photographs in light of the narrow, rather 
complex issues in the case.” Homans, like Flanagan, knew that there was a good chance that 
the predominantly Catholic jury would think of the fetus as a baby once they saw the picture. 
He charged that the picture would discount all the medical testimony compiled by the 
defense that demonstrated that the fetus was not viable and did not survive the abortion.  The 
picture appealed to the jurors’ emotions, not their reason. Though the judge acknowledged 
the defense’s objections to the photograph, he allowed the prosecution to submit it as 
evidence. 
As the jurors discussed the case, one reported, “We paid a lot of attention to that 
picture” because “none of us had ever seen a fetus before.”228 Mildred Jefferson recalled that 
the picture “of this little dead baby boy, lying on his side with his hair long enough to curl” 
convicted Edelin. “You could not tell that jury this was not a little human being.”229 Jury 
member Liberty Ann Collin agreed with Jefferson’s analysis. She told reporters  “why 
you’ve got all these very learned men, these doctors, arguing between themselves about 
whether this baby was alive or not, it made it very difficult for us to decide who was right.” 
She relied on her own experience as a mother of five to make her decision. She had “had 
babies, and [she knew] at six months they’re alive.” 230 After seven hours of deliberation, jury 
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members agreed that Edelin had been negligent; they believed he had not given the “baby 
enough of an opportunity,” and had not checked for fetal signs of life.231 They found him 
guilty even though the judge told them negligence was not grounds for a manslaughter 
conviction.232 
The verdict inspired heated discussion of the underlying issues of race and class in 
Boston exploded. A letter to the editor of the black Boston newspaper Bay State Banner 
claimed that right to life activists capitalized “on the explosively tense racial situation in 
Boston and a borderline abortion performed by a Black doctor on a Black teenager in an 
effort to achieve.... further restriction on legalized abortion.”233 Jury alternate Michael Ciano 
stated that Edelin’s race biased some white jurors. He told reporters that “there were quite a 
few [jury members] who made racial slangs, not against Edelin, but against black people in 
general,” and that one juror said, “That black nigger’s guilty as sin” after the final 
arguments.234 The jury foreman denied Ciano’s charges, claiming, “We didn’t speak racial 
whatsoever. I didn’t know that the doctor was black until last Saturday, after the verdict.”235 
Several other jury members backed up the jury foreman’s assertion that they did not know 
that the medium-skinned Edelin was black. The foreman also said that if some jurors were 
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racist, they would have found Edelin innocent because they certainly knew from the 
photograph that Baby Doe was black. The jurors insisted that their decision was based on 
their belief that the fetus was a baby and wrongfully killed.  
Right to life activists across the country came to the defense of the all-white jury. To 
do so, they drew upon the rhetoric they had developed to pursue abortion restrictions, 
positing a corrupt government, liberal press, and an amoral academic elite that unfairly 
criticized the jurors. The jury came to represent the lower and middle-class white 
homeowners that had made up Nixon’s “silent majority.” The jury did represent this 
demographic: all the jurors were white. Eleven of the sixteen jurors identified themselves as 
Roman Catholic and one of the remaining five was married to a Catholic Six of the sixteen 
came from the racially-charged neighborhoods of Dorchester and South Boston, and seven 
had school-aged children and a personal investment in the ongoing school desegregation 
crisis. The group included a bartender, a housewife, a ship builder, a custodian, a mechanic 
and an engineer, most belonged to the white ethnic working class and lower-middle class. 
None had completed college.236  
Right to life activists also deflected charges of racism by questioning Edelin’s race. 
They claimed that even though Edelin self-identified as black, his appearance was 
ambiguous: Edelin’s skin tone was not very dark. He wore a bushy black mustache and wore 
his hair in tight black curls, a popular style for all men in the mid-1970s. Many people 
misidentified Edelin’s race and ethnicity. Dr. Mildred F. Jefferson believed Edelin’s “overall 
comportment was just another Latino.”237 Tom Connelly recalled, “The problem was that Dr. 
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Edelin looked more white than ten or fifteen people in the court room, who were Italian, 
Spanish or whatever, or even Irish. In other words, he didn't look black.”238 During the initial 
investigation, Newman Flanagan assumed Edelin was Jewish. Rumor had it that when 
Flanagan learned that Edelin was black, he said, “Oh. Shit.”239  By questioning Edelin’s 
racial identity, Connelly, Jefferson, and Flanagan discounted all charges of the jury’s racial 
prejudice. “The people involved [in the trial] weren't racists,” Connelly would later assert. “It 
had nothing to do with that.” 
The activists then championed the jury as wiser than the medical and legal elites. 
“The jury's decision,” wrote National Right to Life News reporter Michael Coughlin, “is an 
unequivocal announcement to American's legal and medical communities that ordinary 
Americans are shocked with this country's cavalier attitude toward abortion.”240 A  pro-lifer 
from Arizona praised the common sense of the jury. “It is that lay juries, as unsophisticated 
as they generally are, look at the picture of a dead baby and see it for what it is – a dead baby, 
not just 'the products of conception' or some other equally silly euphemism.”241 Senator 
Dewey Bartlett told Congress, “I am now given new spirit and encouragement for the 12 
Americans sitting in a jury box in Boston, Massachusetts, who looked at a picture of a 6-
month-old fetus and concluded that this tiny infant was worthy of protection by our legal 
process.”242  
The verdict also mobilized abortion rights supporters and civil-rights activists in 
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Boston and Massachusetts throughout the spring of 1975. Just two days after the trial ended, 
1,500 women marched to the Massachusetts State House protesting the verdict with signs 
stating “Abortion is the issue” and chanting, “Not the Church, Not the State, Women must 
decide their fate.” That evening, local women’s organizations held a candlelight vigil for 
Edelin. The Association of Professors of Gynecology and Obstetrics passed a resolution on 
February 18 stating that doctors “must guard against local jurisdiction or vocal minorities 
imposing their ethical position for medical care in family planning and abortion on those 
patients or doctors who do not hold those positions.”243 In a clear sign of his dismay over the 
jury’s decision, the judge sentenced Edelin to one year’s probation, pending the appeal he 
expected Edelin to launch, so that even if the verdict stood, the judge Edelin would not serve 
any jail time. A week after the trial, Edelin began a year-long appeals process and returned to 
the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department at Boston City Hospital.244  
Right to life reactions showed that activists understood the Edelin trial and verdict in 
a larger conservative context. “The judge was on [Edelin's] side from the beginning,” wrote 
North Carolinian Carol M. Blackney in March 1975. She was furious the judge had 
instructed the jurors to declare Edelin innocent. "When that failed,” she complained, “he 
sentenced him to a year's probation…. What a farce! What a waste of taxpayer's money." 
Blackney concluded her letter reiterating the emotion fuelling the movement’s strategic 
pursuit of abortion restrictions. “900,000 abortion deaths in 1974 diminish me and you. We 
are all responsible for allowing this slaughter to continue.245 
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Abortion Rights Mobilization 
In April 1975, Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma once again proposed restricting 
federal funding of abortion. Rather than attaching the amendment rider to the 1976 Health, 
Education, and Welfare Department appropriations bill, he tagged it onto the 1975 Nurse 
Training Act. He again cited right to life critiques of government population control efforts 
and a defense of the rights of taxpayers and the rights of poor and minority fetuses., claiming 
that the government “has taken on the Orwellian task of encouraging mothers to eliminate 
their unwanted unborn.”246 He also charged that the American taxpayer wanted to know 
“why the Federal Government is spending good tax dollars for questionable programs.” He 
concluded, “Congress has a real opportunity by passing this amendment to guarantee the 
right to life of thousands of the unborn poor who otherwise will lose their lives.”247 
To the surprise of abortion rights supporters, Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts rose to 
lead the opposition to the ban on abortion funding. Prior to the funding debate, Kennedy had 
not taken a stand on abortion. As a member of the Kennedy family, he was part of the most 
prestigious Roman Catholic family in the country, and was also one of the best-known 
Democratic Senators. By attacking efforts to cut abortion funding, Kennedy defied the 
Catholic Church’s opposition to abortion.  
Kennedy would later claim that his decision to support legal abortion took lots of soul 
searching. Much of that soul searching may have occurred during a March 1975 secret 
meeting he arranged between reproductive choice advocates and Catholic Democrats. 248 The 
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purpose of the meeting was to find a way for Catholic Democratic politicians to support legal 
abortion without alienating the Catholic hierarchy or Catholic voters. Attendees of the 
meeting at the Kennedy compound in Cape Cod included: Father Robert Drinan, a Jesuit 
Priest and representative of Massachusetts fifth district in Congress; Sargent Shriver, 
Kennedy’s brother-in-law, who had served in the Kennedy and Johnson presidential 
administrations and had run for vice president in 1972; Kennedy’s sister, Eunice Kennedy 
Shriver, the founder of Special Olympics and a right to life ally; and Pamela Lowery, the 
president of Massachusetts Organization to Repeal Abortion Laws. Together they came up 
with a defense of legal abortion that would center on the implications of an amendment 
establishing fetal personhood, and on the rights of poor and minority women. Their position 
would leave abortion’s moral dimension to the Catholic Church and the realm of private 
belief. As private citizens, then, Catholic Democrats could declare their personal opposition 
to abortion, but as legislators they would not impose that belief on other American citizens. 
Kennedy tested this defense in the April 10 debate over Medicaid funding of abortion. 
When Catholic Republican Dewey Bartlett and Conservative James Buckley of New York 
asked Kennedy’s opinion on abortion, he refused to give it. “I believe that . . .the question 
[is] whether it is legal,” Kennedy replied. “I am not going to get into a position, as much I am 
sure the Senator would like me to, of talking about my own philosophy or religious 
belief.”249 Kennedy then attacked Bartlett’s proposed funding ban on two accounts: would 
this ban eliminate necessary funding for contraception, and for abortions for victims of rape? 
He also attacked the bill as a violation of equal access to health care. He charged, “This is a 
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14th amendment issue. It is an equal rights issue.”250  
 Supporters of the funding restrictions deflected charges of discrimination in the same 
way right to life activists had responded to the 1974 Medicaid funding debates, and to 
charges of racism during the Edelin trial: they defended taxpayers’ rights and championed 
the rights of unborn fetuses, including those of poor and non-white origins. Senator Buckley 
replied, “First, it is simply not true that denying tax dollars for practices held to be rights by 
Supreme Court decisions is discriminatory . . . The taxpayer is under no obligation to fund 
with his money any and all rights.” Bartlett added, “What I am saying is that I do not want to 
see the unborn children of the poor be discriminated against.” The ban on Medicaid funds for 
abortions and abortion referrals failed on a vote of 54 to 36. The Senate then unanimously 
adopted the position of black feminists and the National Welfare Rights Organizations 
concerning indigent women’s reproductive choices, and passed a resolution that prohibited 
government officials from coercing welfare recipients into obtaining abortions or being 
sterilized. 251 
Taken together, the Edelin verdict in February and the Medicaid funding debates in 
April alerted abortion rights supporters that the right to life movement had shifted strategies. 
The movement now seemed united in pursuing abortion restrictions that disproportionately 
targeted poor, minority and underage women’s abortion access. In a New York Times 
editorial, Beatrice Blair, the executive director of the National Abortion Rights Action 
League, wrote: “A zealous, well-organized, well-financed minority is responsible for the 
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enormous political pressure.”252 In response to this right to life strategy shift, the National 
Abortion Rights Action League in May held a series of protests and Abortion Action weeks 
across the country. They chose the slogan, “Defend Edelin, Defend Your Rights.” “The 
conviction of Dr. Edelin is only a part of a very strong campaign against a woman's right to 
choose abortion,” stated a flyer publicizing the Abortion Action Week. “The anti-abortion 
forces are now agreed that a good method of operation against women's rights is the 'state-
rights' approach, thus in Massachusetts bills restricting or limiting abortion are constantly 
being introduced.”253 Conference panels for the Abortion Action weeks included: “Minor's 
Rights Conference on abortion and birth control,” “Conference on the special needs of high 
school women and abortion,” and “Seminar on Black and Third World Women and 
Abortion.254 Abortion Action week culminated in rallies in New York, Philadelphia, 
Washington, D.C., Detroit, Atlanta, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Cleveland. 
Every rally raised money for Dr. Edelin’s appeals case.255 On December 17, 1976, nineteen 
months after the guilty verdict, the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned Edelin’s 
conviction in a six to five decision. The court overruled the conviction because the judge had 
not conducted the trial appropriately.256  Following the successful appeal, Kenneth Edelin 
went on to become a civil rights advocate and pro-choice activist of international renown.257 
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In1976, the newly elected Suffolk County District Attorney Newman Flanagan also dropped 
the grave-robbing charges against the four Boston City Hospital medical researchers. In the 
meantime, fetal research once again became legal in the United States. The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
released a series of regulations that Congress approved in July, 197.258 
 
 “Strength Through Unity” 
On June 20, 1975, the National Right to Life Committee held its annual National 
Convention. Over 1500 members gathered in Denver to lay strategy and discuss movement 
priorities. The theme of the conference, “Strength through Unity,” highlighted right to life 
activists’ desire to move past the bitter debates over strategy and the Human Life 
Amendment that characterized the organization in 1973 and 1974. State board members 
elected a new Executive Board and approved the incremental strategy to restrict abortion that 
was first developed at the grassroots level between 1974 and 1975. Dr. Mildred Jefferson was 
elected president, and former Executive Director and disgraced incremental leader Robert 
Green of Kentucky became the organization’s vice president.259 Alice Harlte reported that 
“when it was all over Sunday noon, the facial expressions of people leaving the convention 
hall left no doubt that they felt that the Right to Life movement had taken a giant step 
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[forward].”260   
At her acceptance speech and presidential address, Mildred Jefferson articulated the 
National Right to Life Committee’s strategic turn to abortion restrictions. She exclaimed, 
“We will use every means possible to overturn the decision of the Supreme Court.”261 
Jefferson spent most of her allotted time railing against government funding of abortion, not 
advocating a Human Life Amendment. She described government funding as attempts to use 
“our tax monies . . . to destroy the poor.” She warned other Democrats against following Ted 
Kennedy’s path. If Democrats adopted what right to life activists considered a “pro-abortion” 
and “pro-death” position, Jefferson threatened, single-issue anti-abortion voters who were 
also loyal Democrats would have no other choice but to leave the party. Democrats like 
Kennedy, Jefferson said, could no longer automatically assumer their fellow Catholics would 
support them.262  
Dr. Jefferson was not the only leader to grasp the importance of her movement’s 
revised strategy and its potential impact on American politics. In July of 1975, Ronald 
Reagan wrote a nationally syndicated article reflecting on the Edelin trial. At the time, the 
former California governor was contemplating running for the 1976 Republican presidential 
nomination. “The press called it a fetus. The defense lawyer called it a fetus. The jury called 
it a baby. And, after they did, they convicted Dr. Kenneth C. Edelin of Boston of 
manslaughter,” wrote Reagan.“Dr. Edelin was frustrated and angry at the outcome, not 
surprisingly. That he momentarily charged the jury with racial prejudice (he is black) can be 
                                                
260Alice Hartle, “National Right to Life Committee President takes Sen. Kennedy to Task,” NRL News 
2 (August 1975). 
 
261 Emphasis mine. Ibid. 
 
262Ibid. 
 
 131 
attributed to the heat of the moment.” Reagan dismissed entirely any notion of jury prejudice: 
“There is no evidence to suggest that the jury based its decision on anything other than the 
charge put to them and the facts presented.” He then expressed his increasing concern “that 
there is a subtle, but nonetheless effective, move afoot to dehumanize babies unwanted by 
their mothers.” He argued that calling unborn babies fetuses were central to this 
dehumanizing campaign; he compared the use of “fetus to all the pejorative terms applied to 
various enemies to rob them of human qualities, in order to make belittling them, ostracizing 
them or killing them more easy. He then listed those terms: “wops, frogs, spics, micks, 
polacks, gooks and slopes.” By listing terms applied to white, Asian and Latino ethnic 
groups, and excluding terms applied to blacks, Reagan hinted that a conservative politician 
could use fetal rights to appeal to the working-class ethnic groups that were a core part of the 
Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition. From his office in July 1975, Reagan envisioned a 
right to life movement that would be essential to electoral politics and pivotal to forming a 
new conservative coalition around issues of race, class, sexuality and gender. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
“The Right to Life Revolution” 
 “Will liberals capture the GOP? Can responsible Democrats find a home? Has the 
time come for a new party?” asked promotional material for the Conservative Political 
Action Conference in the February 1975 National Right to Life News.263 The American 
Conservative Union and Young Americans for Freedom, the sponsors of the conference, 
hoped to advance the right to life movement’s involvement in a conservative coalition they 
were forming. In order to do so, they invited Mildred Jefferson to attend the conference as 
the representative of the National Right to Life Committee. Jefferson was open to their 
overtures and eager to solidify such an alliance. At the end of the four-day conference, and 
amid news of the just-announced Edelin manslaughter verdict, attendees passed a resolution 
“to protect the life of the unborn child from the moment of conception.”264  
One year later, Mildred Jefferson would make conservative coalition-building an 
essential component of what she envisioned as the right to life revolution of 1976.265 Two 
larger goals undergirded her plans: Jefferson wanted to turn what was a small but militant 
right to life minority that was strongest at the local and state level into a political force to be 
reckoned with at the national level. She also wanted to turn that pro-life minority into a
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majority by recruiting more conservatives and Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants to 
the movement. Two strategic initiatives would further these ends. Jefferson sought to make 
abortion a pivotal issue in the presidential primaries and fall elections and to ban federal 
funding of abortion and abortion referral services. These initiatives worked hand in hand to 
align what was now a united right to life movement with conservatives mobilizing in the 
Republican Party.  
 
The Right to Life Movement, Ronald Reagan and the Rise of the New Right 
The February 1975 Conservative Political Action Conference was the brainchild of a 
group of Washington insiders and right-wing political pundits who made up the “New 
Right.” These men included Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, and John 
“Terry” Dolan; more established conservative commentators including William F. Buckley 
and William Rusher; and conservative politicians such as Senator Jesse Helms of North 
Carolina and Representative John Conlan of Arizona. Between 1973 and 1975, these men 
founded and led a number of conservative institutions, organizations and political 
committees, including the Heritage Foundation in 1973, the Committee for the Survival of a 
Free Congress and the Conservative Caucus in 1974, and the National Conservative Political 
Action Committee in 1975.266 These organizations created a powerful conservative 
establishment that would help forge grassroots conservative groups across the United States 
into a national coalition between 1975 and 1980.267 Kevin Phillips, a political columnist and 
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former analyst for the Nixon presidential campaigns, dubbed these men the “New Right” in 
1975.268 
The young men who made up the New Right were indebted to older conservative 
leaders. Most grew up in the Republican Party and met first through Young Americans for 
Freedom, a conservative organization founded at Buckley’s estate in Connecticut in 1960. 
Four years later, Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign served as the New Right activists’ 
baptism by fire into the conservative political movement.269 By the late 1960s and early 
1970s, however, these young men were eager to differentiate themselves from the “Old 
Right.” That group of businessmen, economists and conservative intellectuals, according to 
these younger men, “had been fighting liberalism since the 1930s,” and the Old Right had 
been losing the fight.270 Richard Viguerie quipped that they “spent so much time putting out 
liberal fires, they had little time to start any fires of their own.”271 This new generation of 
conservative leaders wanted not only to start fires but also to start a revolution, echoing 
Mildred Jefferson’s call for a right to life revolution in 1976. Paul Weyrich said, “We are 
radicals who want to change the existing power structure . . . The New Right does not want 
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to conserve, we want to change – we are the forces of change.”272  
 Within five months of Gerald Ford taking the oath of office in 1974, leaders of the 
New Right began serious discussions around dinner tables over whether the Republican Party 
could be their home any longer. They were unhappy with Ford’s appointments of Nelson 
Rockefeller as vice president and pro-choice, pro-ERA feminist Mary Louise Smith as the 
chair of the Republican National Committee. Rockefeller was the former governor of New 
York and the leader of the Republican Party’s moderate wing. Right to life activists detested 
Rockefeller because he was a staunch supporter of abortion rights and had signed into law 
the repeal of the New York criminal abortion statute in 1970. Two years later, he vetoed a 
bill re-criminalizing abortion for which state activists, who were predominantly Catholic 
Democrats, had lobbied heavily. After Rockefeller’s appointment, conservatives, including 
some right to life activists, began to wonder whether they should establish a third party.273 
Data supported their unease. Public opinion polls at the time showed that more Republicans 
supported legal abortion access than Democrats. Even in 1976, only forty percent of 
Republican delegates to the National Convention identified as pro-life.274  
The publication of William Rusher’s The Making of a New Majority Party in 1975 
reinforced New Right leaders’ desire to consolidate conservative efforts. Rusher was a 
regular columnist for the National Review and had been a mentor of Young Americans for 
Freedom since its founding in 1960. In his new book, Rusher asserted that fifty-nine percent 
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of the American people were conservatives. It was past time to create a conservative 
coalition, Rusher charged, and if need be, a new independent party. In an attempt to get an 
independent party up and running in the spring of 1975, Rusher tried to convince former 
California governor Ronald Reagan to run for president as an independent.  
Reagan rejected Rusher’s overtures. The Republican Party was in shambles after 
Watergate, Reagan observed. Was this not the perfect time for conservatives to revitalize the 
party instead of establishing a new one? Reagan expressed a clear interest in launching a 
conservative challenge within the Republican Party to Gerald Ford’s presidency. His interest 
in a Republican candidacy persuaded New Right leaders; ideas of a conservative third party 
faded as they invested in the Republican Party and in Ronald Reagan. In the summer of 1975, 
Reagan and the New Right began to court the various conservative organizations they hoped 
to weld into a coalition to win the Republican nomination.275 Many of the groups Reagan 
targeted had sent representatives to attend the Conservative Political Action Conference the 
previous February, including Mildred Jefferson and other members of the National Right to 
Life Committee.  
As the newly elected president of the Committee in June 1975, Mildred Jefferson 
welcomed such an alliance. The burgeoning conservative revival excited the born-and-bred 
Texas Republican, despite the fact that a majority of the members of her organization were 
Roman Catholic, and, many politicos assumed, loyal to the Democratic Party. She and other 
National Right to Life Committee leaders had already been urging activists to disregard 
former party loyalties. If they were truly sympathetic to the plight of the unborn, leaders 
announced, they would vote on abortion and abortion alone. The political opportunity these 
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single-issue voters presented to New Right leaders was almost irresistible. They could shift 
entire blocks of voters who had voted for the Democratic Party into the Republican Party by 
championing the anti-abortion cause. the conservative alliance forwarded two of Jefferson’s 
primary goals: it would expand the movement’s membership and sympathizers and turn a 
pro-life minority into a winning majority. New Right leaders also had political expertise that 
Jefferson needed. They could help her transform a grassroots anti-abortion effort that had 
helped to unite the pro-life movement from the bottom up in 1974 and 1975 into an effective, 
national, top-down lobbying campaign in 1976. 
In September 1975, Jefferson invited New Right leaders to participate in a 
“Congressional Liaison” meeting in Washington, D.C. Would they, Jefferson asked, be 
willing to teach her and thirty other women from National Right to Life Committee state 
affiliates to be better lobbyists? At the meeting, Jefferson and the state participants worked 
with Paul Weyrich and Carl Curtis of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress to 
coordinate two legislative campaigns, to stop Medicaid funding of abortion in 1976 and to 
pass a Human Life Amendment.276 Other presenters at the meeting included American 
Citizens Concerned for Life leader Judy Fink, conservative activist Connie Marshner, and 
National Right to Life Executive Committee members Robert Greene and Ray White.277  
 
Abortion and the Origins of the Christian Right  
As Reagan began to contemplate a presidential campaign in the summer of 1975, 
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evangelical Christian leaders of the right to life movement began to found their own 
organizations, separate from but in accord with the goals of the National Right to Life 
Committee. On July 7, 1975, twenty-five Protestant ministers and lay right to life leaders 
founded the Christian Action Council. The new Protestant organization’s goals included 
reminding non-Catholics, in the words of the new chairman Harold O.J. Brown, “that 
virtually all Christians from the beginning have been against permissive abortion.” For the 
right to life movement to succeed, Brown proclaimed, “We can no longer leave our 
legislators and judges . . . under the mistaken impression that the abortion issue is of concern 
only to a ‘sectarian’ minority in our ‘pluralistic’ society.”278 A group of distinguished 
Protestant leaders joined Brown on the Christian Action Council’s Board of Directors. They 
included: Mrs. Ruth Bell Graham, wife of Rev. Billy Graham, Mrs. Edith Schaeffer, wife of 
the famous Evangelical theologian Francis Schaeffer, Rev. Harold Lindsell, editor-in-chief of 
Christianity Today, Rev. William Bentley, president of the National Black Evangelical 
Association, Rev. Jacob A.O. Preus, president of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Rev. 
J. Robertson McQuilkin, president of Columbia Bible College, and C. Everett Koop, a 
prominent Presbyterian physician and right to life activist who was the head of pediatric 
surgery at Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia. 
 The Christian Action Council held its first meeting at the Billy Graham Evangelistic 
Association in Montreat, North Carolina over the weekend of August 14, 1975. There, they 
agreed to support constitutional amendments that would overturn Roe v. Wade but did not 
specifically endorse a Human Life Amendment. Rev. Robert Holbrook, the executive 
director of Baptists for Life and a board member at-large of the National Right to Life 
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Committee also attended the meeting. Holbrook told the gathered group of ministers and lay 
organizers "The key to changing the present situation of unlimited permissive abortion in 
America is first to make uncommitted American Protestants aware of the full reality of the 
situation.”279 According to Holbrook and Christian Action Council members, the right to life 
movement’s priority should be recruiting Protestants. Holbrook was not the only 
conservative leader to believe that a right to life revolution and a corresponding conservative 
counterrevolution against liberalism was dependent on Protestant involvement. Earlier in 
February 1975, Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina had told attendees at the Conservative 
Political Action Conference that a conservative coalition hinged on the mobilization of 
evangelical Christians. Without them, Helms charged, conservatives would not be able to 
realign American party politics and shift the country to the right.280  
As these Protestant organizations formed, leaders of the right to life movement 
welcomed them as part of conservative attack against “secular humanism” and in defense of 
“Judeo-Christian” and “Western” values. Rev. Robert Holbrook had told the 1,500 attendees 
at the June 1975 National Right to Life Convention that “The Bicentennial will find us with 
little of the Christian roots of our nation recognizable, but replaced with a philosophy of 
secular humanism.” The National Right to Life Committee Board, too, had accepted and 
promoted this rhetoric in attempts to unite conservative Catholics, Protestants and Jews. On 
June 22, 1975 they passed a resolution acknowledging the role of a Judeo-Christian God in 
their movement for the first time. “Be it resolved that we make our witness to Him [sic] who 
created us . . . Be it further resolved that we make our witness to Him in protecting life from 
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the moment of conception to natural death, in seeking a Human Life Amendment however 
long it takes, at whatever cost may prove necessary.”281 
As part of the effort to recruit evangelical Protestants, The National Right to Life 
News began to expand its coverage beyond abortion. In September 1975, Alice Hartle 
interviewed Arizona Representative John Conlan, a speaker at the February 1975 
Conservative Political Action Conference. Conlan was also the man behind Third Century 
Publishers, which Campus Crusade for Christ founder Bill Bright established in 1974 in 
order to mobilize socially conservative evangelical and fundamentalist Christians. The article 
focused on Conlan’s attempts to cut the grant funding for National Science Foundation 
programs he and other social conservatives believed “undermine[d] traditional Western 
values.” These programs include a course for fifth and sixth graders titled, “Man: A Course 
of Study” and a Florida State University program on “Human Sexuality” that, according to 
the National Right to Life News, was “apparently so hot that it is unavailable for public or 
congressional review.” As pro-lifers had done in 1974 and 1975, Conlan questioned the use 
of taxpayers’ money to underwrite these programs. He wanted the National Science 
Foundation to “increase its efforts in explaining to the taxpayers how their hard-earned 
dollars are being invested in scientific research.”282 
To the delight of New Right and pro-life leaders, evangelical Christians also began to 
mobilize around abortion and other social issues in the fall of 1975. In October seventy-five 
ministers representing “every element of evangelical Christianity,” led a “Continental 
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Congress on the Family” in St. Louis, Missouri. Over 2,000 Protestant clergy and their wives 
attended the conference. American Citizens for Life leaders Judy Fink and Marjory 
Mecklenburg presented seminars on abortion and local efforts to offer alternatives to 
abortions. Missouri Citizens for Life welcomed the conference attendees on the first day with 
an anti-abortion rally attended by an estimated thirty-two to thirty-three thousand people. Dr. 
Mildred Jefferson gave the keynote address at the rally and later attended the Continental 
Congress on the Family.283 
As socially conservative Protestants became more politicized and involved in the 
right to life movement, the American Roman Catholic Church also increased its political 
involvement in preparation for the 1976 elections. The National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops released its Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities on November 20, 1975. The plan 
thrilled right to life activists and leaders alike. It not only “significantly stepped up the 
church’s fight against abortion,” Jefferson wrote, but also acknowledged the grassroots 
consensus that emerged in non-sectarian right to life organizations across the country 
between 1974 and 1975.284 Unlike the Catholic hierarchy’s position in 1973, which relied 
heavily on Catholic money and leadership to pass a Human Life Amendment, now the 
bishops acknowledged that working against abortion was “not simply the responsibility of 
Catholics, nor should it be limited to Catholic groups or agencies.” Instead, the fight to make 
abortion illegal again called for “widespread cooperation and collaboration.” The plan 
prioritized both the “Passage of a constitutional amendment providing protection for the 
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unborn child to the maximum degree possible,” and attempts to restrict abortion through the 
“Passage of federal and state laws and adoption of administrative protection for the unborn 
child to the maximum degree possible.”285 Moreover, the bishops made it clear that they and 
the fifty million plus Catholics they claimed to represent would ensure that abortion was 
pivotal to the 1976 elections.286  
The same day that the Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities was released, Ronald 
Reagan formally announced his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. His 
candidacy solidified the convergence of the conservative coalition first envisioned at the 
Conservative Political Action Conference nine months before.287 In December 1975, Alice 
Hartle published an extensive interview with Ronald Reagan as the top story in the National 
Right to Life News. When Hartle asked him why he signed California’s 1967 abortion reform 
statute and how he came to reverse his position, Reagan wove together numerous 
conservative complaints.  
When a 15-year-old girl can have, under Medicaid, at the taxpayer's expense, 
three abortions with the same psychiatrist each time simply giving a quick, 
off-the-cuff diagnosis that she has suicidal tendencies, this was not what I had 
in mind . . . . I was shocked at this abuse of the Medicaid -- what we call 
MediCal in California -- program. Probably my anger about this is what led to 
many of our welfare reforms. . .  We hadn't realized that welfare would turn 
around and simply say that pregnancy was sufficient cause for eligibility for 
the Aid for Dependent Children program. Therefore, any girl in trouble and 
wanting an abortion could simply go down and apply for welfare on the basis 
that she was pregnant. Now her father could be the president of a bank, and 
she would still be eligible; but, also, those privacy clauses prevented us from 
letting her parents know. Here is a situation where legally a doctor can't take a 
child's tonsil out without the parents' permission, but he can perform an 
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abortion on a child . . . an underaged girl.288  
 
Reagan provided no evidence to support his anecdote against the privileged fifteen-year-old 
girl he cited. Hartle then asked Ronald Reagan why pro-life Democrats should vote for him. 
Reagan responded, "But the big thing to me is that the average man and woman in America -- 
the so-called middle class, the people who are making this system work . . . they're worse off 
than they were because government is taking almost half of every dollar they earn.”289 Rather 
than defending fetal personhood and championing a Human Life Amendment, Reagan 
attacked federal funding of abortion as symptomatic of what would become his signature 
issue – a corrupt, expensive and overpowering federal government that infringed upon the 
rights and privileges of average American parents and taxpayers.  
 These newly forged conservative alliances, however, remained tentative. In January 
1976, Alice Hartle warned that “there are some stumbling blocks along the road.” She cited 
tensions between Catholic and Protestant activists as one of those stumbling blocks: “Some 
exist through real or imagined lack of willingness to cooperate with the many anti-abortion 
people not of the Catholic faith who have been fighting valiantly to restore protection for the 
unborn child.”290 Issues of distrust and prejudice grounded in theological differences 
continued to undermine the ability of conservative Protestant ministers, right to life leaders 
and Catholic bishops to work together despite their rallying behind Judeo-Christian values. 
One protestant minister and pro-life leader commented, “The assumption was that it must not 
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be right if Catholics backed it, so we haven’t.”291  
 A large segment of social conservatives and right to life activists also hesitated to join 
in the New Right’s campaign to take over the Republican Party. While many were willing to 
become single-issue anti-abortion voters, they still hoped to use their political clout to sway 
the Democratic Party to a pro-life position. In January 1976, one activist wrote “pro-life 
Democrats wait and hope, struggling with their consciences, hesitant to vote outside the party 
they have known and loved and yet determined not to leave out of their decision the 
compelling moral issue of human life.”292 As Alice Hartle predicted in February 1975, the 
conservative coalition-building occurring throughout that year represented a “glimmer of 
hope” and a “suggestion of things to come” on the eve of the presidential primaries. 
 
Ellen McCormack and Pro-Life Mobilization in the Democratic Party  
Ellen McCormack was anything but a typical presidential candidate. The forty-nine-
year-old housewife and grandmother had never worked for a salary, graduated from college, 
or even run for a public office prior to filing to run for president. McCormack's life and 
politics had centered on the small suburban community of Long Island, New York, and Cure 
of Ars Roman Catholic Parish, where she attended daily mass. McCormack's closest female 
friends from the parish ran her campaign organization, the Pro-Life Action Committee. The 
women had formed the committee in 1974 with the explicit goal of finding politicians who 
would be amenable to running pro-life television commercials as part of their electoral 
campaigns. They soon discovered the best way to do so was to recruit candidates from within 
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the organization. In June 1975 they nominated Ellen McCormack to run for president while 
she was away on a family vacation. After some cajoling, McCormack agreed, and in July she 
filed to run for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party. She set out to run for 
president not to win the nomination but in order to air federally subsidized pro-life television 
commercials supporting a Human Life Amendment.293  
McCormack’s campaign organization grew out of the Cur of Ars women’s dialogue 
group’s longer engagement in abortion politics. In 1970, pastor Father Paul Driscoll 
encouraged women in the dialog group to lobby against a proposed law that would repeal 
New York's criminal abortion statute. In 1971, the women founded a chapter of “Women for 
the Unborn” and began to place pro-life advertisements in local newspapers and the New 
York Times. Their goal was to “educate politicians and the public about the abortion issue 
through the media.”294  By 1974, the group formed the Pro-life Action Committee and 
successfully aired a series of pro-life commercials on behalf of a Conservative Party 
candidate that members estimated reached 70,000 to 80,000 people in New York and New 
Jersey.295  
The idea for the 1976 presidential campaign came from Eugene McMahon, a local 
Catholic lawyer and political consultant. Shortly after the women founded the Pro-Life 
Action Committee, McMahon become aware of a newly passed 1974 federal election law 
that sought to reform campaign finances in the wake of the Watergate investigation. The new 
law granted matching federal funds to any presidential candidate who raised $5,000 or more 
                                                
293 Jane Gilroy, A Shared Vision: The 1976 Ellen McCormack Presidential Campaign (Denver: 
Outskirts Press, 2010), 31-32; Stacie Taranto, “Ellen McCormack for President: Politics and an Improbable 
Path to Passing Anti-abortion Policy.” Journal of Policy History, 24 (2012):265, 268-69. 
 
294 Gilroy, A Shared Vision, 9. 
 
295 Taranto, “Ellen McCormack for President,” 266-268, 270: Gilroy, A Shared Vision, 5, 8. 
 
 146 
in twenty states. There were no restrictions on how candidates could use the matching funds 
once raised, and no requirements to continue to receive the funds once the initial $100,000 
had been collected from twenty states. McMahon believed the Pro Life Action Committee 
could receive matching federal funds, even if it backed an unknown single-issue candidate 
who had little chance of winning. If this was true, the Committee could then front a candidate 
of their own to run pro-life campaign commercials at the expense of the federal government. 
The Committee quickly grasped that this was a political opportunity of a lifetime, even if it 
required a level of pro-life political organization that had not yet been achieved at the 
national level.296  
Much to the Pro Life Action Committee’s benefit, their desire to run a top-down 
political campaign meshed with Mildred Jefferson’s larger right to life revolution goals: not 
only would the campaign help rally the grassroots, it would also publicize the pro-life cause 
through commercials, potentially recruiting new movement sympathizers. Thus Jefferson and 
the National Right to Life Committee quickly endorsed the campaign in August 1975. 
Through the Ellen McCormack campaign, right to life activists would participate in two 
political party battles. McCormack and her supporters fought what Jefferson later referred to 
as the Democratic Party’s “left wing,” while others worked to defeat what Jefferson referred 
to as the “Rockefeller wing” of the Republican Party.297  
Everyone who participated in the McCormack campaign, however, understood the 
primary goal was to fund subsidized pro-life commercials. Why else? There was no chance 
that McCormack would win the Democratic nomination. As Jay Bowman, head of Georgia 
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Right to Life, told a reporter in February 1976, “She’s not a serious candidate . . . But she can 
get equal time [on television] for the pro-life message – and she can get the Federal 
government to pay for the ads.”298 Right to life activists, whether they intended to vote for 
McCormack or not, supported her campaign with financial contributions. By December 
1975, activists in Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, New York, and Wisconsin had raised 
the $5,000 per state required by federal campaign law. By January 1976, McCormack 
supporters in Kentucky, South Dakota, California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Illinois, Ohio, 
New Jersey, Minnesota, and Texas had also raised the required $5,000.299  
Contrary to some activists’ claims, McCormack’s campaign wasn’t just about the 
commercials. As Jefferson hoped in August 1975, McCormack set out to change the political 
landscape of America. She wanted to target and identify the single-issue anti-abortion vote 
on a national level. How many single-issue anti-abortion voters were there in America? 
McCormack asked. If she could get them to vote for her rather than a candidate who could 
win, the right to life movement would have an accounting of its electoral strength. 
Knowledge of the number of those voters, could in turn be used to threaten and pressure 
politicians, regardless of their party affiliation, into backing anti-abortion legislation. 
McCormack also favored a hard line position on fetal personhood and her campaign would 
re-focus attention on the Human Life Amendment by using it to test all Democratic 
politicians. Finally, McCormack understood her presidential campaign as part of a larger 
battle over the direction of the Democratic Party. Democratic politicians’ views on abortion 
would test the status of white ethnic Catholics and other social conservatives within the 
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party. 
McCormack and the Long Island housewives who made up the Pro Life Action 
Committee had grown up in the Catholic, Democratic working-class enclaves of New York 
City. They were first generation suburbanites who continued to support the male breadwinner 
model of the New Deal Democratic coalition and the social welfare policies and union 
politics that helped them and other Northern Catholic ethnics prosper under Democratic 
presidents in the 1960s and 1970s. Their politics sought to shore up the workingman and at-
home wife as the norm in the face of huge social and economic changes that were sweeping 
across America. These changes threatened these women’s new middle-class status and 
positions as homemakers, and placed new pressures on all American women and their 
families. By championing male breadwinners, McCormack positioned herself against 
contemporary feminist, who held that the model did not meet the needs of most American 
women, including single mothers and women with careers. Feminists charged that instead of 
focusing on men’s employment, wages, and education, the federal government should 
increase women’s access to jobs and improve their chances for career advancement. Policies 
they supported included government-funded daycare, and legal, government-subsidized 
abortion and birth control.300  
McCormack’s campaign and its political goals thus focused on the Democratic Party. 
In one flyer, the Pro-Life Action Committee argued that running in the Democratic primaries 
would provide the right to life movement the opportunity to attack the “reluctance of the 
Democratic Congress to act on the Human Life Amendment.”301 McCormack, in particular, 
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wanted her campaign to target the growing number of Democratic politicians who professed 
their personal opposition to abortion but supported legal abortion access. This strategy, which 
Ted Kennedy pioneered in 1975, infuriated McCormack. Personal opposition, McCormack 
and a growing number of right to life leaders asserted, amounted to nothing in the high stakes 
of abortion politics. 
The decision to target Democrats was a practical one. The Pro-Life Action 
Committee’s strategy to air pro-life commercials relied on the Federal Election 
Commission’s requirements that political candidates have equal airtime for commercials. 
Since committee members believed at the time that Gerald Ford would run unopposed in the 
Republican primaries, and thus significantly lessen the opportunities to run commercials, 
they filed in the Democratic Party.302 
McCormack was not the only leader who began to mobilize grassroots activists to 
target Democratic politicians; other grassroots activists initiated their own campaigns. On 
September 17, 1975, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments tabled all 
versions of the Human Life Amendment after seventeen months of hearings. Democratic 
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana chaired the subcommittee and was an aspiring presidential 
candidate at the time. He admitted to the press that he voted against the amendments even 
though he was personally opposed to abortion. Pro-life activists were furious. The next day, 
an estimated thirty-five to forty right to life activists from the Boston area picketed Bayh’s 
presence at a Newton Democratic Party meeting.303 Four days later on September 21, 
activists from Ellen McCormack’s home of Long Island launched a protest against Bayh 
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when he appeared at a Nassau county Democratic Party meeting. At the end of the week, on 
September 25, people from Bayh’s home state of Indiana also protested him at his public 
appearances, a tactic they would continue to use throughout the fall whenever he returned to 
his home.  
Right to life anger over the Human Life Amendment failure in mid-September soon 
transferred to any Democratic politician who professed his or her personal opposition to 
abortion but upheld Roe v. Wade. On September 27, activists from across Massachusetts 
organized another protest against Birch Bayh when he appeared at the Northeast Democratic 
Conference in Springfield. There, 1,500 key members of the Democratic Party met at the 
Springfield Civic Center to field questions to all the Democratic presidential nominees. One 
hundred and fifty members of Massachusetts Citizens for Life protested outside the 
conference, while thirty more who were registered Democrats attended. These thirty asked 
every Democratic presidential candidate about their stance on abortion. The candidates 
included Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, Senator Birch Bayh, Senator Fred Harris of 
Oklahoma, Sargent Shriver of Massachusetts, and Representative Morris Udall of Arizona. 
All the presidential contenders discussed their personal opposition to abortion but refrained 
from endorsing a Human Life Amendment. In response, an activist from Syracuse, New 
York said that “I’m personally opposed but . . .” statement had “become the epitome of 
obnoxiousness to pro-life people throughout the country.”304 The candidates’ statements thus 
encouraged right to life attacks against their party. Local activists from California, Kansas, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and New Hampshire launched public protests outside Democratic Party 
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events in October 1975.305  
McCormack and Mildred Jefferson looked to use this anger against the Democrats to 
further their own political goals. In a November 1975 National Right to Life News interview, 
McCormack said, “A right to life constitutional amendment is not presently supported by any 
of the professional politicians who are seeking the Democratic nomination.” “…unless right 
to life enters its own candidate, the pro-life question will be brushed aside by the Democratic 
presidential aspirants. And that could mean four more years of congressional inaction.”306 
McCormack encouraged people to support her campaign in order to call attention to what she 
viewed as the Democratic Party’s increasing hostility to the pro-life movement.  
Mildred Jefferson also blamed the movement’s failure to pass anti-abortion 
legislation at the federal level on Democratic politicians. In a November 1975 editorial she 
claimed that Democratic Senators Birch Bayh and Edward Kennedy, and Massachusetts 
Representative and Jesuit priest Robert Drinan, were “an unholy trinity of influential 
members of the majority party in Congress.” She wrote, “They vocalize repeatedly their 
moral opposition to abortion while leading every effort to make the practice a social reality.” 
She also accused the three of sharing “a common delusion that a vocal minority of women 
can guarantee more votes than the quiet majority of women.”307 Like McCormack, Jefferson 
then used abortion as a wedge issue to exploit ongoing shifts in the Democratic Party’s base. 
She asked, “Will a coalition of the politi-feminists and liberal minorities win the presidential 
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nomination for Senator Bayh if he seeks it?”308 To ensure Bayh’s defeat, Jefferson 
coordinated a national campaign from Washington, D.C. Right to Life members continued to 
protest outside of Bayh’s campaign events until he dropped out of the race in the spring of 
1976. 309 
Right to life activists, however, did not just protest Democratic politicians that fall; 
they were also disenchanted with Republican leaders. President Ford, they charged, was too 
reluctant to engage the abortion issue; he would not have their support until he endorsed the 
Human Life Amendment. To that end, seventy-five activists from the D.C. area gathered to 
protest outside the White House on November 12, 1975. Nellie Gray, president of the 
National March for Life and a board member of the National Right to Life Committee, 
organized the protest. “Our purpose in the monthly picketing,” Gray told the press, “is to 
make sure that the right to life is the number one political issue in next November’s 
elections.”310  
In the midst of all these protests against politicians, Ellen McCormack launched her 
national campaign for the Democratic nomination on November 16, 1975. At a press 
conference in Boston, McCormack charged that, “No man does more to promote abortion 
than Edward Kennedy.” Echoing Jefferson’s earlier criticisms of the senator, McCormack 
attacked him for his pivotal role in defeating the Bartlett amendment that banned government 
funding of abortion earlier that spring.311 Though the House and Senate had yet to vote on a 
Human Life Amendment, the right to life movement had collected all the Congressional 
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voting records over abortion funding bans from the past three years, and each candidate’s 
position on government funding of abortion became a campaign litmus test in 1976.  
McCormack’s announcement of her candidacy was followed four days later by 
Reagan’s announcement that he would run for president in the Republican primaries. 
Jefferson greeted both Reagan’s and McCormack’s campaign with enthusiasm. While in 
different political parties, the two campaigns had complemented each other in the fall of 
1975 and would continue to do so. McCormack, while not a serious candidate, attacked 
Democratic Party politicians who failed to support the Human Life Amendment, and used 
abortion to test the status of socially conservative Catholics and evangelical Christians in the 
Democratic Party. Reagan, a serious candidate, hoped to exploit right to life voters’ 
discontent with the Ford White House and with Democrats to advance a conservative 
coalition within the Republican Party. The right to life efforts and plans of 1975 within both 
parties prepared for Jefferson’s 1976 right to life revolution. In January of that year, Jefferson 
reflected, “The year 1975, for the most part, was a time of planning, preparation and 
projection for the pro-life movement.”312 Pro-life activists and leaders waited with 
anticipation to implement their plans during the upcoming Democratic and Republican 
primaries, shocking their opponents and the press when abortion took over the political scene 
in January 1976. 
 
“Two weeks in the winter when media, candidates began to hear”313 
On January 15, 1976, Democratic Presidential nominee Jimmy Carter was in the 
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basement of Holy Springs Church in Creston, Iowa; the late night meeting was part of 
Carter’s turn-out-the-vote effort four days before the Iowa caucuses. A “handsome young 
matron” rose and asked an exhausted Carter if he would support a constitutional amendment 
that placed the same restrictions on abortion as a 1970 Georgia criminal abortion statute that 
Carter had passed as governor. The Georgia law, which the Supreme Court overturned in 
Doe v. Bolton, restricted access to abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or fetal deformity, 
or when a pregnancy threatened the health of the mother. Carter paused and answered her 
softly, “Under certain circumstances, I would.” The Iowa right to life movement response 
was immediate. Carter's ambiguous statement was the most promising answer they had 
received from any Democratic presidential candidate other than Ellen McCormack, who was 
not running in the Iowa primary. Over the weekend, right to life forces mobilized on behalf 
of Jimmy Carter. By Sunday, January 18, Catholic pastors attached Carter's anti-abortion 
statement to Sunday church bulletins. Pro-life teams manned phone banks to run a last-
minute “marathon get out the vote” telephone campaign.  
Carter won the Iowa causes with twenty-eight percent of the delegates the following 
Monday; the victory established him the frontrunner for the Democratic presidential 
nomination, a position he would never lose.314 The press and his political opponents 
attributed Carter's victory to grassroots right to life mobilization that weekend. Senator Bayh 
in particular blamed Carter for playing the anti-abortion vote to his favor in Iowa, especially 
since Carter refused to endorse a Human Life Amendment. The Washington Post 
conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, on the other hand, claimed that 
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Carter had achieved what had seemed to be the impossible: according to them, Carter had 
outdone his opponents “by winning anti-abortion conservatives without losing pro-abortion 
liberals.”315  
On January 15, the same evening as Carter’s whispered conversation in Iowa, 
President Ford decided how his campaign would handle the abortion issue. In the comfort of 
the oval office, he debated four position statements his staff had drafted and debated 
throughout the fall. As House minority leader in 1973, Ford had co-sponsored the Whitehurst 
constitutional amendment that overturned Roe and Doe by giving the states the power to 
legislate abortion.316 Ford, however, had not given his stance on abortion as president. Since 
taking the oath of office in August 1974, he had also acted in ways that upset right to life 
activists; his appointment of several prominent pro-choice Republicans, including Nelson 
Rockefeller and Mary Louise Smith, was highly unpopular with right to life activists. Then in 
August 1975, Betty Ford came out in support of the Roe decision. In a 60 Minutes interview, 
she said “it was the best thing in the world when the Supreme Court voted to legalize 
abortion.”317 After Betty Ford’s interview no one was sure where the president stood, but 
right to life activists were irate. Mildred Jefferson charged, “It has never been my 
presumption that sharing a President’s bed automatically infused any woman with wisdom, 
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knowledge, intelligence or sound judgment.”318 Joseph Stanton of Massachusetts wrote to 
Ford telling him that the First Lady’s statement had lost Ford his vote in the upcoming 
election. 
As Ford contemplated his position on January 15, he was aware of intense pro-life 
pressure coming to bear on him. The previous December Ronald Reagan had backed the 
Human Life Amendment. Chances were slim that right to life activists would support Ford 
over Reagan, the president reasoned, because he continued to favor the more moderate states’ 
rights anti-abortion constitutional amendment he had originally sponsored in 1973. The 
actions of right to life leaders seemed to support Ford’s conclusions. On January 14, Nellie 
Gray had released a statement noting the president’s unwillingness to schedule a meeting 
with pro-life leaders for January 22, 1976, the day of the March for Life and the third 
anniversary of the Roe and Doe decisions.319 On the same day, Mildred Jefferson wrote a 
letter to the president as a representative of the National Right to Life Committee. She 
reminded Ford of what she claimed were the one million plus members of her organization 
and urged him to clarify his position on abortion.320 
Fully aware that pro-life Republicans were more likely to back Reagan, Ford came to 
a moderate position on abortion that he and his strategists hoped would capture the sympathy 
of a majority of American voters.321 “As a matter of personal philosophy . . . my belief is that 
a remedy should be available in cases of serious illness or rape,” Ford wrote. “Personally I do 
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not favor abortion on demand.” After stating his personal view, the president offered his 
policy position; as he had in 1973, he continued to support a states’ rights constitutional 
amendment.322 Ford notified his staff of his decision on January 16, and resolved the Nellie 
Grey situation. He refused to meet with Gray and her colleagues in person, but set up a 
meeting between his staff and the national leaders on the morning of January 22. It was the 
first time a president invited right to life leaders to a White House meeting. 
At the thirty-minute meeting Nellie Gray and U.S. Coalition for Life leader Randy 
Engel took the president’s staff by surprise. Instead of focusing on the Human Life 
Amendment, as they had expected, Gray and Engel took the Ford administration to task for 
supporting Medicaid funding of abortion. “Every tax dollar the federal government pays for 
convenience abortions is taken away from the genuine health needs of citizens,” Randy Engel 
charged. “If the administration was really interested in helping the poor, they would find 
better ways than helping them to kill their babies.”323 The two stated that the President should 
issue an executive order cutting off the Medicaid funding, or at least initiate an investigation 
into government funding of abortion. 324 In response, Ford’s staff promised to look into the 
regulations in question. 
White House staff then shared the president’s moderate position on anti-abortion 
constitutional amendments. This time, the activists behaved as the staff expected them to. 
Pro-life leaders were less than enthusiastic about Ford, and. some were even hostile. A few 
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hours after the White House meeting, Nellie Gray attacked President Ford in front of the 
estimated 65,000 people attending the National March for Life rally.325 She announced that 
President Ford’s administration was “synonymous with Massacre Unlimited,” because it 
“approve[d] of the killing of preborn children and using tax dollars for the barbaric deeds.”326 
Grey also read a telegram from Ronald Reagan pledging support for the movement and for a 
Human Life Amendment. The pro-life vote in the Republican Party seemed set; Reagan had 
won it.327  
Ellen McCormack, the March for Life’s featured speaker, also attacked government 
funding of abortion. At the time of the rally, McCormack was six days away from reaching 
her matching funds goal, and her campaign was starting to gain national media attention. 
Editorial writers questioned whether McCormack should receive federal funds, given the fact 
that the purpose of her campaign was to fund pro-life commercials. McCormack compared 
this argument against her candidacy to the campaign against government funding of abortion. 
As long as the government used taxpayer’s money to fund abortions, McCormack told the 
March for Life Rally, she wouldn’t hesitate to use the taxpayer’s money to fund pro-life 
commercials.328  
This combination of events in the last two weeks of January achieved at a national 
level what single-issue right to life activists had achieved in select states and localities such 
as Kansas and Boston in the past three years. “Overnight, abortion had 'arrived' as the hottest 
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issue in the just-beginning primary campaigns” wrote a pro-life publication on February 5.329 
From that point on, right to life activists ensured that presidential candidates declared their 
position on government funding of abortion and the Human Life Amendment. Abortion was 
also an issue in both the Democratic and Republican Primaries. While Reagan and Ford held 
different positions, Ellen McCormack’s campaign kept abortion at the forefront of most 
Democratic primaries.  
 
Reagan versus Ford 
In February 1976, things were not going very well for Reagan or other conservatives 
in the Republican Party. Reagan had yet to win a primary; Ford narrowly defeated him in the 
Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primaries and decidedly trounced him in Massachusetts, 
Vermont, Florida and Illinois. Reagan’s campaign came to hinge on the March 23 North 
Carolina primaries. There, the state organization of his deeply conservative ally Jesse Helms 
squared off against the moderate organization of Republican Gov. James Holhouser. Helms 
and his aides at the North Carolina Congressional Club ran a statewide campaign that 
emphasized Reagan’s conservative ideology, optimized Republican voter turn-out, and 
increased Reagan’s exposure in the state. As part of these efforts, Emma O’Steen and the 
Western North Carolina Pro-Life Action Committee sent letters to pastors and ministers who 
read them to their congregations the Sunday before the primary. That same Sunday, leaders 
of North Carolina State Right to Life presented a plaque with a silver medallion to Reagan in 
Ashville in order to honor his pro-life stance. On March 23, Reagan won North Carolina by a 
                                                
329“Jimmy Carter makes abortion the issue.” Lifeletter '76. 
 
 160 
margin of 12,000 votes, revitalizing his campaign.330  
Following the North Carolina primary, Reagan ran a tit-for-tat primary campaign 
against Gerald Ford. The race revealed a profound internal split between moderate and 
conservative Republicans that the anti-abortion vote revealed. Due to his support for the pro-
life movement, Reagan out-polled Ford among Catholic Republicans and did well with 
conservative Evangelical Protestants.331 Both were key voting groups that had helped win 
Richard Nixon the presidency in 1972. Many Republicans leaders, regardless of their stance 
on abortion, also hoped to recruit Catholics and Evangelicals into their party to form a new 
majority coalition. Taking an anti-abortion position seemed to be an excellent way to win 
these voters over. For example, Reagan had won a huge victory in Texas, sweeping all the 
state’s delegates on May 1. There, Ellen McCormack’s staff blamed pro-Reagan Republicans 
for foiling her campaign efforts: Reagan’s supporters had run a television commercial that 
encouraged pro-life Democrats to cross party lines and support Reagan. It seems that Texas 
the first state in which so-called Reagan Democrats switched their affiliation on the abortion 
issue alone.332 By the end of the primaries in June 1976, Reagan had won twenty-three states 
to Ford’s twenty-seven. Neither candidate had the necessary 1,130 delegate votes needed to 
secure the nomination in June 1976; Ford was one hundred votes short while Reagan was 
two hundred votes short.333  
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The Pro-Life Movement Splits from the Democratic Party 
As the Republican Party nomination battles dragged on, Jimmy Carter and his 
campaign staff began to strategize about how to present a solid, unified Democratic Party 
capable of winning the White House. Carter kept his position as the Democratic Party 
frontrunner following the Iowa caucuses, and in April 1976, he secured the Democratic 
presidential nomination. The general election then became the focus of Carter’s campaign 
staff and Democratic Party leaders. No one wanted a repeat of the divisive and violent 1968 
and 1972 Democratic National Conventions. This time around, Carter and party leaders 
would not tolerate dissension on the convention floor. Conflicts over the platform would be 
worked out beforehand so that television audiences would see a strong Democratic Party 
fully supporting the Carter nomination.334  
 Throughout the spring of 1976, feminists and right to lifers lobbied Democratic 
Platform Committee members to include their respective positions in an abortion plank. 
“Although there are prominent exceptions, more and more Democrats seem willing to have 
our party identified in the public arena as the party of abortion,” Ellen McCormack reported 
to committee members. “If this trend continues . . . millions of pro-life Democrats across the 
country are prepared to look for some other party to support.” She then warned that the nine 
per cent of the voters who supported her in Vermont, the eight percent in South Dakota and 
the five percent in Indiana and Kentucky would be pivotal for Democrats in close elections. 
Shouldn’t Democratic politicians and Party leaders care about the right to life movement and 
meet its demands? McCormack asked.335  
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Despite the lobbying efforts, the Democratic Platform committee voted against 
including any abortion statements in the platform. Like most politicians in 1976, the drafting 
subcommittee members deemed the issue too controversial, emotional, and dangerous. Any 
position, whether for or against abortion, would alienate a Democratic Party base. Why chose 
between feminists and Catholics when you didn’t have to address the issue? In face of the 
committee’s intransigence, feminists switched tactics and began to lobby Jimmy Carter's 
campaign staff to include a plank opposing efforts to criminalize abortion and efforts to pass 
the Human Life Amendment. They cited the significant number of delegates willing to 
support their plank, and if need be, to help bring the abortion plank to the convention floor. 
They convinced Carter’s staff, who then pressured the Democratic Platform Committee to 
adopt an abortion stance on June 16. The final wording read:  
We fully recognized the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which 
many Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is 
undesirable to attempt to amend the United States Constitution to overturn the 
Supreme Court decision in this area.336  
 
A firestorm quickly erupted in Catholic newspapers and anti-abortion publications. 
Ellen McCormack, right to life activists, and Catholic Church officials were livid. 
They moved quickly to protest the platform and to define abortion as an issue that would 
drive Catholics out of the Democratic Party.337 A Catholic priest wrote in the St. Louis 
Review: “The platform makes it official. The Democratic Party doesn't want Catholics.”338  
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Others also hastened to criticize the platform. Harold Brown of the Christian Action 
Council compared Jimmy Carter to Pontius Pilate, the Roman official who refused to acquit 
Jesus Christ. Carter, Brown said, aligned himself “with the pagan Roman position on the 
value of human life” rather than the Christian one.339 Ellen McCormack and the Pro-Life 
Action Committee set to work on a publicity campaign against the Democratic Party, whose 
leaders had already alienated McCormack in their preparation for the National Convention 
when they refused to give her floor space to set up a pro-life booth. They also gave her and 
her campaign staff only one floor pass and four gallery seats to curtail any attempts to bring 
the abortion plank to a floor debate. McCormack described her failed attempts to gain a 
convention floor booth and passes for her campaign staff as evidence of the Democratic 
Party’s increasing hostility to the pro life movement.  
When the Democratic Party released its platform on June 16, the Pro Life Action 
Committee scrambled to pull together the last of its federal funds to protest the platform 
committee, and to air a series of commercials against Jimmy Carter during the convention in 
July. By that point, Ellen McCormack had little to no funds left because Congress had passed 
reforms to the 1974 Federal Elections laws to prevent another campaign like hers from ever 
happening again. Ford signed the reforms into law on May 11, and McCormack’s ability to 
gain matching federal funds ended on June 25, 1976.340 She had just enough funds to air two 
more national commercials. “The Democratic Party will officially become the party of 
abortion,” McCormack warned in the first ad. In the second, she told Americans that “Jimmy 
Carter, by forcing his views upon the entire Democratic Party,” had “disenfranchised 
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millions of pro-life Democrats.”341 
 At the same time, Nellie Grey and the March for Life organized a national protest to 
occur at the Democratic National Convention in New York City. An estimated 10,000 right 
to life activists from across the country came. Once again, Ellen McCormack gave the 
keynote address and focused on government funding of abortion. She bemoaned the fact that 
the Democratic Party of her childhood was gone. The solution to poverty, McCormack 
asserted, was “not to set up abortion clinics and to pressure the poor to take the lives of their 
unborn children.”342 She then led a march from Central Park to Madison Square Garden, 
carrying a sign that said: “Jimmy Carter to be born again one must first be born. Stop 
Abortion.”343  
 The attacks against Carter and the Democratic Party at the June and July conventions 
led National Right to Life News editor Alice Hartle to announce: “The Republican national 
convention has a clear opportunity to be the good guys to the pro-life movement.” “Will the 
Republican Party take advantage of this ready-made situation offered up on a silver platter?” 
she asked.344  
 Indeed, strategists from Ford’s campaign staff had begun to pay attention to overtures 
from activists during the June National Right to Life Convention. The same weekend as the 
convention, Ford strategists read "Reflections on Abortion and Catholic Votes." The memo 
argued that "even a modestly anti-abortion position could win millions of votes." Because 
Carter and the Democratic Party came out strongly against a Human Life Amendment, these 
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Republican strategists believed that Ford could not only win over voters in the Democratic 
Party by emphasizing his moderate abortion position, and also shore up the support of 
Reagan Republicans and secure his party’s nomination.345  
 
The Hyde Amendment and the Solidification of a Conservative Republican Alliance 
On June 24, 1976, Republican Rep. Henry Hyde, a conservative Catholic from 
Illinois, proposed an amendment to a House appropriations bill. The amendment cut all 
federal funding for abortions to Medicaid recipients. In a succinct speech before the House, 
Hyde expressed his moral outrage over abortion. He declared that his proposed amendment 
was not about cutting government costs or helping the poor; it was about saving “the most 
defenseless and innocent of human [life], the unborn.” To counter arguments that the funding 
ban would discriminate against poor women, Hyde argued that society denies poor women 
many things, thus Congress had “the choice of what [it] will give them.”346 Following a brief 
debate between eight representatives in which only one defended indigent women’s equal 
access to exercise the abortion right, the House passed the Medicaid cuts, with no exceptions 
for rape, incest, deformity, or the mother’s health. 199 representatives voted for the ban, 165 
voted against it, and 67 abstained.347  
 On the same day, Mildred Jefferson praised the House vote as a “crucial victory” at 
the opening of the National Right to Life Convention in Boston. Titled “Cradle for Liberty,” 
the convention played on 1976 bicentennial themes. Jefferson told the more than 3,000 
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convention attendees that "We in the United States are standing at the same kind of crisis 
point that the colonists did in 1776 . . . we have decided to meet that crisis point and we will 
start the right to life revolution in this country." She then argued that the goal of the right to 
life revolution was “to restore human affection [so that] the economic disability or status of 
unwed mothers would not lead them to destroy the lives of their children.” Finally, Jefferson 
attacked Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Party for its inclusion of an anti-Human Life 
Amendment plank in its platform the week before. She said that if Jimmy Carter, “who wants 
to run as a Christian crusader, does not understand the moral objections to abortion, then he 
does not understand what running as a Christian crusader is.”348 
 The next day, the National Right to Life Committee’s Board of Directors made the 
passage of the Hyde Amendment their first priority. The ban on funding abortions would be 
the organization’s major goal in the six months following the convention, especially since 
efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment through the Senate had failed in April. As Mildred 
Jefferson later put it, “the fight to cut-off the government funding of abortion is the single 
most critical fight in the movement, second only to the Human Life Amendment.”  
 Robert Marshall, a leader of the U.S. Coalition for Life, explained why abortion 
funding was so important in a 1976 guide to pro-life electoral politics: “The engine that 
keeps the abortion movement going is money.” “Abortion could be perfectly legal, but if 
there was no material gain . . . you could be sure that most of the children put to death since 
January 22, 1973 would be alive today.” Marshall pointed out that cutting of the supply of 
money to abortion providers was relatively easy and could be done in the immediate future. 
Unlike the Human Life Amendment, a ban on abortion funding did not require an onerous 
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campaign. Marshall also argued that the funding ban would be one of the most effective 
legislative strategies to save thousands of what he considered unborn children. In 1976, some 
right to life activists estimated that the federal government subsidized approximately thirty 
percent of the abortions performed in the United States. If the money stopped, Marshall and 
other to life leaders reasoned, so too would the abortions.349  
 Acknowledging the importance of the funding ban, organizers of the National Right 
to Life Convention invited Henry Hyde to give Saturday’s keynote address. One day after 
Hyde’s victory in the House, he appeared before fifteen hundred convention attendees 
gathered in Faneuil Hall. Hyde introduced himself: “I stand before you as a 634-month-old 
fetus.”350 After his speech, Hyde joined hands with Mildred Jefferson and they raised their 
arms in celebration of the amendment. Attendees gave them both a standing ovation.351  
 To buttress efforts to pass the funding ban, leaders at the convention looked to 
minority pro-life activists to launch charges of genocide and population control. A strategy it 
had perfected in 1974 and 1975. Erma Clardy Craven, Constance Redbird Uri and Xavier 
Suarez, all minority pro-life leaders, had joined Mildred Jefferson to accuse the federal 
government and abortion rights supporters of population control. Craven was a black social 
worker from Minnesota and a dedicated Democrat; in 1972, she published “Abortion, 
Poverty, and Black Genocide,” an essay that quickly became a classic read for pro-life 
activists across the country.352 Uri was a Choctaw  physician, and Saurez was a Cuban 
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American activist from Miami, Florida. All three leaders believed government-subsidized 
abortion, birth control, and sterilization were a coercive way for the government to limit their 
communities’ populations. Like Mildred Jefferson, they understood that their role as 
representatives of racial minorities helped to buttress the predominantly white right to life 
movement’s credibility; their presence and support for population control arguments also 
deflected any accusations of racism within the movement. For example, a white convention 
presenter suggested to attendees that the best way to convert liberal ministers to the anti-
abortion cause was to send “in a couple of women who can talk up women's lib or a black 
who can deal with exploitation.”353  
 On Sunday June 27, Craven, Uri, and Suarez appeared with Mildred Jefferson and ten 
other national pro-life leaders at a press conference, though none of the three served on the 
National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors or represented any other major pro-life 
organization. “We resent and oppose vigorously an attempt by the establishment to limit our 
population by inducing us to abort our unborn children,” Suarez told the press. Uri added that 
the “major thing that concerns the Indian people is why, in this bicentennial year, is the 
United States government still murdering Indians [through] family planning.”354  
 While the rhetoric attacking abortion as a form of population control had changed 
little since the early 1970s, thanks to Jefferson and other female pro-life leaders’ efforts in 
1975 and 1976, the movement now had a broader conservative coalition supporting the 
initiative to cut abortion funds in Congress. This coalition troubled Erma Clardy Craven and 
Constance Redbird Uri deeply; at the convention, they criticized the right to life movement’s 
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growing alliance with conservatives, pointing out that those politicians sought to cut welfare 
programs and education funds that improved their respective communities. Craven and Uri 
also expressed doubt about how their own race and rhetoric played into pro-life movement 
strategy and its alliance with a conservative movement. At a poorly-attended panel on 
minorities, Craven questioned what she considered her role as a token in a “movement which 
call[ed] itself 'pro-life' but then refuse[d] to deal with the lives of any but those who are yet to 
be born.” 355  
 Craven and Uri’s protests and critiques were in vain. Leaders of the movement and 
the National Right to Life Convention of 1976 overwhelmingly endorsed conservative 
coalition building and openly invited an alignment with the Republican Party. The 
Convention program itself advanced coalition building; the organizers invited conservative 
leaders to participate in panels alongside established pro-life leaders. Representatives from 
the conservative American Legislative Exchange presented “Is Your School’s Curriculum 
Anti-Life?” That panel attacked the National Science Foundation’s “Man: A Course of 
Study,” and reinforced earlier complaints from conservative Republican and Arizona 
Representative John Conlan. Paul Weyrich of the Committee for the Survival of a Free 
Congress took part in a panel on effective congressional lobbying with U.S. Coalition for 
Life leader Robert Marshall. The two men had met when Marshall was a congressional aide 
and Office of Economic Opportunity program analyst.356  
 Marshall distributed copies of Bayonets and Roses, his 1976 political strategy book 
for the pro-life movement. In it, he outlined his ideal conservative coalition and theorized 
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that conservative and pro-life leaders could encourage a convergence of different groups of 
people and belief systems into a powerful political force. “There was the possibility of 
ideological compatibility among those who opposed abortion, supported capital punishment, 
opposed the increasing tyranny and corruption of the government, and who supported the 
traditional American value structure,” Marshall wrote.357 He hoped that the right to life 
movement’s alliance with conservative organizations and its further exposure to conservative 
thought would broaden the meaning of pro-life, so that the term came to represent larger 
value systems and cultural conflicts about the role of religion in society, gender roles, and 
sexual norms.  
 The National Right to Life Committee’s decision to dedicate itself to the passage of 
the Hyde Amendment and to foster coalition-building complemented another shift in 
movement strategy. Dr. Carolyn Gerster, a Protestant from Arizona and the newly-elected 
chair of the National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors, emphasized the 
importance of the upcoming congressional races over and above the presidential race.358 
“This battle is going to be won or lost in the halls of Congress. This is a hard, cold political 
fact,” Gerster stated.359 Using the roll call records of an April 28, 1976 Senate vote to table 
the Human Life Amendment, Gerster introduced a “deadly dozen” list of senators. She urged 
activists from these senators’ states to work non-stop to ensure their defeat in November.360 
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In turn, Gerster and other pro-life leaders planned to use the records generated by the 
upcoming Hyde Amendment votes in the Senate and House to target those who failed to 
align with the pro-life movement.  
 On June 28, one day after the conclusion of the National Right to Life Convention, a 
Senate vote reinforced the Committee’s determination to pass the Hyde Amendment. 
Responding to the June 24 House vote, the Senate voted 57 to 28 to exclude the amendment 
from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare Department’s appropriation bill.361 
Senators overwhelmingly opposed the Hyde’s strict language, which did not allow abortion 
funding for indigent women under any circumstance; a majority of senators indicated they 
would support a compromised ban that allowed for exceptions for the victims of rape and 
incest, and those whose pregnancies threatened their health. However, right to life leaders 
were unwilling to compromise; they believed that making exceptions would allow most 
indigent woman to receive an abortion at the taxpayer’s expense. State leaders of the 
National Right to Life Committee affiliates and their lobbyists immediately began to 
implement the national campaign Jefferson had planned at the September Congressional 
Liaison meeting. With the assistance of Paul Weyrich, Jesse Helms, Henry Hyde, and 
congressional members of the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, the activists let 
representatives know that they would be held accountable in November for their vote on the 
funding bill, and pro-life activists would work against anyone who opposed the funding ban 
or supported compromise language.362 They backed up their threats by citing their role in the 
                                                
361 “Senate Votes,” NRL News,3 (September 1976). 
 
362 “Can we let them off the hook?” NRL News 3  (June 1976,);Thea Rossi Baron, “Hyde Amendment 
Big Victory; Fight Goes On,” National Right to Life Committee, Inc. Report, 1 (January 1977); Seth S. King. 
"Abortion Ruling is Expected to Affect Restrictive Laws in at Least 26 States." New York Times, 2 July 1976, 
8. 
 
 172 
recent Presidential primaries and the percent of single-issue anti-abortion voters that Ellen 
McCormack’s campaign had identified. The lobbyists pointed out that these single-issue 
voters would swing against any candidate who faced a close race in November.  
As the Hyde Amendment lobbying campaign took off, two July 1 Supreme Court 
decisions undermined the National Right to Life Committee’s efforts to restrict abortion 
access. In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, the court voided a number of 
restrictions passed by an estimated twenty-six states since 1973. In a 6-3 decision, the court 
held that states could not require a woman to obtain her husband’s consent before having an 
abortion. In a 5-4 decision, the court ruled that states could not adopt a hard-and-fast 
requirement that women under the ages of eighteen needed both parents’ consent prior to 
receiving an abortion. The court then struck down a Missouri statute that prohibited saline 
amniocentesis after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy and a requirement that doctors 
performing an abortion endeavor to save the life of the fetus during second-term 
procedures.363 In the second decision, Belotti v. Baird, the court hinted that it would be open 
to a less stringent parental consent legislation if the law allowed for a mechanism to 
determine if and when an adolescent girl was mature enough to pursue an abortion without 
her parent’s knowledge.  
The July Supreme Court decisions served as a rallying cry for conservatives and pro-life 
activists who saw them as an attack on the status of the family in American law and society. Dr. 
John C. Wilke, the newly elected Executive Vice President of the National Right to Life Committee, 
said that the “split decision of the U.S. Supreme Court can only be described as a disastrous blow to 
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marriage and family life in the United States.” 364 Ellen McCormack claimed the Supreme Court had 
mandated that the “state has more power over the minors of this country (than their parents).” 365 
Archbishop Bernardin, the head of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, told the press that, 
"This sadly mistaken decision makes abortion more constitutionally significant than the rights of 
parents to rear their children . . . (and) the rights of husbands to participate fully in all decisions 
affecting their marriages."366  
In response to the Supreme Court decisions, Ronald Reagan echoed these charges. He then 
linked his criticisms of the decisions to the ongoing struggle over the Hyde Amendment.  
Even those who disagree must certainly be concerned about one facet of 
government’s involvement in abortion. The pregnancy of an underage girl 
automatically makes her eligible for welfare on the Aid to Dependent 
Children program. This, in turn, makes her eligible for Medicaid and a free 
abortion regardless of her family’s means. To add insult to injury, welfare 
rules forbid government for informing her parents. Thus, government is in the 
position of conspiring with an underage child to provide her with an abortion, 
while keeping knowledge of her situation from her parents.367  
 
With these rhetorical attacks, Reagan articulated a growing dissatisfaction with the federal 
government and a reactionary defense of the family that continued to win the support of 
conservative Christians of all denominations for his campaign. The recruitment of these 
voters was particularly important to Reagan in July, when he was still scrambling to win 
enough delegates to defeat Gerald Ford for the Republican presidential nomination. Ford, 
meanwhile, was trying to imagine how to unite the Republican Party behind his candidacy. 
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An Incomplete Right to Life Revolution 
In July, Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas endorsed Gerald Ford for president; Dole hoped to 
be the vice presidential nominee, and he encouraged the president to swing to the right on 
abortion in order to win. Dole claimed that if Ford approved the Human Life Amendment he 
would gain the support of much of Reagan’s conservative base. Dole also believed that Ford 
could replicate his own come-from-behind victory against Bill Roy in 1974. Champion the 
small but militant anti-abortion movement, Dole urged. To test his theory, Dole met with 
representatives of Ellen McCormack’s presidential campaign and worked with Sen. Jesse 
Helms and members of the North Carolina Congressional Club to ensure that a plank in 
support of the Human Life Amendment would appear in the Republican platform. Ford 
complied and Dole’s strategy succeeded despite opposition from Republican feminists. Ford 
secured the nomination in late July; Dole won the vice presidential nomination; and the 
Republican Party endorsed efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment.368 It seemed that the 
Republican Party and the right to life movement had aligned perfectly.369 
Ford then made the anti-abortion plank central to his fall campaign strategy. A Ford 
aide told a New York Times reporter in September that the campaign sought, “above all, a 
concentrated attempt to convert to Republicanism a substantial percentage of working-class 
Catholics in California and in the 10 states that form an arc around the Great Lakes from 
metropolitan New York through Wisconsin.” In many of these industrial states, Catholics 
constituted fourteen to thirty-thirty percent of the general population.370 The Ford campaign 
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believed a strong anti-abortion position would be enough to sway a number of these 
Catholics to vote for the president. The actions of the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops were a boost; many bishops told their parishioners that abortion was the most 
important issue in the campaign. Then, in an unprecedented move, the National Conference 
of Catholic Bishops showed a bias for Ford. For example, Ford attended the Forty-First 
Eucharistic Congress in August where he addressed an estimated 100,000 Catholics in the 
audience. Cardinal Krol, who was in charge of the Congress, welcomed Ford’s presence and, 
in a clear act of disapproval of Carter, refused to read the Democratic candidate’s prepared 
statement. In a more publicized exchange, the Conference expressed “dismay” with Carter’s 
candidacy and his position on abortion while they were “encouraged” by Ford and his 
position on abortion after they met with both candidates in late August and early 
September.371  
As Ford and Dole moved the Republican Party to the right on abortion, and their 
Catholic strategy seemed to be paying off, the ongoing Congressional debates over abortion 
funding showed that not all party members followed them. Republican Senators Edward 
Brooke of Massachusetts and Robert Packwood of Washington led the fight against the Hyde 
Amendment in August and September. Brooke was the first African American senator 
elected from Massachusetts and a leader of the party’s moderate wing. At the time, he was 
also the only black senator serving in Congress. He charged that “the Hyde Amendment 
discriminates against the poor who cannot afford the cost of an abortion but must rely upon 
Medicaid. It would not put an end to abortions, but simply would price them out of reach of 
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the neediest of our citizens."372 He and Sen. Packwood also believed the ban violated a 
woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and would be ruled void by the 
Supreme Court. Despite Brooke and Packwood’s opposition, Republicans showed more 
proportionate support for the funding ban than Democrats, further solidifying the pro-life 
movement’s alliance with the Republican Party.373  
In a show of political strength, the pro-life movement continued to lobby members of 
the House to maintain the abortion funding ban without exceptions, increasing the numbers 
of representatives supporting the measure with each vote while working on senators to pass 
the ban. In a letter before an August 10 House vote on the H.E.W. appropriations bill, the 
National Right to Life Committee declared that members who opposed the ban were 
“unwittingly joining in a class war against the poor by using Medicaid funds to get rid of the 
poor.”374  On August 10, the House voted to retain the funding prohibition without any 
exceptions. On August 25, the Senate voted against the House version of the amendment 
once again. Congress was at an impasse, and representatives and senators entered into 
conference to resolve the disagreement. Then on September 17 and in response to intense 
pro-life lobbying, the Senate passed a compromised version of the Hyde Amendment. At 
Brooke’s urging, the Senate’s version banned Medicaid funding of abortion except for cases 
“where the life of the mother would be endangered.” Congress passed this version of the 
Hyde Amendment on September 30. It was the pro-life movement’s greatest legislative 
victory to date. 
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The right to life movement’s shift away from a Human Life Amendment and towards 
the Hyde Amendment created a political opportunity for Jimmy Carter. Unlike Gerald Ford, 
who had not declared his opposition to government funding of abortion until September 
1976, Carter had supported the ban throughout his candidacy. Carter now used his 
consistency to oppose an emerging alliance between the right to life movement, the 
Republican Party, and the Catholic bishops. In speeches and in response to questions from 
the press, Carter reiterated that the government should not be involved in funding abortions 
because some citizens equated the procedure with murder. He also emphasized his personal 
opposition to abortion. Carter’s outspoken support of the Hyde Amendment helped to sway a 
number of pro-life activists back to his candidacy.  
  Ford’s campaign inadvertently assisted Carter in September 1976. The Republican 
staff approached the abortion issue by working with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, not right 
to life leaders. For example, the White House launched an investigation of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare’s abortion fund because the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops urged Ford to take executive action on abortion funding at a September 10 meeting. 
Nine months earlier, right to life leaders Randy Engel and Nellie Gray had requested a 
similar investigation, and the White House had done nothing. The investigation was thus too 
little and too late for many anti-abortion leaders. Ford’s prompt action following the meeting 
with the bishops may have also stirred the feelings of Protestants and lay Catholics against 
the Catholic hierarchy for dominating the movement’s politics.  
Ford’s campaign staff also isolated right to life leaders in September. First, Ford 
swung back to his moderate stance on abortion. He asserted that the Republican platform 
supported his state’s rights approach to a constitutional amendment overturning Roe v. Wade, 
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and not the Human Life Amendment. This undermined the main reason any right to life 
activists would support his campaign over Carter’s: now both Carter and Ford endorsed the 
Hyde Amendment and neither supported the Human Life Amendment. Ford also refused Dr. 
Jefferson and other leaders of the National Right to Life Committee’s requests for a meeting 
in mid-September; Jefferson had demanded to meet after learning of the high-profile meeting 
with the Catholic bishops.375  
By October 1976, many pro-life activists were not sure who the worse candidate was, 
or if there was much a difference between the two. Ellen McCormack reflected the feelings 
of many anti-abortionists when she told a reporter that, "It will be a devastation to this 
country and to the unborn if Carter is elected president," but, she added, Ford, “leaves much 
to be desired." “I’m in the same dilemma as a lot of people in this election . . . That of 
choosing the lesser of two evils.”376 This frustration worked in Carter’s favor in the election. 
Right to life activists as well as white ethnic Catholic voters from the North, and evangelical 
and fundamentalist voters from the South, would have to vote on other issues than abortion. 
Ford’s campaign recognized the error of its ways in October and sought to reconcile 
its differences with the right to life movement. To re-connect with pro-life leaders, the 
campaign hired Marjory Mecklenburg and established a “pro-life desk” in the national 
campaign headquarters. Mecklenburg was arguably the wrong person to appoint. Mildred 
Jefferson wrote, “So far as the national campaign is concerned, the people of the right-to-life 
movement were given the back-of-the-hand. . . . When the Republican campaign decided on 
a "Pro-Life Desk" it was staffed without consultation with anyone who is now central to the 
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right-to-life movement or part of the current consensus."377  
On November 2, Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Gerald Ford to become president. 
Carter won 50.8 percent of the popular vote to Ford’s 48.02. While Carter won the majority 
of Southern Baptist and Catholic voters, he failed to win the majority of evangelical and 
fundamentalist Protestants by two percentage points.378 Neither candidate excited right to life 
activists in the ways that Ronald Reagan’s and Ellen McCormack’s candidacies had in the 
primaries. Because Ford failed to fully capture the movement’s backing, pro-life leaders and 
grassroots activists did not view his defeat as a blow to their own movement.  
 
 “There are times when failure can be magnificent”379 
One day after the Hyde Amendment became law federal judge John Francis Dooling, 
Jr. suspended the enactment of the amendment pending a class action lawsuit filed by Cora 
McRae. McRae was a 24-year-old Brooklyn woman who suffered from varicose veins and 
blood clots. When she discovered she was pregnant in September 1976, she sought an 
abortion at a local Planned Parenthood clinic because the pregnancy threatened her health. 
Staff told her there was no Medicaid funding available for her abortion due to the impending 
legislation. Even though McRae received an abortion partially funded by Medicaid, she filed 
a class action lawsuit on October 1 against H.E.W. On October 22, Judge Dooley ruled the 
Hyde Amendment unconstitutional and stopped its enforcement. He upheld all the arguments 
of the plaintiff on the grounds that Medicaid is a joint fiscal partnership between states and 
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the federal government and “the needy are citizens no less of the United States than of the 
states of their residence.”380 In short, Dooling found that the Hyde Amendment violated the 
constitutional rights of the poor at the federal level because state Medicaid services relied so 
heavily on federal funding. A cut in federal funding would, in effect, cut the state services. 
On November 8, the Supreme Court refused to block the use of Medicaid funds for elective 
abortions until it ruled on the appeal of the federal government.381 As a result, eligible 
women continued to receive federal funds for abortions in 1976 and 1977. Pro-life activists 
were outraged. Janet Grant of The National Right to Life News wrote, “The real fruits of 
labor of the pro-life labor to limit abortions through passage of the Hyde Amendment by 
Congress have not yet been realized."382 The battle over the Hyde Amendment wording and 
its enforcement would continue in the years to come. 
Still, pro-life leaders rejoiced in the victories brought on by the right to life revolution 
as 1976 came to a close. Reflecting on the Ellen McCormack campaign, the Archbishop of 
Oakland wrote, “There are times when failure can be magnificent.” His words were apt for 
the right to life revolution and its goals: though the Hyde amendment passed, the government 
could not enforce it, and though right to life activists had succeeded in polarizing the political 
parties over abortion, the expected realignment of voters had yet to occur. Ronald Reagan did 
not win the Republican nomination, but his 1976 campaign helped to mobilize a conservative 
coalition and to solidify the ties between the pro-life movement, social conservatives, and 
leaders of the New Right.  
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By the close of 1976, Jefferson and many of the leaders of the National Right to Life 
Committee had come to believe that the conservative Republican alliance represented the 
future of the movement. While Carter won the election and Democrats remained in control of 
the House and Senate, a freshmen cohort of conservative Republican congressmen would 
become outspoken advocates for the pro-life movement and social conservatives in the years 
to come. They included Senators Richard Lugar of Indiana, Orrin Hatch of Utah, John 
Danforth of Missouri, and Representative Robert Dornan of California. With an eye on these 
men, Jefferson told activists in December 1976, “The right-to-life movement can learn good 
lessons from the 1976 presidential campaign … Campaigns are not won by wishful thinking 
or good intentions. Winning the big ones requires planning, persistence, dogged 
determination, money and hard work by lots and lots of people. It is helpful to have strongly-
committed, reliable allies.” One month later, Jefferson made it clear that the Democratic 
Party was not the movement’s future or part of what she considered a new political landscape 
She wrote, “The national right-to-life movement is only three years old yet we held our own 
nationally against the mighty combination of the powerful Democratic machine and union 
politics…. We are painfully forging a new politics that will break the slavery of the people to 
machine loyalties and win them to support principle. This principle will make the protection 
of human life the absolute priority of this society.”383   
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
“This is War!” 384 
  “It’s about time that all of us realize that a war is going on – a war against evil, the 
evil of abortion,” declared James Wesolowski, a Kentucky pro-life leader. “For too long, the 
pro-life cause has been run along one dimension only, and that dimension has been staid and 
respectable.” But, he charged in June 1976, “Now is the time to take up arms in a unique type 
of warfare – a war to save lives, a war against death.” Wesolowski believed that, “Even the 
respectable element should think in terms of warfare and direct its energies toward strategic 
targets.” Foremost among those targets was government funding of abortion and abortion 
clinics. "Knock out the ball-bearing factories or the refineries and you stop the war-making 
capacity of the enemy." The writer then commanded activists to “go to abortion mills to sit-
in, blocking entrances, doorways, and halls with the express purpose of disrupting these 
obscene establishments’ grisly work.” Throughout his editorial, Wesolowski reiterated two 
salient points: “Pro-lifers must abandon fears of radicalism” and “This is War!”385 
 Between 1977 and 1979, grassroots right to life activists would answer Wesolowski’s 
call to arms. New strategies emerged that challenged Mildred Jefferson’s presidency of the 
National Right to Life Committee and her top-down right to life revolution. Once again, 
activists and leaders found themselves arguing over the Human Life Amendment, power 
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distribution between the grassroots and the organization’s national headquarters in 
Washington, D.C., and the role of the pro-life movement in a larger conservative coalition 
mobilizing in the Republican Party. These conflicts helped fuel a period of remarkable 
growth and diversity within the pro-life movement and laid the foundations for another 
internal consensus generated by grassroots members. Right to life activists united to fight 
abortion funding at all levels of government, from their respective counties to the U.S 
capitol. The momentum in the movement shifted away from Mildred Jefferson and her office 
and back to the state and local organizations. 
A better-organized and funded feminist lobby campaign for federal funding of 
abortion convinced pro-life activists that they were in a war against feminists. To fight this 
war and to win the battle over government funding, pro-lifers joined a “pro-family” 
conservative coalition that was organizing against the International Women’s Year 
Conference. Even activists who resisted the movement’s growing alliance with Republicans 
and conservatives at the outset of 1977 now took actions that solidified that alliance. While 
the pro-life movement did not support all the issues championed by the larger pro-family 
coalition, the coalition embraced the pro-life call for an anti-abortion constitutional 
amendment as an essential test for politicians. The pro-family coalition then won a series of 
major electoral victories in 1978; these victories paved the way for the 1980 Reagan 
conservative counter-revolution and the realignment of the American electorate as it shifted 
to the right.  
 
Ellen McCormack and the Constitutional Convention Call 
 On the eve of the 1976 elections, former presidential candidate Ellen McCormack 
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gave the keynote address at the North Carolina State Right to Life Convention. Four weeks 
earlier, Judge Dooling of New York had stopped the enforcement of the Hyde Amendment 
through a court injunction in response to a legal case challenging the funding ban's 
constitutionality; now, pro-life activists had no idea if or when federal funding of abortion 
and abortion referrals would stop. Dooling's injunction helped convince McCormack to 
challenge Mildred Jefferson’s vision for the movement and the uncompleted goals of her 
1976 right to life revolution. McCormack charged that efforts to restrict abortion access 
failed to address the real problem, and unborn babies would continue to die unless the United 
States ratified a Human Life Amendment. For two long years, McCormack and activists who 
held a hard line on fetal personhood had followed Jefferson as she pursued the ban on 
government funding of abortion. The Hyde Amendment had two consequences that troubled 
some right to life activists; it had consolidated alliances with conservatives in the Republican 
Party that more liberal activists, and those who wished to remain loyal to the Democratic 
Party, resented. The right to life revolution also concentrated power at the national level at 
the expense of the grassroots, where the movement was strongest and most innovative.  
At the North Carolina State Right to Life Convention McCormack introduced a new 
strategy that provided the perfect excuse for these internal battles to erupt. She argued that 
The National Right to Life Committee and other pro-life organizations should not focus their 
efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment on Congress, since that legislative campaign was 
"so painfully slow it [was] similar to running up against a stone wall.” Why was the 
movement stuck on this strategy, McCormack wondered, when there were two ways to pass a 
constitutional amendment? One was to pass an amendment through two-thirds of Congress 
and then send the amendment to the states for ratification. The other required two-thirds of 
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the states to call a constitutional convention where an amendment could be drafted and then 
ratified by Congress. Why not concentrate the Human Life Amendment campaign where the 
movement was strongest, at the state level? Why not turn the campaign over to grassroots 
activists and coordinate a state-by-state constitutional call? If national leaders adopted this 
strategy, McCormack believed grassroots pro-life activists could lobby two-thirds of the fifty 
state legislatures to call for a constitutional convention within a short time.386  
Unlike her unifying presidential race in 1976, McCormack’s call for a constitutional 
convention shattered the consensus the movement had gained under Mildred Jefferson’s 
presidency.387  
Opposition to the constitutional convention strategy varied. Some activists claimed 
that the convention would shift energies away from Congress at the wrong moment. Since 
the movement had just persuaded Congress to pass the Hyde Amendment, its biggest national 
victory to date, shouldn't it continue to pressure Congress? After all, right to life activists 
now better understood how to lobby at the national level. Others argued that a constitutional 
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convention would increase pressure on Congress while rallying the movement’s grassroots. 
Still others feared that a convention would not just pave the way for a Human Life 
Amendment but would become an open forum for any special interest group to amend the 
U.S. Constitution. How could pro-life activists guarantee that the convention would adopt 
their version of the Human Life Amendment rather than a weaker version? Or worse yet, was 
there any guarantee that a convention would not adopt an amendment that guaranteed the 
right to abortion? Those with a more conservative outlook weighed the benefit of a Human 
Life Amendment against the risk a constitutional convention could pose as a veritable 
Pandora’s Box that threw open to change all the United States’ legal traditions and 
government institutions. Of all the amendments that the United States had ratified, they 
pointed out, none had come through a constitutional convention.  
In response to these arguments, constitutional convention supporters asked: If not 
now, when? The Human Life Amendment had stalled in Congress since the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee had tabled all anti-abortion amendments in 1975. There was no indication the 
newly elected 94th Congress would take up a Human Life Amendment, and every indication 
that Congress was even more reluctant to debate such an amendment in 1977 than it had been 
in 1973. When was the National Right to Life Committee going to again take up the Human 
Life Amendment? Was the National Right to Life Committee going to forever chip away at 
Roe v. Wade instead of establishing fetal personhood?  
While differences in religion and leadership styles had informed the Human Life 
Amendment strategy divisions in 1973-74, this time the divide was largely about partisan 
politics. As McCormack and her allies rallied for a constitutional convention, they also tried 
in vain to win back support from the Democratic Party. In January 1977 McCormack helped 
 187 
to found Democrats for Life, and also continued to champion an independent third party in 
New York to thwart the state’s largely pro-choice Republican Party. These efforts reflected 
McCormack’s larger goal: she wanted to keep the National Right to Life Committee, which 
was still dominated by Catholics, a single-issue, non-partisan organization. With that in 
mind, it was not surprising that many of the states that first called for a constitutional 
convention had both large Catholic populations and Democratic parties sympathetic to the 
pro-life movement. Nor was it surprising that Pat Goltz, the president of Feminists for Life, 
was one of McCormack’s staunchest allies. They positioned themselves against conservative 
activists led by Jefferson who pushed for the National Right to Life Committee to broaden its 
single-issue politics and adopt positions on other issues. Conservative pro-lifers also fostered 
the movement’s growing alliance with the Republican Party even though the alliance could 
never be official lest the organization lose its tax-exempt status. 
The debate over a constitutional convention became a heated battle at the grassroots 
throughout 1977 and 1978. In February 1977, Louisiana and Indiana passed constitutional 
convention calls, and a new national pro-life organization formed, Americans for a 
Constitutional Convention.388 Due largely to Jefferson’s opposition, the National Right to 
Life Committee’s Board responded by passing a strong resolution endorsing the 
congressional route to passing a Human Life Amendment on March 23, 1977.389 However, 
by May, New Jersey, Rhode Island and South Dakota had also called for a constitutional 
convention.390 Then pro-life leaders from Jefferson’s home state of Massachusetts defied her 
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directives and successfully lobbied their Democratic-controlled legislature to pass a 
constitutional convention call on June 8, 1977.391  
Dr. Joseph Stanton of the Value of Life Committee and Katherine Healy, the 
president of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, had come to believe the constitutional 
convention call was a good strategy. Massachusetts Citizens for Life already had persuaded 
their legislature to pass many abortion restrictions between 1973 and 1976. These restrictions 
included parental consent laws, spousal consent laws, and requirements that physicians do 
everything in their power to save fetuses that showed any sign of life during an abortion; the 
Supreme Court had overturned most of these laws in 1976. In response, Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life began to work harder for the Human Life Amendment. Also, the 
Massachusetts activists did not see McCormack’s call as very different from the incremental 
path they had steered all along. They agreed with McCormack that the constitutional 
convention calls were a way for states to do something proactive for the Human Life 
Amendment and to rally their supporters at home.  
By endorsing McCormack’s plan Massachusetts Citizen’s for Life’s Executive Board 
opposed Mildred Jefferson's presidency of the National Right to Life Committee. That 
spring, they elected Phillip Moran to replace Jefferson as the state's representative on the 
National Right to Life Committee’s Board of Directors. Once Jefferson was no longer a 
board member she could not run for any offices on the executive committee, including the 
presidency.392 Thirty-five years later, Jefferson still found it too difficult to talk about 
precisely what happened between her and other Massachusetts Citizens for Life leaders to 
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cause the break: she referred to it as a betrayal, became somber, and held her silence. An 
editorial Jefferson drafted in the spring of 1977 hints at the personal toll the constitutional 
convention conflict took on her. She wrote, “No abortion-advocate’s attacks can measure up 
to the aggravated assaults I have had to endure from some of the people who are supposed to 
be on our side.”393 Unfortunately, that was not the only grassroots challenge Jefferson had to 
face as President in 1977.  
 
“Now is the time to take up arms, literally”394  
“If I saw a child in the street whose life was endangered even though it would be a 
risk to myself, I would have to take the risk to save the child,” stated Jeannette Reinecker of 
Takoma Park, Maryland. “I don’t see any difference between the born and unborn child.” In 
the summer of 1975, Reinecker founded Women Against Massacre and Brutality (WOMB) 
with five other women and their husbands. They drafted a three-page logistical plan that set a 
tight schedule for a clinic sit-in, and practiced letting their bodies go limp in preparation for 
their arrests in special role-playing sessions. The WOMB activists also decided that only 
women would participate in the clinic sit-in. As one of the husbands and leaders later 
recalled, “You had to get across something that would break the [pro-life] stereotype of 
misogynistic males who were trying to control women.”395 On the Saturday morning of 
August 2, 1975, the six women occupied the waiting room of the Sigma Reproductive Health 
Center in Takoma Park, Maryland. Three of the six carried their infants in their arms as their 
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husbands waited outside. In the afternoon, police arrested the women for trespassing on the 
clinic grounds.396 
Leaders of WOMB had already obtained the services of a pro-life lawyer who took on 
their case pro bono. The lawyer argued that his client’s trespass was driven by a compelling 
motive: they wanted to save the lives of unborn children. His argument failed to sway the 
judge, who convicted all six women of trespassing, a misdemeanor. WOMB counted the first 
clinic sit-in as a success anyway. According to members of WOMB, the event generated “a 
remarkable amount of media coverage” because they “found the media eager to explore this 
new ‘radicalism’ among seemingly conservative people."397  
Over a year later, on October 6, 1976, a second group of pro-life women organized a 
sit-in at the National Health Care Service clinic in Cleveland, Ohio. Police arrested eight 
women after they entered the clinic, sat down and began to sing “Where have all the babies 
gone, doctors killed them everyone.” The lyrics were from a song “Give Life a Chance” set 
to the melody of the anti- Vietnam War protest song “Where have all the flowers gone.” The 
women had been protesting outside several Cleveland women’s health clinics for months. At 
some point that summer they decided to take the next step and stage a sit-in. They formed 
People Expressing a Concern for Everyone (PEACE) and contacted a sympathetic lawyer to 
handle their trespassing charges and trial. By December 1976, the National Right to Life 
News nicknamed the women the “Cleveland 8” and reported on the progress of their trial and 
eventual trespassing convictions.398  
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In January 1977, the Washington, D.C. activists from WOMB won their sit-in 
movement’s first legal victory. After protesting at the Northern Virginia Women’s Medical 
Center outside Washington, D.C., the first sit-in in which men also participated, a Virginia 
judge ruled in the activists’ favor and dropped the trespassing charges. He accepted the 
reasoning that since the sit-in activists were trying to save unborn babies’ lives they had a 
compelling reason to trespass on clinic grounds. Shortly after the verdict John Cavanaugh-
O’Keefe, one of the men arrested, founded the Pro-Life Non-Violent Action Project. The 
organization supported the development of local organizations dedicated to non-violent clinic 
sit-in protests.399  
Pro-life activists would come to know Cavanaugh-O’Keefe as the father of pro-life 
civil disobedience. Cavanaugh-O’Keefe came from a more liberal Catholic background than 
many of the leaders of the National Right to Life Committee. While at Harvard between 1968 
and 1976, O’Keefe had participated in the anti-war movement. In 1970, he had filed as a 
conscientious objector and opted to serve his country as a hospital orderly at a Boston mental 
health institute rather than as a soldier. In a nod to the feminist movement, he and his wife 
had hyphenated their names when they married in 1976; they wanted their joint names to 
reflect their equal partnership and standing in marriage. In the wake of Roe v. Wade, 
Cavanaugh-O’Keefe became aware of Massachusetts Citizens for Life and the Value of Life 
Committee. Neither organization captured the young man's interest. He later called Stanton's 
Value of Life Committee a weekend right to life organization; its activists approached the 
movement as a hobby to pursue in their free time, not the life-or-death issue it was. Viewing 
his anti-abortion activism as an outgrowth of his anti-war activism, Cavanaugh-O’Keefe 
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argued that the best way to counter violence was through a radical commitment to human 
rights and non-violent protest. He saw the anti-abortion movement as consistent with his 
more liberal pasts. “Sit-ins are changing the nature of the struggle,” he wrote in March 1977. 
“Our simple recognition of the unborn as human is coming into focus more clearly…. By 
sitting in, we really do say, physically as well as verbally: I am with that child and if you 
reject him, you must reject (eject) me first.”400 Sit-in activists, like pro-life activists pursuing 
a constitutional convention, re-affirmed the importance of establishing and defending fetal 
personhood.  
In March 1977, Cavanaugh-O'Keefe joined Ellen McCormack in critiquing both 
Mildred Jefferson’s leadership and the results of her 1976 right to life revolution. He wrote: 
“If the abortion question were merely a particular battle line in the continuing ideological 
struggle between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, then the proper tactics would be speeches, 
conventions, legislation, etc.,” but “it is truly a question of basic human rights, cutting across 
ideological lines.”401 If pro-life activists held that a fetus was a person and abortion was 
murder, Cavanaugh-O’Keefe concluded, “We should be willing to risk more than our vote.”  
For pro-life activists willing to risk arrest, clinic sit-ins could achieve a number of 
goals that more traditional political engagement had not. Moreover, the goals of clinic sit ins 
breached the divide between pro-life activists who argued for fetal personhood and those 
who stressed abortion restrictions. Cavanaugh-O’Keefe was sure that clinic sit ins saved fetal 
lives, intimidated abortion providers, made clinics more expensive to run, brought publicity 
to the pro-life movement, and generated court cases that could help establish fetal 
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personhood. Above all, the use of non-violent protests brought into focus what sit-in activists 
believed to be the violence of abortion. Sit-in protesters placed themselves between those 
they considered murderers and their victims, the pregnant woman and her unborn child. Both 
the rhetoric and the actions of these activists popularized a sense of apocalyptic conflict that 
James Wesolowski’s editorial had captured with the simple statement, "This is War!" Even 
opponents of clinic sit-ins as a strategy began to adopt the language of war to explain the 
polarizing effect of abortion on the American populace.402  
This “abortion war” was heightened by a series of arsons at clinics that occurred as 
the clinic sit-ins started. On June 27, 1975, Joseph C. Stockett set fire to a Planned 
Parenthood clinic in Eugene, Oregon. He later wrote to The National Right to Life News to 
explain his actions; like Cavanaugh-O’Keefe, he stated “I believe that a man is morally 
responsible for every act of killing he has knowledge of but does not attempt to prevent.” On 
February 23, 1977 another anti-abortionist set fire to a recently opened Planned Parenthood 
clinic in St. Paul, Minnesota. The fire caused $60,000 of damage. National Right to Life 
Committee leaders condemned the arson but blamed Planned Parenthood, not the person who 
committed the crime: “Planned Parenthood has become so fat and comfortable with its status 
quo, its financial resources and its judges that it howled in ferocious indignation against the 
attack on itself,” wrote Dexter Duggan in the National Right to Life News. Echoing 
Cavanaugh-O'Keefe's articulation of abortion as violence, he charged that Planned 
Parenthood committed a level of violence against women and children that no other violent 
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act, no matter how damaging to clinic property, could ever equal.403  
National Right to Life leaders thus embraced the rhetoric of abortion as violence that 
clinic sit-in activists had made popular. What National Right to Life Convention planners had 
announced as a “time to take stock” after the November 1976 elections now evolved into a 
four-part conference entitled “Alive in Chicago” in the spring of 1977. The four conference 
themes, one for each day of the meeting, were: “Our Increasingly Violent Society – How,” 
“Our Increasingly Violent Society – Why,” “Stemming and Reversing the Tide of Violence – 
The Task of Everyman,” and “The Making of a Candidate 1978/1980: Legislative, 
Congressional, and Presidential.”404 This evidence then mapped onto what activists believed 
was an irreconcilable value conflict of values. Panelists and speakers at the convention 
compared legal abortion in the United States to the Holocaust. Charging that German’s 
general lack of respect for human dignity led the Nazi government to perpetuate horrendous 
crimes against Jews, Gypsies, the disabled and the mentally challenged, pro-life leaders 
claimed that now American’s lack of respect for human life and dignity was causing the 
murder of millions of innocent fetuses. At various panels and speeches, leaders pondered 
how to combat what they considered an “anti-life” mentality that was growing stronger in 
America the longer abortion remained legal. 405 
While Mildred Jefferson’s presidency had been under threat before the conference, a 
series of events in the spring and early summer helped her secure an at-large position on the 
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National Right to Life Committee Executive Board and to win a third term as president. 
Jefferson approved of the idea of an abortion war that the clinic sit-ins generated. She rallied 
conservative pro-lifers around two ideas that could convert the pro-life activists who 
challenged her leadership and change the political direction of the movement. First, Jefferson 
declared that the pro-life movement was at war with feminists. To wage that war effectively, 
she announced that right to life activists had to join the broader conservative coalition that 
McCormack and Cavanaugh-O’Keefe had criticized.  
According to Jefferson, the war that pitted feminists against anti-abortion activists 
represented a clash between two worldviews. In August 1977, Jefferson said that feminists 
lived in “a gray world, without love, romance, courtesy and charm; a mean world, where 
children are considered an inconvenience or a handicap; an unsettling world, where every 
emotional encounter becomes a battleground and every human experience a fresh chance for 
self-pity and selfish preoccupation.” She concluded: “I do not want their kind of world.”406  
 
Mildred Jefferson and the War Against Feminism  
On Sunday June 5, four hundred conservative women stood in pouring rain to hear 
Mildred Jefferson speak at a rally to counter Minnesota’s International Women’s Year 
conference in St. Cloud. Two years earlier, Congress had passed an act that both established 
and funded a series of International Women’s Year conventions; Congress hoped that 
American women of various ethnic, racial, religious and socio-economic backgrounds would 
convene in Houston in 1977. Using the federal money, government-appointed International 
Women’s Year committees organized state conferences at which women could meet to reach 
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a consensus on a “National plan of action” that would benefit all American women. Over 
4,000 Minnesota women attended the state convention the first weekend of June 1977 to 
nominate a series of delegates to attend and to make policy recommendations for the 
International Women’s Year Conference to be held in Houston in November.407  
In preparation for the state convention, Minnesota Citizens for Life had formed a 
loose coalition with state chapters of Stop-ERA, the Eagle Forum, the League of Catholic 
Women and other women’s church groups. Their coalition did not have an official name, but 
they united against a series of feminist-backed policies that included support of the Equal 
Rights Amendment, legal abortion, and acknowledgment of gay and lesbian rights. The 
conservative coalition of an estimated six hundred women then worked to pass their 
resolutions on Friday and Saturday, June 3 and 4. They also lobbied against resolutions that 
recommended that abortion remain legal and that supported government funds to subsidize 
the costs of abortions for women on public assistance. When the state convention passed the 
feminist-backed policy recommendations on Saturday night, the conservative women walked 
out. On Sunday, they held a counter-rally where Jefferson berated feminists and condemned 
the Minnesota International Women’s Year state commission.408 
The National Right to Life Committee had long opposed the International Women’s 
Year. Two years before, on December 5, 1975, the Committee on Reproductive Freedom of 
the National Commission on the International Women’s Year had released a series of 
recommendations that outraged pro-life activists. The committee recommended that the 
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President and Congress should reject all anti-abortion constitutional amendments and any 
federal legislation that would limit legal abortion services; state legislatures, should also 
bring their laws into compliance with the Supreme Court’s Roe and Doe decisions; the 
federal and state governments should both work to provide abortion services for indigent 
women under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. In response to these recommendations, 
National Right to Life Committee leaders directed their members to write to their legislators 
in protest. Anti-abortion leaders urged women in particular to write to Congress conveying 
how upset they were that the International Women’s Year Conference “would be used to 
espouse anti-life policies at the taxpayers’ expense.” As with their ongoing attempts to 
restrict abortion funding, the National Right to Life Committee had suggested in 1975 and 
1976 that the best way to combat the International Women’s Year and its recommendations 
was to defund the program.409 Two years later, pro-life leaders looked to the International 
Women’s Year Conference as pivotal to solving their movement’s recent divisions 
concerning strategy. For Mildred Jefferson, the International Women’s Year presented the 
perfect opportunity to strengthen conservative coalition-building within the Republican Party 
that those who preferred a Human Life Amendment had begun to challenge in the fall of 
1976 and winter of 1977. 
 Jefferson was not the only conservative leader to see the International Women’s Year 
conference as a potential moment of convergence between conservative social and political 
organizations. Conservative icon and anti-feminist Phyllis Schlafly had long been courting 
the pro-life movement by the time the first state International Women’s Year conventions 
commenced in February 1977. In a December 1974 Phyllis Schlafly Report, she had argued 
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that the Equal Rights Amendment would protect a woman’s right to choose abortion, and 
pushed for a pro-life anti-ERA alliance.410 These alliances between National Right to Life 
Committee affiliates and the anti-ERA movement flourished in many states. For example, 
Kansas Right to Life worked against the state's ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment 
in 1972, and joined forces with the state’s Stop-ERA chapters in an attempt to rescind ERA 
ratification in 1977 and 1978.  
The National Right to Life Committee Board, however, refused to take a position on 
the ERA until 1978. Prior to that, the board had argued that it was a single-issue organization 
and that releasing a position statement on the Equal Rights Amendment fell outside its 
purview. Many pro-life activists backed the board’s decision. Elizabeth Moore, a National 
Right to Life Committee lobbyist and staff member in Washington, D.C., pleaded for the 
movement not to associate with the anti-ERA movement as late as April 1977. To Moore, 
women who belonged to Stop-ERA had “the public image of being ultra-conservative or 
reactionary.” She did not think of herself in that way. Like other female activists concerned 
about women's issues in the pro-life movement, Moore argued that feminists and others 
would best help women in crisis pregnancies by advocating for better welfare policies and 
health care, not abortion funding.411 Moore was not alone. 
Feminists for Life also continued to advocated for the Equal Rights Amendment. The 
group believed that in order to support single mothers who chose to carry their pregnancies to 
term, the pro-life movement should sympathize with the larger education and employment 
goals of feminism. In 1977, Pat Goltz, the president of Feminists for Life, was one of the 
                                                
410 “ERA spells abortion, Phyllis Schlafly says,” NRL News 2 (January 1975). 
 
411Elizabeth Moore, “Readers argue abortion effects of Equal Rights Amendment,” NRL News 4 (April 
1977). 
 
 199 
strongest advocates of the constitutional convention call because she believed a Human Life 
Amendment would resolve the abortion issue without the pro-life movement having to 
mobilize against feminism. Conservative arguments linking the ERA to abortion did not 
cause the larger pro-life movement to embrace anti-feminism as a strategy; organized 
feminist opposition to the Hyde Amendment did.  
In 1976, the Hyde Amendment had been an unpleasant surprise for feminists and the 
abortion rights movement; they could no longer rely on the Roe and Doe decisions to protect 
American women's access to legal abortion. In response they formed political coalitions and 
made indigent women's access to government funding of elective abortions a top policy 
priority along with the Equal Rights Amendment. Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
teamed with the American Civil Liberties Union to launch lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of state and federal abortion fund bans. These organizations then joined with 
the National Abortion Rights Action League, the National Organization for Women, and the 
International Women's Year State commissions to launch a lobbying campaign to overturn 
they Hyde Amendment in 1977. Between June and mid-July, forty-five states held 
International Women’s Year Conventions, and thousands of women across the country voted 
to support government funding of elective abortion and other family planning services for 
women who otherwise could not afford them. These women insisted that government 
subsidized reproductive health care was essential to the betterment of all American women. 
While the Hyde Amendment had yet to be enforced in 1977, no pro-life activist 
wished to see it overturned. By endorsing abortion funding, the International Women’s Year 
Conventions that took place between February and July 1977 helped to support Jefferson’s 
presidency of the National Right to Life Committee, since even Jefferson’s opponents agreed 
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that working for the Hyde Amendment’s enforcement and its re-passage in the face of 
feminist opposition was more important than any pro-life movement internal battles. “I’d like 
to ask convention supporters to join me in giving Dr. Jefferson a vote of confidence as an 
indispensable leader in the pro-life movement and as a personal friend,” wrote Pat Goltz of 
Feminists for Life. “We have a lot of work to do. So let us stop throwing brickbats at each 
other and get busy.”412  
 
The Pro-Family Convergence: The Hyde Amendment and International Women’s Year 
On Friday June 17, Representative Henry Hyde proposed another abortion funding 
ban amendment to the 1978 appropriation bill for the Health, Education and Welfare 
Department. The House once again ratified the funding ban.413 The same day, the National 
Right to Life Committee elected Mildred Jefferson to her third term as president and reached 
another period of consensus despite the ongoing constitutional convention controversy and 
the burgeoning clinic sit-in movement. The Board of Directors agreed that the new Hyde 
Amendment would remain the movement’s top priority until the federal government 
enforced last year’s amendment, and until Congress passed another abortion funding ban.  
On Monday June 20, one day after the National Right to Life Convention ended, the 
Supreme Court released Maher v. Roe. The legal case originated in Connecticut and 
challenged that state’s 1974 ban on abortion funds. In a 6-3 vote, the Court ruled that the 
Connecticut law that cut state Medicaid funding of abortion was constitutional. In the Court’s 
view, funds for abortion were a different legal matter than a woman’s access to abortion. 
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Because a state was not responsible for an indigent woman’s poverty, the Court ruled that 
cutting Medicaid funds was not an undue burden on poor women. As long as the state did not 
place any obstacle on a poor woman seeking an abortion, for example by prohibiting her 
from using her own private funds, it could cut state Medicaid funds for abortions. This ruling 
signaled to Congress that the Hyde Amendment would now pass judicial muster. Nine days 
after they released the decision, the Supreme Court vacated Judge Dooling’s earlier 
injunction against the enforcement of the 1977 federal Hyde Amendment, clearing the way 
for the amendment’s enforcement and its re-passage in 1977.414  
As the battle over federal abortion funding heated up in June and July, the pro-life 
movement turned to the other conservative women’s organizations it was aligning with in 
opposition to the International Women’s Year. The two campaigns worked closely together 
to mobilize a broad spectrum of conservatives by pushing an anti-feminist, anti-government 
and anti-tax rhetoric. Right to lifers had long complained that government funding of elective 
abortions violated the rights and sensibilities of American taxpayers who equated abortion 
with murder. At the heart of conservative women’s complaints against the International 
Women’s Year was their contention that feminists did not represent the majority of American 
women, and that the federal government had given feminists preferential treatment as a 
special interest lobby group when it funded the International Women’s Year. “We haven't 
been given taxpayer's money to promote our beliefs,” wrote National Right to Life News 
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editor Janet Grant in July 1977. “Any time Congress wants to vote five million dollars for the 
right to life movement, we'll take it!"415 
When it became clear that a majority of International Women’s Year state conference 
attendees supported the feminist-backed policy recommendations, conservative women 
changed tactics; they no longer sought to participate in the convention but to protest it, and, if 
possible, to shut it down. In July 1977, they began to pressure Congress to hold a series of 
legislative hearings on how the International Women’s Year’s funds had been and were 
continuing to be used. Nellie Gray, the president of the National March for Life, headed a 
national citizens’ review committee on International Women’s Year.416 Gray worked to halt 
government funds supporting both International Women’s Year and Medicaid abortion funds 
in the summer and fall of 1977. She turned to North Carolina’s Sen. Jesse Helms, who 
proved to be a pivotal ally in both campaigns. Conservative women’s discontent over the 
International Women’s Year state conferences also led them to form a national coalition on 
July 15, 1977. The coalition, housed in Houston, began to organize a counter -rally and “pro-
family” convention to be held on the same weekend as rival conference. One of the most 
effective members of the national coalition was Ira Early, chairman of Life Advocates of 
Houston, where the national International Women’s Year Conference would be held.  
On September 15, Sen. Helms oversaw a series of ad hoc Senate hearings about the 
International Women’s Year. As with the ongoing Hyde Amendment battles, the 
conservative women who testified wanted to halt all government funding of the International 
Women’s Year, thereby cancelling the upcoming November Houston conference. 
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Conservative women from Maryland to California lined up to speak against what they 
considered their unfair treatment at the hands of feminists at state International Women’s 
Year Conventions. They complained that the state International Women's Year meetings had 
been led and directed by women espousing a "radical feminist philosophy,” whose leaders 
had not allowed them to voice their views. Instead, they manipulated the International 
Women's Year meetings so that "abortion-on-demand," support for the ERA, and "approval 
of lesbianism and sexual promiscuity as fully valid alternatives" became part of the national 
plan of action. The conservative women also accused International Women's Year organizers 
of bigotry directed toward the Catholic and Latter Day Saints churches, hatred of men, and 
animosity toward conservative women.417  
While Helms’ hearings served as way for conservative women to come together and 
air their grievances on a national stage, the Hyde Amendment was even more essential to 
many conservative women. It would be the pro-family movement’s first major policy victory 
and would solidify the ongoing local and state battles over abortion funding. Under intense 
pressure from both the pro-life/pro-family coalitions and the feminist coalitions, Congress 
had a difficult time working out compromise language for the new Hyde Amendment.418 
Lobbyists on both sides of the issue also used the heated controversy around abortion to 
demand support from their congressional representatives before the upcoming 1978 
elections. Unable to reach a compromise on the Hyde Amendment, Congress failed to pass a 
budget for H.E.W. on September 28, the federal fiscal year deadline.419 
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The lobbying battle over the Hyde Amendment continued into October, drawing the 
media’s attention to what appeared to be a new and powerful pro-life and pro-family 
movement. An October 1977 New York Times survey of thirteen states found that the pro-life 
movement gained strength from other conservative organizations such as “Stop ERA.” Due 
to this coalition building and growth, the survey showed that the pro-choice movement could 
not match the pro-life movement in funds raised, number of organizations, or numbers of 
activists willing to demonstrate and protest on a routine basis.420 Jefferson’s strategy of 
working with other conservatives and supporting the pro-life war against feminism was 
paying off.  
In November, Mildred Jefferson joined Anita Byrant, Nellie Gray, Phyllis Schlafly, 
and California congressman Robert Dornan to headline the pro-family counter-rally to the 
International Women’s Year Conference at the Houston Astrodome complex. After attending 
the convention and the rally, Jefferson came to the conclusion that pro-life cooperation with 
feminists would no longer be possible. Describing her experience with feminists at the 
Houston conference, Jefferson wrote a series of brief but telling notes:  
Pain resulted from seeing the chip-on-the-shoulder hostility and hatred directed by 
them toward men and children, especially the unborn child. Detached tolerance was 
necessary to find anything of value in feminist effort, to find out if the search for 
equality of opportunity could provide a common meeting ground. No more.421 
  
For the first time, Jefferson made opposition to the ERA one of her top priorities. She then 
reiterated her more militant rhetoric, calling feminists “terrorists” and “tyrants” that right to 
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life activists had to oppose.422 
Two and a half weeks after the meeting in Houston, on December 7, 1977, Congress 
passed the Health, Education, and Welfare budget, with the Hyde Amendment attached.423 
That victory became the pro-family movement’s first success in changing national policy, 
which not only strengthened the coalition but also helped various affiliated organizations 
raise money that they could then contribute to other conservative causes. Reverend John F. 
Wilder, the founder of Christians for Life, summed up the coalition’s feelings in one word: 
“Jubilation.” His organization had raised $9,000 since its official incorporation in May of 
1977 in order to work for the Hyde Amendment. The National Right to Life Committee did 
even better; in direct-mailing fundraisers, twelve percent of their eleven million active 
supporters donated money. (Typically, only two percent of Committee members donated in 
direct mailing fundraisers). The Washington office’s budget increased four-fold, from 
250,000 dollars to over one million dollars, in 1977. The Hyde Amendment campaign had 
paid off royally.424 Moreover, the Hyde Amendment debates of 1977 showed the pro-life 
movement could halt Congress and bring its deliberations to a standstill. Rep. Daniel J. 
Flood, a Democrat from Pennsylvania who had served in Congress for thirty-two years, told 
a reporter “This issue took more debate and more votes than any other issue since I’ve been 
on the Hill.”425 
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“Elective Abortion Funding comes under state’s fire”426 
On August 4, 1977, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare announced that 
it would enforce the Hyde Amendment restrictions imposed by the 1977 appropriations bill 
in the wake of the Maher v. Roe decision. At the time, fifteen states had laws prohibiting the 
use of Medicaid funds for abortion. The remaining thirty-five, including Kansas, North 
Carolina and Massachusetts, funded elective abortions for women on public assistance. Since 
federal Medicaid funding subsidized roughly one third of all abortions performed yearly in 
the United States, paying up to ninety percent of the costs, the announcement came as a 
shock to state governments. The majority of them were left scrambling to come up with 
abortion funds for the remainder of the 1977 fiscal year. Further complicating the funding 
crisis, some state legislatures had ended their 1977 sessions, making it more difficult to pass 
emergency funding measures to aid women on public assistance. 
As a result of the H.E.W. directive, many governors faced a difficult choice: they 
could either transfer funds from an existing state program to cover the costs of elective 
abortions, or completely cut state abortion funds.427 Nineteen of the thirty-five state 
governments that had provided state funds for abortions came to the same conclusion: they 
no longer could afford to pay for elective abortions. As Republican Gov. Robert Bennett of 
Kansas wrote, “I very much wanted to continue the program but I was caught in a box 
primarily as a result of the federal abortion decision.”  He cut Kansas abortion funds the 
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second week of September.428  
 In Massachusetts, Democratic Gov. Michael Dukakis vowed he would continue the 
Massachusetts state abortion fund in lieu of the federal cuts. For five years, he had vetoed 
every bill that cut the state’s abortion fund for women on public assistance, and his vetoes 
stood because Massachusetts Citizens for Life had never gained enough state senate seats to 
override the vetoes. This was in part because Massachusetts Organization to Repeal Abortion 
Laws (MORAL) focused its funds and political energy on maintaining, and. if possible, 
increasing the number of state senators who supported the right to abortion. After the Hyde 
Amendment enforcement in August, Massachusetts Citizens for Life stepped up their 
lobbying efforts for House Bill 6327, which would cut state funds for abortion. On August 4, 
the same day as the HEW announcement, Charles Swain and a Boston “action for life” group 
climbed up the 175-foot state capitol dome to hang a seven-foot sign. “HR 6327 Pro-Life” 
greeted legislators and Boston commuters the next morning. Swain planned the illegal break-
in and sign hanging to coincide with debate over the state’s version of the Hyde Amendment 
that took place the following afternoon. By Friday August 5, the Massachusetts House and 
Senate passed HR 6327. On Monday August 8, Gov. Dukakis vetoed the bill. Massachusetts, 
he said, would continue to support the reproductive choices of all women, including women 
on public assistance.429   
 Massachusetts Citizens for Life tried a new tactic in response. Rather than proposing 
another legislative bill, they attached a funding ban as a rider to a highly popular state 
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employee pay raise bill. They hoped the governor would not veto the legislation and they 
would be able to finally slip the ban past Dukakis. Massachusetts Citizens for Life and the 
Catholic Church also stepped up their lobbying efforts. In homilies and announcements, 
priests denounced Catholic representatives who had failed to vote for either the bill or the 
rider cutting abortion funds. The aunt of Sen. Jerry D’Amico was shocked one Sunday 
morning to hear her priest denounce her nephew for opposing the amendment. D’Amico later 
told reporters “I’m used to political pressure – but it’s a different kind of pressure when God 
is involved.” Still, the senator insisted that he could not vote to cut funds because “the 
indigent should not be deprived of parity in medical services.” Despite this pro-life activity, 
Gov. Dukakis vetoed the state employee pay raise on November 10 because of the bill’s 
abortion rider. In December, the legislature sustained the veto, making Massachusetts one of 
sixteen states still funding abortion in the wake of the Hyde Amendment enforcement in 
August. The abortion rider’s defeat taught Katherine Healy, the president of Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, an important lesson: to stop the state’s abortion funding pro-life activists 
would have to defeat Gov. Dukakis in the 1978 election.430 
 North Carolina also continued to fund abortions due to the will of its Democratic 
Gov. James Hunt and a Democrat-controlled legislature. Hunt and North Carolina’s 
legislators viewed abortion funding as part of the state’s progressive family planning 
program. These legislators took pride in the fact that North Carolina was the first state to 
subsidize birth control for women on public assistance during the Great Depression. Abortion 
funding, they believed, was part of this progressive heritage. In the wake of the August 4 
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H.E.W. directive, Hunt worked with state legislators and county governments to increase the 
state’s funds for poor women: he offered to share the costs of subsidizing abortions with city 
and county governments that were willing to contribute money to a state abortion fund. This 
state-county share program helped to make up some of the deficit in federal funds, but fell far 
short of the federal funds that had paid for approximately ninety percent of the 3,552 
abortions North Carolina women on public assistance had received in 1976.431  
In the fall of 1977, North Carolina Right to Life made ending government-subsidized 
abortion their first priority, and National Right to Life Committee president Mildred 
Jefferson fully endorsed their efforts and priorities. At the time, North Carolina’s 
organization was small compared to other state affiliates, and North Carolina Right to Life 
had achieved no electoral victories and had not passed any anti-abortion legislation.  Their 
campaign to cut government funding for abortion was ambitious and would achieve several 
goals; potentially it would save some fetuses’ lives, and it would be a rallying point to build 
the local and state movement’s membership and political power.   
To end the state-county abortion funds, North Carolina pro-life activists pursed 
strategies that mirrored some of the National Right to Life Committee’s tactics at the national 
level. Their campaign, however, focused on the grassroots. Local pro-life leaders increased 
their base of support by forging pro-family coalitions that were also mobilizing against the 
International Women’s Year and public school sex education programs in the fall of 1977. 
As part of these efforts, they focused on inviting apolitical Fundamentalists and Evangelical 
Christians into participating in local politics. “It is up to YOU the citizens of those counties 
to put a stop to this. It is no longer out of your control. It is YOUR money, your elected 
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officials, and your responsibility,” wrote Dan Horley in the North Carolina Right to Life 
Newsletter.432  
In Raleigh, John Dowd created a pro-family coalition that served as an example to 
other state chapters. Dowd was the president of Wake County Right to Life and served on 
North Carolina Right to Life’s board. In September, he recruited Reverend T. Marshall 
Collins of the Tabernacle Baptist Church to speak with him at a Wake County Social 
Services Board public hearing on the proposed county abortion fund. The same month, Dowd 
met Reverend Coy Privette, the President of the N.C. State Baptist Convention. At the 
meeting, Privette told Dowd that the majority of Baptists in the state were in sympathy with 
North Carolina Right to Life and promised his full support in the campaign to cut the state 
abortion fund.433 Dowd also coordinated a Wake County Right to Life prayer service and 
planning meeting at the Mormon Church of Latter Day Saints in downtown Raleigh in 
September. There forty activists gathered to hear Carl Anderson, Jesse Helm’s Congressional 
aide. Anderson spoke about all the ongoing pro-life initiatives happening in September 1977, 
including the recent enforcement of the Hyde Amendment, the ongoing attempts to pass the 
1978 Hyde Amendment ban in Congress, and protests against the North Carolina state-
county abortion fund. While Anderson pleased the audience when he stated that the Hyde 
Amendment had saved over 3,000 lives a day (a figure no one substantiated), it was clear that 
Wake County had its work cut out for it to stop the county abortion fund.434 Despite Dowd’s 
work, the Wake County Commissioners voted in October 1977 to provide $10,000 in county 
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funds for abortions.435  
Other North Carolina Right to Life chapters worked with the newly formed Women’s 
Conservative Caucus, which had come into being in response to the International Women’s 
Year. The state organizations’ speaker bureau had made two pro-life presentations to 
Women’s Conservative Caucus members in the fall of 1977, one to the Rockingham County 
Area Women for the Christian Churches and the other to the Winston-Salem’s Women’s 
Conservative Caucus, formerly the local STOP ERA chapter.436 On November 11, 1977, 
several representatives from the Women’s Conservative Caucus attended the North Carolina 
Right to Life Convention where state president Emma O’Steen praised their efforts against 
the International Women’s Year Conference that would take place the next weekend in 
Houston. Mildred Jefferson, who gave the convention’s keynote address, also praised the 
state pro-family coalition, announcing that the state’s pro-family movement would be 
necessary to end the state-county abortion fund share program.437 She then went on to 
criticize government funding of abortion as a form of black genocide, and population control 
against poor people. 
 
“The mighty army of the people is on the move” 438 
In January 1978, Mildred Jefferson asked herself a question that continued to plague 
her presidency: “Why can’t [pro-life] people get together in one organization?” She then 
answered her own question. “There are too many people from many different backgrounds, 
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philosophies, experiences and temperaments to get along together for very long.” Under 
Jefferson’s National Right to Life Committee presidency, the Hyde Amendment had kept this 
diverse and growing pro-life movement together, allowing it to move in one conservative 
direction for three years. As 1978 dawned, the pro-life movement had lost the one policy and 
goal every activist could rally around. Was there any strategy or policy that could replace it 
and unite the movement? The Human Life Amendment could not; it continued to be divisive. 
Activists still could not agree on the amendment’s wording or on McCormack’s 
constitutional convention call strategy. Now, the Hyde Amendment and questions of 
government funding of abortion also drove divisions. For activists from the sixteen states that 
continued to subsidize abortions, including Massachusetts and North Carolina, eliminating 
that funding remained the top priority. For the remaining thirty-four states, priorities differed. 
Should they focus on passing abortion restrictions and creating new barriers between 
abortion providers and their clients, or on preparing an all-out Human Life Amendment 
campaign? One sentiment, however, was universal: pro-life activists continued to believe 
they were in an abortion war against feminists.  
Due a lack of a national consensus, the pro-life movement waged a de-centralized war 
on several fronts. By July 1978, six more states passed constitution convention calls, bringing 
the total to twelve. Clinic sit-ins spread. In January and February alone, sit-ins occurred in 
Alaska, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia.439 By the spring, St. Louis, 
Missouri became a hotbed of activity as established leaders of Missouri Citizens for Life 
joined a younger group of activists in weekly sit-ins at abortion clinics. The participation of 
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Missouri Citizens for Life leaders in civil disobedience set off a series of heated debates at 
the national level that culminated at the 1978 National Right to Life Convention in St. Louis. 
Mildred Jefferson and others argued that it was imperative that the two movement strategies 
not cross-pollinate; the National Right to Life Committee could not be financially responsible 
or liable for the illegal acts of the non-violent civil disobedience movement. While Jefferson 
understood the rage that fueled the sit-ins, she also believed their strategy “was a dangerous 
detour which the right-to-life movement and our country can ill-afford.”440 Jefferson wanted 
politics and education to rule the pro-life movement. 
Other activists undermined abortion clinics by passing new city, county, and state 
regulations. Pro-life activists in Akron, Ohio led the way in January 1978. There, a 23-year-
old Jewish law school student made his hometown the front line in what activists on both 
sides were coming to refer to as the abortion wars. Martin Weinberger was a law student at 
Boston University when a question captured both his heart and mind. What kind of abortion 
regulations would the Supreme Court allow under the Roe and Doe decisions? This was not 
an original question; incremental pro-life activists and movement lawyers had been debating 
it since 1973. What was original was how Weinberger arrived at an answer. He wanted 
women who were seeking abortions to consent to the procedure after they had been informed 
of what he believed were all the facts. This included learning all the biological stages of fetal 
development through what Mildred Jefferson described as “graphic information about the 
development of the unborn child.”441 As part of this pro-life narrative, abortion counselors 
were supposed to convey the belief that a fetus was a human being from the moment of 
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conception as a medical fact. The ordinance also required clinic staff to tell women the age of 
the fetus they carried and when it would reach viability, as well as any and all potential 
psychological and physical harm a woman could suffer as a result of abortion. Finally, clinic 
staff would have to provide information about adoption agencies and childbirth resources to a 
woman before she consented to an abortion. The legislation then mandated a twenty-four 
hour waiting period between the counseling and the procedure to ensure that women fully 
thought through their decisions. Weinberg presented his legislation as being pro-woman, 
claiming it empowered women to make better-informed choices concerning their 
pregnancies.442  
Whether his proposed city ordinance actually accomplished informed consent was 
debatable. At the time, most abortion providers asked for a patient’s consent and had already 
developed procedures for discussing the risks associated with abortion through professional 
meetings of the National Abortion Federation and the American Congress of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists. What Weinberg proposed was that abortion clinics also require women to 
hear a series of pro-life narratives concerning abortion and fetal development that would be 
presented to them as incontrovertible scientific fact. The twenty-four hour waiting period 
between counseling and the procedure set up yet another restriction for women to overcome 
in order to have an abortion; this was particularly true for poor women from rural areas. If the 
ordinance passed and these women were coming in from out of town, they would now have 
to stay overnight at a hotel or arrange two visits to the clinic on two separate days, sometimes 
a weeks-long delay that not only lengthened their pregnancies but also increased both the 
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costs and risks of their abortions. The intent to restrict abortion access in Akron became even 
clearer when the ordinance also included other popular pro-life injunctions that had been 
tried in other states and localities since 1973. One required parental consent or judicial 
bypass for young women under the age of fifteen; the other required physicians to perform 
abortions past the first trimester in hospitals, not clinics.443 
While the ordinance itself represented a new pro-life legislative model, the pro-life 
activity on its behalf also revealed significant changes in the pro-life movement as a result of 
the formation of the pro-family coalition in 1977. Leading into the Akron City Council vote 
on February 28, local pro-life forces organized an all-night prayer vigil outside the municipal 
building. Protestant ministers from local Baptist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran churches spoke 
at the vigil as well as the Catholic bishop of Akron. Six hundred people from different 
denominations attended, including a handful of activists from neighboring states who wanted 
to duplicate the ordinance in their own towns and cities. When the City Council approved the 
measure 7-6, shouts of “praise God” were heard in the audience. Some even called it a 
miracle, the result of the concentrated prayers of so many Christians coming together. This 
too was a tactic other pro-life activists sought to emulate in addition to passing similar 
abortion restrictions in their own towns and states.444 
In North Carolina, similar interdenominational efforts had been going on for a long 
time. Now, however, they would be influential in state politics. In January 1978, Rev. Roy 
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Privette, the president of the North Carolina Baptist Convention, began to coordinate a series 
of eighty “mission meetings” to discuss members’ political engagement and to assess the 
positions of potential candidates in local and state races.445 He had already vowed to North 
Carolina Right to Life that the state’s Southern Baptists were with the organization in spirit. 
Through the mission meetings, Southern Baptists began to participate in pro-life politics. 
Privette was not the only Protestant minister to organize in North Carolina. Rev. Curtis 
Carrington, a black AME Church minister from Greensboro and a North Carolina Right to 
Life board member, had been organizing Protestant ministers in North Carolina since 1976. 
By June 1978, he had gained the support of the Greensboro Ministerial Association and the 
High Point Baptists Association, and had organized 1,000 North Carolina ministers into a 
loose coalition in opposition to the state abortion fund.446  
In the spring of 1978, North Carolina Right to Life relied on these church groups to 
lobby for a bill banning the use of state funds for abortion and abortion referral services. To 
gain support for the bill, North Carolina Right to Life funded a March 1978 public opinion 
survey that asked two thousand North Carolinians, “Do you think the Government should 
help poor women with her medical bills if she wants an abortion?” 41.5 percent said yes, 
44.3 percent said no and 14.2 percent did not know.447 Despite what appeared to be a split 
public opinion, the House tabled the state abortion funds ban in June. In response, North 
Carolina Right to Life activists looked to the local and state primaries and fall elections. They 
issued candidate surveys and began to target county commissioners and state representatives 
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they wanted to unseat in order to pass bans on abortion funding at the county level in 1979. 
Some chapters followed the example of Cattawba County’s Citizens Against Tax Funded 
Abortions, a political action committee that won county seats for all but one of their 
candidates.448 
In 1978, these pro-family coalitions not only rallied against the state abortion fund but 
also engaged in the ongoing battles in the state house over the ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and proposals for sex education programs in the public schools. Particularly 
upsetting to pro-family activists was the Planned Parenthood film “About Sex” that some 
schools in Raleigh and Charlotte had begun to incorporate into their curriculum. The film 
covered such topics as abortion, masturbation, contraception, and homosexuality, discussing 
them within a relativistic view that challenged the idea of sexual normality. In Raleigh, Wake 
County Right to Life helped to organize parents in opposition to the health education 
program’s director’s decision to air “About Sex” and won a school board ban on the film.449 
The state’s pro-life speaker’s bureau also continued presentations at churches and private 
Christian academies to recruit activists across a broad denominational spectrum. Instead of 
speaking on abortion alone, they presented talks titled “Marriage and Family” to discuss the 
wider topics of sexuality and relationships, and address the pro-family coalition’s opposition 
to the ERA, abortion, sex education, and gay rights. George Miller, a progressive Democratic 
state representative from Durham, recalled in an interview that there was little to no 
difference between these organizations. The same conservative people showed up at the same 
                                                
448 “Victory . . . Victory . . . Victory,” The Concept 6 (January 1979). 
 
449 “State Roundup,” NRL News 5 (June 1978). 
 
 218 
state hearings concerning any legislation dealing with sexuality and gender.450 
As the pro-lifers waged these battles in 1978, challenges to Jefferson’s presidency of 
the National Right to Life Committee mounted. In November 1977, some Board members, 
led by Jack Wilke, began to question Jefferson’s handling of the organization’s finances. 
Despite the influx of funds during the Hyde Amendment battles in 1977, by 1978 the 
organization had a $200,000 debt.451 Others questioned what they increasingly viewed as her 
imperial style of leadership. In 1975 Jefferson had rallied against the idea of any Moses-like 
leader arising to save the movement; in 1978 she referred to herself as the movement’s sole 
general. In 1975 she also appeared to champion the diversity of grassroots initiatives, in 1978 
she insisted, “The right-to-life movement must avoid at all costs the inclination to move off 
in all directions at once.” Jefferson wanted to continue to lead centrally-coordinated 
campaigns out of the national office. She also had no plan of resigning or retiring, and a 
growing number of grassroots activists came to believe that Jefferson planned to remain 
president of the organization for as long as it would take to overturn Roe v. Wade or to pass a 
Human Life Amendment. This was an unsettling idea to many activists and state leaders, 
even the conservatives among them who favored Jefferson’s strategies but also believed in 
term limits, and feared concentrations of power in any one leader’s hands.452  
In June 1978, the National Right to Life Committee Board elected Dr. Carolyn 
Gerster, another prominent Protestant and physician who had been Chairman of the Board 
under Jefferson, president of the organization. While campaigning for the office Gerster 
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promised a two-year term limit and revealed a five-year plan to pass a Human Life 
Amendment. Her plan focused on the upcoming 1978 and 1980 congressional elections. “The 
Human Life Amendment,” Gerster declared, “will become a reality if we send the men and 
women to Washington who will vote for it and if we elect the state representatives who will 
ratify it.”453 In addition to focusing on congressional campaigns through the Life Amendment 
Political Action Committee, Gerster and the National Right to Life Committee Board 
endorsed the constitutional convention call as an important strategy to pressure Congress, 
overturning Jefferson’s 1977 decision. Gerster’s presidency would better reflect the pro-life 
movement’s recent shift from Washington, D.C. to the grassroots and state levels.   
Jefferson was shocked. She lost not only the presidency, but also her position on the 
National Right to Life Committee’s Executive Committee and Board as a Director-at-large. 
Since she had already lost her position as representative of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
she now found herself completely excluded from the leadership of the organization. In one 
day, she had gone from being the central decision-maker to someone with no power to affect 
decisions. It was a drastic fall for her. “In the heat of battle, I have been unhorsed,” Jefferson 
wrote.  
 
The 1978 Elections 
 
As 1978 dawned, Republican Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina viewed the pro-
family coalitions in his home state and at the national level as vital to the upcoming election. 
In November 1977, a public opinion poll found that seventy-five percent of North Carolina 
voters were undecided and only fourteen percent favored Helms.454 Moreover, in 1978, for 
                                                
453 Dr. Carolyn Gerster, “From the President’s Desk,” NRL News 5 (August 1978). 
 
454Link, A Righteous Warrior, 195. 
 220 
every North Carolinian registered as a Republican, there were three Democrats. In order to 
overcome these odds, Helms and his team began to pay close attention to the state’s pro-
family coalition, of which North Carolina Right to Life was a part, while building a larger 
conservative network of donors nationwide. Two years earlier, Helms had signed an 
exclusive fundraising contract with Richard Viguerie for the present re-election campaign. 
Between January and July 1977, Viguerie had helped to raise 1.4 million dollars; by 
November 1978, Helms’ campaign chest held over seven million dollars. Most of his funds 
came from out-of-state donors who on average contributed between twelve and fifteen 
dollars; over one hundred thousand Americans contributed to keep the conservative in 
office.455 Despite outspending his Democratic opponent fifty-two to one, Helms eked out a 
victory, winning only fifty-three percent of the North Carolina vote. “Senator No” won re-
election in large part because conservatives in states other than North Carolina rallied to his 
campaign.  
 The National Right to Life Committee sought to accomplish a similar feat. In 
September 1977, Mildred Jefferson and Carolyn Gerster had founded the Life Amendment 
Political Action Committee as the political arm of the National Right to Life Committee. The 
PAC’s sole purpose was to elect a pro-life Congress capable of passing a Human Life 
Amendment. While LAPAC’s board members and staff overlapped with the National Right 
to Life Committee’s, it quickly became clear that Paul and Judy Brown, a Catholic couple, 
were leading it.  
The Browns had joined the National Right to Life Committee on the eve of the 1976 
elections and quickly moved up in the ranks of the Washington, D.C. headquarters. They 
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were Mildred Jefferson’s strongest allies in the headquarters during the constitutional 
convention controversy, and like Jefferson they cultivated close ties with leaders of the New 
Right. Paul Weyrich of the Committee for a Survival of a Free Congress had invited the 
Browns to attend the weekly meetings of the Library Court, a group of men and women from 
approximately fifty organizations concerned with social issues. At the Library Court, the 
Browns met Richard Viguerie and hired him to handle direct mailing fundraising for 
LAPAC. Paul Weyrich and Viguerie also taught the Browns a lesson that right to life 
activists across America were learning in 1977 and 1978: their success and that of the pro-
life movement depended on their ability to unite with other conservatives.456 
In 1978, Paul Brown worked with Robert Sassone, a population analyst, to draft a 
plan to elect a pro-life congress. Sassone zeroed in on a tactic that local pro-life activists had 
learned and applied since the Dole-Roy Senate race in 1974. He proposed that the political 
action committee carefully select close congressional races where a five to ten percent single-
issue vote could decide the outcome. This time, however, the funds, money and strategy 
would be directed nationally rather than locally, as they had been in political races since Roe 
v. Wade. If pundits predicted that your district’s pro-choice congressional representative 
would win in a landslide, Sassone and Brown urged you to spend your money and time 
fundraising for a tight campaign race in another state. They reasoned it was better to win a 
battle in another state than to lose in a landslide at home. LAPAC’s strategy was similar to 
the one Sen. Helms was employing in North Carolina; both raised money at the national level 
and focused it on key elections at the state and local level. 
Paul Brown announced LAPAC’s first congressional target in July 1978: Edward 
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Brooke. Brooke was vulnerable; one of the most prominent liberal Republicans in office, he 
was increasingly out of step with his party. In a predominantly Democratic and Catholic 
state, he had led Senate opposition to the Hyde Amendment in 1976 and 1977, making him a 
national anti-abortion target. Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Catholic bishops also were 
organizing against both Brooke and Governor Dukakis, making it clear that they would treat 
abortion as the most important issue for Catholics to consider in the upcoming elections. 
Finally, in January 1978, a scandal had erupted over whether or not Brooke had lied on his 
divorce deposition concerning the state of his finances and what appeared to be a 
questionable purchase of Caribbean island property.457 
Because Brooke and Dukakis belonged to different political parties, Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life focused on both the primaries and general elections. Avi Nelson, a popular 
conservative radio talk show host, ran against Brooke in the September 19 Republican 
primary. Nelson rallied the state’s Republican Party base against the liberal senator who 
more often voted in line with the Democratic Party. According to Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life activists, many progressive Democrats switched party affiliation during the primary to 
ensure Brooke’s nomination. This left Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis with less 
support. The majority of Massachusetts Citizens for Life members registered as Democrats 
voted at precinct level for Ed King, a stout pro-lifer. King defeated Dukakis for the 
gubernatorial nomination on September 19, eliminating the man who had maintained the 
state’s abortion fund through vetoes since 1974. In the general election, Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life rallied behind Paul Tsongas, a Democrat who supported abortion rights, to 
ensure that Brooke would not be elected again. Better to vote Brooke out because he was the 
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most ardent defender of poor and minority women’s abortion access during the Hyde 
Amendment debates. The strategy worked. In 1979, Ed King signed into law a state ban on 
abortion funds. The young daughter of Anne Fox, who masterminded Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life’s 1978 electoral efforts, sat on his lap. 
The biggest pro-life electoral victory in 1978, however, occurred in Iowa. In March, 
Paul Brown contacted local and state pro-life leaders in Iowa to raise the possibility of 
organizing against Democratic Governor Dick Clark. Two years earlier, Iowa pro-life 
activists had flexed their growing political muscles when they organized on behalf of Jimmy 
Carter in the presidential primaries, and Brown and members of the LAPAC board believed 
the same grassroots mobilization could be used to defeat Dick Clark. Carolyn Thompson, “a 
dynamic and beautiful lady,” responded to LAPAC’s letters asking for volunteers.  Described 
as a “ball of fire,” Thompson began to organize town and county political coordinators. At 
the same time, Roger Jepsen, a “true born again Christian” running in the Republican 
primaries, came out against all federal funding for abortion and in support of a Human Life 
Amendment. With Thompson’s assistance, Jepsen won the Republican primary in June with 
61 per cent of the vote. LAPAC then funded a series of surveys of Iowa voters. Brown and 
Thompson came to the conclusion that “a united and state-wide pro life effort could produce 
a minimum of 10 per cent of the vote.” To do so, it was imperative that Thompson convince 
the majority of the state’s pro-life movement, who were registered as Democrats, to switch 
party allegiances and vote for a Republican on the sole issue of abortion. They invited fifty 
state anti-abortion leaders to a special session of the 1978 National Right to Life Convention 
in St. Louis on June 30; most of the fifty came back convinced that they had to support 
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Jepsen.458 In the final Sunday before the election, volunteers blanketed church parking lots 
with pro-life, pro-Jepsen pamphlets. Jepsen’s come-from-behind victory stunned political 
pundits. The 1978 elections showed that the pro-family coalition was not a fluke and not only 
a response to the International Women’s Year campaign. The coalition had arrived and was 
set to change American politics.  
 
No Turning Back 
On January 22, 1979, Eleanor Smeal of the National Organization for Women called 
for organizations on both sides of the abortion divide to meet. In the wake of the Hyde 
Amendment defeat, Smeal believed it was imperative that the two sides of the abortion war 
come together and “seek ways to lesson the need for abortion, to reduce the instance of 
unwanted pregnancy, and to end the polarization and violence that surround the abortion 
issue.” NOW planned a February 14 conference, which would focus on alternatives to 
abortion and the promotion of birth control. Dr. Carolyn Gerster refused to attend. “I asked 
for an announced moratorium on the violence done to women and children in abortion clinics 
during the one day of the meeting with the understanding that the gesture would be symbolic 
only and carry no legal implications,” wrote Gerster. When Smeal and other feminists 
refused Gerster’s request, most national leaders of pro-life organizations refused to attend the 
conference,459 but a small group of young women from PEACE, the clinic sit-in activists 
from Ohio, agreed to come. At the conclusion of the conference, one of the PEACE activists 
approached the podium. To the shock of the press and feminist leaders, she unveiled the body 
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of a one-pound fetus that had been aborted two days earlier and taken from a medical waste 
disposal site. The next day, PEACE held a funeral and buried the fetus in a Catholic 
ceremony, setting up a permanent monument to both the fetus and their protest.  
The PEACE protest ended any possibility of compromise or meeting of the minds 
between pro-life activists and feminists; both movements had come to believe they were in 
an all-out war. Carolyn Gerster wrote, “For one moment at that conference the walls of 
rhetoric must have crumbled revealing the true meaning of the words 'termination of 
pregnancy.'” The PEACE activist meant to bring the conference back to what she considered 
the core issue: abortion killed. “It is an exercise in futility to address peripheral issues on 
which we could agree while avoiding the subject of abortion,” Gerster concluded.460  
 At the 1979 National Right to Life Conventions, the war between feminists and the 
pro-life movement became even more entrenched. The organizers invited anti-feminist 
Phyllis Schlafly to take part in the conference, tellingly called “The Family: Yesterday-
Today-Tomorrow.”461 The National Right to Life Committee Board also passed its first 
resolution opposing the Equal Rights Amendment. A new mood of urgency prevailed as the 
activists prepared for the 1980 elections. Carolyn Gerster reflected, “We stand at the 
crossroads . . . The battlefields may be the halls of Congress, the voting booth, or the 
courtroom, but it is a revolution, none the less.”462 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
“The Split”463 
"It was really something, truly a coalition . . . experience," wrote Jack Wilke in 
September 1981. "Everyone [saw] abortion as the most 'diabolical evil' of this century, a blot 
upon our society, one that must be erased if our nation is to survive." Wilke was reflecting on 
a Religious Roundtable Rally for Life at the Dallas Convention Center on September 3, 1981. 
New Right leader Edward McAteer had organized the meeting to protest the appointment of 
Ronald Reagan's first Supreme Court nominee, Sandra Day O'Connor. Conservative leaders 
charged that Reagan had betrayed one of his 1980 campaign promises to them. Instead of 
appointing a Supreme Court Justice who had strong pro-life credentials, as the 1980 
Republican Platform stipulated, Reagan nominated a woman who had supported a liberalized 
abortion law as an Arizona state legislator in 1972.  Six thousand anti-abortion activists 
attended the Rally for Life to hear speeches from conservative stars and pro-life leaders. 
Former National Right to Life Committee presidents Carolyn Gerster and Mildred Jefferson 
appeared on stage next to Jerry Fallwell, Howard Phillips, James Robinson, Phyllis Schlafly, 
and Paul Weyrich.464  
A year before, on August 21 and 22, many of those speakers shared the same stage in 
Dallas with Ronald Reagan at the Religious Roundtable’s first National Affairs Briefing. 
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Reagan had told that audience of fifteen thousand religious leaders: “I know you can’t 
endorse me. But I want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.” Historians 
have often cited this 1980 National Affairs Briefing as a moment of crystallization: the 
Christian Right had arrived, and its long-term alliance with the Republican Party had 
begun.465 That triumphant 1980 moment, while important, is misleading. Pro-life leaders and 
Christian Right leaders at the time believed that by uniting behind Reagan and electing him 
president, they could accomplish their political goals, including a Human Life Amendment. 
But by August 1981, their profound optimism had faded. Reality had set in during Reagan’s 
first one hundred days in office. Instead of championing social conservative policies, the 
president and Republican leaders pressed for economic reforms. “We did not achieve a 
political revolution in 1980,” stated New Right leader Paul Weyrich. “What we earned . . . 
was only the right to the social-issue agenda.”466 In other words, social conservatives had 
become a force to reckon with in the Republican Party and nation, but had not won enough 
support from the general American public to dictate policy. 
The 1981 Rally for Life produced a more telling example of the uneasy alliances 
between the Christian Right, the pro-life movement and Republican politicians than the 
earlier rally. Instead of supporting Reagan, leaders of the conservative organizations were 
protesting what they saw as Reagan’s betrayal, and the Christian Right broke away from the 
pro-lifers. Rather than directly challenging Reagan and attacking O’Connor, Rev. Jerry 
Fallwell and Rev. James Robinson spoke on the importance of general opposition to 
abortion. National Pro-Life Action Committee Director Peter Gemma told the crowd that the 
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O’Connor nomination made the pro-life movement “look like fools” for supporting Reagan’s 
election. A conflict over fetal personhood was simultaneously causing the social conservative 
alliances undergirding the Reagan Coalition to rip apart at the seams. Within two weeks of 
the 1981 Rally for Life, a pro-life coalition arose to oppose an anti-abortion constitutional 
amendment. This schism was so deep that the pro-life activists joined pro-choice advocates 
to lobby against the proposed amendment throughout 1982. Pro-life activists learned a hard 
political lesson: the unity they had forged to support Reagan in 1980 was based more on 
achieving an electoral goal than a real consensus on policy.467 When it came time to draft and 
pass anti-abortion legislation and a Human Life Amendment, conflicts within the pro-life 
movement and the Christian Right reemerged. 
 
The Human Life Amendment and the Rise of the Christian Right 
In June 1979, National Right to Life Committee President Carolyn Gerster set out a 
three-year plan to pass a Human Life Amendment through Congress. She predicted that the 
1980 elections would be the turning point. If pro-life forces could win enough Congressional 
seats and elect a sympathetic president, they could pass a constitutional amendment 
overturning Roe v. Wade before the decision’s ten-year anniversary in 1983. The plan 
included three initiatives to identify and mobilize pro-life voters. Through a phone drive by 
local and state chapter affiliates, they planned to contact every registered voter in the United 
States and inquire about their views on abortion and their support of a Human Life 
Amendment The organization then planned to establish political action committees at the 
local and state level in order to mobilize the identified pro-life voters. The National Right to 
Life Committee also mandated that all its affiliates create their own three-year plans. Local 
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and state chapter affiliates had to become better organized and more efficient, and to improve 
their fundraising and communication capabilities to prepare for what the Committee leaders 
believed would be the post-1982 state ratification battles.468  
Following the June 1979 convention, leaders set to work to implement the three-year 
plan. A number of states had formed local pro-life political action committees before the 
1978 elections, and two national  pro-life political action committees also existed. In 1977, 
Father Charles Fiore had founded the National Pro Life PAC while leaders of the National 
Right to Life Committee founded the Life Amendment PAC under the direction of Paul 
Brown.469 When Paul and Judy Brown and their followers broke from the National Right to 
Life Committee in 1979, the organization founded its own affiliated PAC. National Right to 
Life Committee leaders believed the Browns had become too closely aligned with the New 
Right. President Carolyn Gerster maintained that “peripheral issues will divide the 
movement” and that “the organization must remain non-partisan and non-sectarian in order to 
achieve a broad base of support.”470 Unlike Paul Brown’s Life Amendment PAC, the 
National Right to Life Committee PAC supported both Republican and Democratic 
candidates in 1980. For example, their PAC gave money to Democratic senator and Human 
Life Amendment co-sponsor Thomas Eagleton from Missouri. 
 While the upcoming presidential race was important, Congress remained the 
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overwhelming focus of the National Right to Life PAC and its affiliates. As Carolyn Gerster 
had argued since 1976, Congress, not the president, would decide the fate of the Human Life 
Amendment. Local and state- level activists began to plot two-step campaign strategies. They 
first focused on the primaries, knocking out pro-choice Republicans or weakening pro-choice 
Democrats. For example, South Dakota Right to Life targeted Sen. George McGovern; in the 
state primaries, they ran staunch pro-life Democrat Larry Schumaker against him. To beat 
Schumaker, who pulled thirty-eight percent of the Democratic vote, McGovern had to dip 
into his campaign chest for the general election, weakening his re-election chances. The pro-
life Democrats then planned to give their votes to George McGovern’s pro-life Republican 
challenger, Jim Abnor, in the general election. The pro-life movement, it seemed, had come 
of political age.471 
Pro-life activists were not the only ones displaying a new level of political 
sophistication and voting discipline in 1979. The same year that Carolyn Gerster proposed 
her three-year plan, Protestant ministers established a number of conservative evangelical 
and fundamentalist political organizations. In January Robert Grant, an independent Baptist 
minister from California who had founded the anti-gay-rights organization, American 
Christian Cause in 1978, established Christian Voice. Under the umbrella of the pro-family 
movement, the new organization expanded its political efforts to attack legal abortion and the 
ERA, argue for a return to biblical values, and lobby for school prayer. Within six months, 
Christian Voice’s membership had grown to 100,000, and by 1980 the organization claimed 
that thirty-seven thousand Christian ministers were on its mailing lists.472  
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Between January and June 1979, key leaders of the New Right also entered into 
serious discussions with Rev. Jerry Falwell about mobilizing Protestants into the 
conservative political movement and the Republican Party. From his seat of power in 
Lynchburg, Virginia, Falwell ran a televangelist empire. His weekly Old-Time Gospel Hour 
appeared on 375 stations across the country and by 1979, his fundamentalist Liberty College 
was flourishing. Falwell was no stranger to politics either. In 1976 he endorsed Gerald Ford 
for president, and celebrated the nation’s bicentennial with an “I love America” celebration 
tour.  When he aired broadcasts on pornography, abortion, and homosexuality in 1978, he 
caught the attention of Presbyterian theologian Francis Schaeffer.  
At the time Schaeffer was touring America with Dr. C. Everett Koop to promote their 
anti-abortion book and film Whatever Happened to the Human Race? The two men showed 
the film in churches, auditoriums, and stadiums across the country, causing a number of 
scholars and activists to credit Schaeffer and Koop with doing more to mobilize evangelical 
and fundamentalist Christians than any other leaders. Koop had served on the Christian 
Action Council’s board of directors since its founding in 1975 and on the board of Americans 
United for Life since its founding in 1972. In 1980, he became a board member-at-large of 
the National Right to Life Committee.473 
In 1978, Francis Schaeffer urged Falwell to take his fight against secular humanism to 
the political arena after viewing his broadcast on abortion. Schaeffer insisted to the Baptist 
minister that it was acceptable to forge alliances across religious denominations, with 
Catholics, Jews and non-fundamentalists, a controversial move that in the past had fractured 
and limited evangelical and fundamentalist Christian political participation. In June 1979, 
New Right leaders Ed McAteer, Howard Phillips, Paul Weyrich, and Richard Viguerie 
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traveled to Lynchburg to meet with Falwell, and founded the Moral Majority, a partisan 
political organization that did not threaten the tax-exempt status of Falwell’s ministries. Like 
the Christian Voice, the Moral Majority board consisted of Baptist veterans of local and state 
single-issue campaigns against abortion, the ERA, gay rights, and pornography. Falwell 
supported using the Human Life Amendment as a campaign litmus test, thus aligning the 
Moral Majority with the National Right to Life Committee on abortion.  
A master at self-promotion, Falwell quickly made the Moral Majority the leading 
conservative Christian political organization in the country. While his claims regarding the 
Moral Majority’s membership and its ability to mobilize voters never matched the reality, 
Falwell’s influence in the media and in the Reagan campaign was extensive. Reagan 
appointed Robert Billings, the Executive Director of the Moral Majority, to be his 
campaign’s religious liaison. In 1982, Reagan staff member Morton Blackwell wrote Falwell 
that he was the minister with the most influence with Reagan and his administration. Despite 
Falwell’s success in gaining media attention and political influence, few of the nation’s 
leading televangelists or Southern Baptists rallied to the Moral Majority. Falwell also failed 
to recruit across denominational lines; only one member of his board was not Baptist, and 
most state leaders were ministers who belonged to Falwell’s Baptist Bible Fellowship 
International.474 
To forge unity between the various factions of Southern Baptists, fundamentalists, 
and televangelists that Falwell’s Moral Majority could not achieve, New Right leader Ed 
McAteer created another Protestant political organization in 1979, the Religious Roundtable. 
Its executive director, James Robison, was a thirty-six-year-old Southern Baptist 
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televangelist from Dallas. In 1980, he became the first major Protestant televangelist to 
address the March for Life in Washington, D.C. He also had good relations with both Jerry 
Falwell and Pat Robertson, two televangelists who often butted heads with on another over 
theology and politics. The Religious Roundtable would lead the way in uniting evangelical 
and fundamentalist Christians with the single-issue groups that had forged the pro-family 
movement in 1977 and 1978. Taken together, the mobilization of the socially conservative 
single-issue groups and Christian conservatives was a force to be reckoned with on the eve of 
the 1980 elections. National Right to Life Committee leader Jack Wilke claimed, “The recent 
movement of evangelical Protestantism into an activist role of support for the prolife 
movement has been the most significant blood transfusion given to our movement in the last 
several years.”475  
However, this coalition of conservatives was fragile in 1980. No one understood that 
fragility better than Ronald Reagan’s campaign strategists and advisors. Reagan’s team had 
tried to bring Christian voters and conservative leaders together and into the Republican 
camp in 1976. They failed. This time, they were determined that the story would end 
differently. Starting in 1979, Reagan’s staff followed the divisions and fights within the pro-
life movement and the emerging Christian Right. They paid close attention to the policy and 
strategy debates that had animated the pro-life movement, created memos detailing the 
differences between national anti-abortion organizations, and tracked the development of 
pro-family and Christian political groups. They drafted position statements that would appeal 
to the largest number of conservative Christian voters and single-issue activists without 
alienating any one faction.  
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On July 27, 1979, Reagan solidified the support of the National Right to Life 
Committee: in a letter to Rep. Henry Hyde, he endorsed both a Human Life Amendment and 
the ongoing state constitutional convention call that the National Right to Life Committee 
had backed in 1978. Characterizing the constitutional convention as a last resort, Reagan 
mostly attacked the Supreme Court decisions concerning abortion as an intrusion of the state 
into private family life. Reagan covered all bases to capture the full support of the pro-life 
movement. National Right to Life Committee President Carolyn Gerster met with Reagan for 
a more extensive discussion in the fall of 1979, and came back with a glowing report and a 
new level of excitement. Reagan, Gerster reported, seemed to be the real deal. He would 
champion their cause, and he was electable.476 
In the spring and summer of 1979, Reagan and his staff also made inroads into the 
emerging Christian Right. Reagan had much to account for: he was a divorcee who never 
attended church. As such, he was anything but the ideal Christian candidate, according to the 
dictates of many churches, but Reagan had fervently upheld a civil religion that opposed 
Communism since the 1960s. He spoke of America as “a city upon a hill” for the world to 
look up to, and as a country whose liberty was blessed by divine providence. During his 1976 
campaign for president, he had told a California evangelical radio talk show host that he had 
a born-again experience. Reagan also quoted favorite passages of the Bible off the top of his 
head on the campaign trail. All this did much to win over conservative Christians to his 
campaign. His staff also made sure to set up meetings and visits to the major leaders and 
churches associated with the emerging Christian Right. 
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Victory through Unity  
The National Right to Life Committee PAC endorsed Ronald Reagan for president on 
January 21, 1980.477 The early endorsement was controversial in many pro-life circles; some 
charged that the organization had tipped its hand too early, and had lost its political 
bargaining power to make Reagan and other candidates meet pro-life demands. Committee 
president Gerster responded that Ronald Reagan was the only viable pro-life presidential 
candidate. She believed it was imperative that single-issue anti-abortion voters understand 
that they had no other candidate for whom to vote in the primaries and general election. Pro-
life voters then were to register in the Republican Party, unless voting in the Democratic 
primaries was part of a state or local chapter plan to elect a pro-life congressional 
representative.  
Not all right to life activists jumped on the Reagan bandwagon.478 When Republican 
moderate George H. Bush won the Iowa caucuses, the leader of Iowa Right to Life blamed 
Reagan’s loss on the fact that the majority of pro-lifers in the state voted in the Democratic 
caucuses. Iowa activists, the majority of whom came from Catholic Democratic backgrounds, 
believed that it was more important to defeat Ted Kennedy than it was to elect Ronald 
Reagan. Up until that time, Iowa’s single-issue anti-abortion voters had been models for the 
rest of the movement: in 1976, they helped to make Carter the front runner in the Democratic 
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race, and in 1978 they shifted to the Republican Party to elect Roger Jepsen in the most 
publicized senate race of the year. In contrast to Iowa Right to Life’s analysis, the press 
blamed Reagan’s Iowa loss on poor strategy, since he had stopped campaigning in the state 
the week before the caucuses.  
Following Iowa, Reagan and National Right to Life Committee leaders came to 
understand the importance and the difficulty of recruiting pro-life Democrats to Reagan’s 
campaign. Their message remained the same: if one was a single-issue anti-abortion voter, 
Reagan was the only presidential candidate for whom one could vote in the primaries and 
general elections. Committee leaders reinforced this dictate: in the spring, Carolyn Gerster 
and her colleagues condemned Ellen McCormack for attacking Reagan. McCormack was 
again running for president as the leader of the New York state-based Right to Life Party. In 
March, when Bush was still running a close race with Reagan, McCormack’s Pro-Life 
Action Committee ran a series of ads against Reagan in Illinois, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Vermont and Florida. In the ads, McCormack asked anti-abortion voters to 
think carefully before giving their vote to Ronald Reagan. She pointed out that as governor of 
California in 1967, Reagan had signed into law a reform in the state’s criminal abortion 
statute. That reform, she claimed, helped pave the way for the Roe decision. She then pointed 
out that since 1973, Reagan had not held elected office and so lacked a voting record to prove 
his pro-life credentials. McCormack asked how sincere Reagan was in his pro-life beliefs, 
and what he would do once he was in office.479  
The National Right to Life Committee Board stood firmly behind Reagan, and by 
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May, George H. Bush had dropped out of the race. With Reagan’s presidential nomination 
secured, Committee leaders set two goals. They wanted the various factions of the pro-life 
movement to unite behind Reagan, regardless of strategy preferences and party loyalties. 
They also hoped to translate movement unity into the Human Life Amendment campaign 
following what they believed would be sweeping electoral victories in 1980.  
To encourage unity, the National Right to Life Committee hosted a summit with 
twelve other national anti-abortion organizations on June 2, 1980. It would be the first of two 
summits in June; both were unprecedented in terms of the number of organizations that 
attended, and the willingness of leaders who had bitterly fought one another in years past to 
cooperate. Representatives came from the American Life Lobby, the Christian Action 
Council, the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense for Life, Friends for Life, LIFE PAC,  
Americans United for Life, the National Youth Prolife Coalition, March for Life, Right to 
Life Crusade, and the National Right to Life Committee and its PAC. Mildred Jefferson and 
Judy Brown, who had both left the National Right to Life Committee, returned to the table. 
At the day-long summit, the various leaders debated a strategy to pass a Human Life 
Amendment through Congress in 1981 and 1982. The election of pro-life senators, 
representatives and Ronald Reagan was essential. The leaders believed Reagan would be able 
to pressure a number of congressmen who were moderate on abortion to vote for a Human 
Life Amendment, helping to push the amendment through what would be a very close 
congressional battle. The twelve anti-abortion organizations also agreed that they had to 
coordinate their efforts to pass a Human Life Amendment. The leaders, however, did not 
discuss when to establish fetal personhood or how to word a Human Life Amendment. These 
were the very matters that had created most of the movement’s divisions since 1973. 
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Apparently it was one thing to achieve pro-life unity in electoral politics, but quite another to 
achieve it on policy.480 
Two weeks later, Dr. Jack Wilke won the presidency of the National Right to Life 
Committee in the most peaceful transfer of power in the organization’s history. Outgoing 
president Carolyn Gerster remained on the board and vowed to work with Jack Wilke to back 
Reagan, and to see the human life campaign she started in 1979 finished. In his first days in 
office Jack Wilke made these movement priorities clear. He organized a committee of the 
movement’s top lawyers to draft a Human Life Amendment that the entire movement could 
rally behind, including those organizations that had broken away from the National Right to 
Life Committee since 1973. Wilke also called for greater cooperation between the national 
pro-life organizations; he hoped to bring these splinter organizations back into the Committee 
fold. Finally, Wilke and Gerster met with Ronald Reagan at his campaign headquarters in 
Anaheim, California during the National Right to Life Convention. At the meeting, Reagan 
assured the two leaders that they would have his support in their efforts to pass a Human Life 
Amendment. He also promised to do everything he could to stop government funding of 
abortion and abortion referral services under his administration. 
The pro-life campaign to stop federal Medicaid funding of abortion once again aided 
in efforts to unify the movement. On June 30 representatives of ten of the twelve 
organizations that had met on June 2 gathered again in Washington, D.C. They met for a 
joint press conference celebrating the Supreme Court’s Harris v. McRae decision that upheld 
the Hyde Amendment. Also in attendance were the lawyers from the Americans United for 
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Life Legal Defense Fund who had argued the case before the court. The organizations 
gathered for what many considered was the final victory of the Hyde Amendment. There was 
no longer any doubt that Roe v. Wade did not provide constitutional grounds to establish 
equal access to abortion under the law.481  
 In July, the Republicans set out a party platform for the pro-life movement and 
emerging Christian Right to unite behind. Not only did the party refuse to endorse the Equal 
Rights Amendment for the first time in forty years, it also added three new abortion planks to 
its 1976 platform backing a Human Life Amendment. The Republicans now  opposed any 
government funding of abortion, supported efforts to establish parental consent and 
notification laws for adolescents. Finally, in a more controversial move, the platform 
advocated for the appointment of federal judges “who respect traditional family values and 
the sanctity of innocent human life.” For the first time, a political party placed a judicial 
ideological test in its platform. 
 The platform encouraged National Right to Life Committee leaders’ efforts to rally 
pro-life Democrats behind Reagan and the Republican Party. Jack Wilke, who had supported 
pro-life Democrats in his native Ohio, led the charge. He created a compelling, simplistic, 
and inaccurate narrative to explain the complex, ongoing voter realignment in America. 
Wilke theorized that Republicans had become the ruling party by opposing slavery in the 
nineteenth century and by championing freedom and equal protection under the law for all. 
Democrats had forged their own coalition in 1932, according to Wilke, by becoming the 
party of the “defenseless:” Democrats defended the rights of the poor, the less fortunate, and 
minorities. Now, Wilke asserted, Republicans were creating a new coalition by defending 
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those least able to protect themselves, fetuses, and Democrats had become the party of 
violent death. Wilke concluded that the best thing pro-life Democrats could do in 1980 was 
vote for Republicans. "It seems to me that the only salvation of the Democratic Party is for 
the nation to send Mr. Carter and many of its pro-abortion, anti-family senators and 
representatives down to a crushing defeat. Then the 'good' Democrats will be able to stand 
up, throw out the amoral, radical, elitists who now dominate it, and return the party to its 
roots.” Reinforcing Wilke’s rhetoric, the National Right to Life Committee PAC launched a 
series of ads with the tagline, “A Vote for Carter is a Vote for Abortion.”482 Meanwhile, local 
and state chapter affiliates focused on congressional races and voter registration campaigns in 
order to pass a Human Life Amendment. 
 Leaders of the Christian Right had also consolidated evangelical and fundamentalist 
support for Ronald Reagan. On August 21 and 22, Reagan appeared at the Religious 
Roundtable’s National Affair’s briefing where leaders of the Christian Right embraced him 
with open arms. In the last two months of the campaign, Reagan drew ever closer to the 
Christian Right. His campaign staff began to coordinate with Christian Right leaders and 
ministers so that they could time their remarks to the greatest advantage of the Republican 
Party. Christian Right leaders joined Reagan’s campaign in October as “family policy” 
advisors. The combined effect of these efforts was to create a feeling that a sea change was 
about to occur in November.483 “Many Protestant and Fundamental Christian groups are 
joining ranks in the anti-abortion fight to form one of the greatest voting crusades since Civil 
War times,” wrote a National Right to Life Committee member in late October. This activist 
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believed that God was finally answering the movement’s prayers after seven long years. 
They would elect to office men and women with the “courage to correct the terrible 
injustice” of legal abortion.484 
National Right to Life Committee President Jack Wilke referred to the November 
elections as a pro-life “Fantasy Island come true.” An eighteen-seat Democratic majority in 
the Senate turned into a six-seat Republican majority. For the first time in twenty-five years 
Republicans controlled committee appointments and the legislative calendar. Passing a 
Human Life Amendment through the Senate Judiciary Committee now seemed possible. 
Under Democratic control, the Senate Judiciary committee had routinely tabled all anti-
abortion constitutional amendments, and refused to hold hearings after Birch Bayh concluded 
the first set of hearings in 1975. Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the pro-life movement’s 
staunchest allies, was now the Judiciary Committee’s chair, and ten pro-life senators made up 
the majority of the eighteen-member committee.485 Throughout November major 
newspapers, political commentators, and pro-choice leaders predicted a Human Life 
Amendment would pass through the 97th Congress. NARAL immediately began to draft a 
plan to block state ratification. In an irony not lost on the feminist organization, they looked 
to copy the strategies of Phyllis Schlafly’s Stop-ERA movement.486  
The anti-abortion political victory came about in part because the movement had 
united to support Ronald Reagan. Through the National Right to Life Committee’s three-year 
plan to pass a Human Life Amendment, they joined a wider Reagan coalition and changed 
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the make-up of Congress. By emphasizing electoral campaigns, the movement was able to 
hold together in spite of persistent divisions. Political strategist and executive director of 
Minnesota Citizens for Life David O’Steen wrote in April 1980, “Differences in general, 
organizational, and strategic philosophies do exist among pro-life individuals and groups . . . 
We cannot agree, we never will, but we can and must direct our skills and energies towards 
achieving our common goals and away from internal self-destruction.” Now the activists 
wanted the political dividends of their hard work. 
 
“Now is the Time for a Human Life Amendment”487 
 “We must not now bask in the glory of incomplete victory,” wrote National Right to 
Life Executive Committee member Alexander Ladd in November 1980. After eight years of 
work, prayer, protest, and hope, the pro-life movement believed it had achieved a political 
revolution. Activists prepared to push a Human Life Amendment through Congress as fast as 
they could, before campaign promises were forgotten and before the pro-choice movement 
had a chance to regroup. Ladd even believed the right to life movement and its allies could 
pass the amendment through Congress and thirty-eight states within the year. His optimism 
was short-lived. 488 
Disagreements over the Human Life Amendment and fetal personhood that had 
plagued the National Right to Life Committee since its founding in 1973 emerged with a 
vengeance as victory seemed at hand. Ladd contributed to these divisions in December 1980. 
He wrote an editorial in the National Right to Life News advocating for a Human Life 
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Amendment without any maternal life exceptions. Along with March for Life leader Nellie 
Gray, Ladd vowed to oppose any compromised amendment that allowed exceptions, or “a 
little bit of abortion.”489 As Ladd phrased it, “To concede that killing innocent human life 
under any circumstances is acceptable destroys our prolife credibility.”490 By January 1981, 
former National Right to Life Committee President Carolyn Gerster wrote an editorial in 
defense of the maternal life exception. She could not list a single politician who would pass 
an anti-abortion amendment that did not allow abortions to save a woman’s life. Few 
Americans would support such an amendment: a 1980 Gallup poll found that only eighteen 
percent of Protestants and twenty-one percent of Catholics would support an amendment 
with no exceptions for maternal life, and numbers were even lower for the general 
population. 491 Further complicating the debate, Sen. Jesse Helms had introduced a 
“Paramount” Human Life Amendment in Congress in 1978. The “Paramount” language 
differed drastically from the National Right to Life Committee’s version, establishing fetal 
personhood at conception, and declaring that the right to life superseded all other 
constitutional rights. There were no exceptions in the paramount amendment.492 
The pro-life movement again threatened to fracture within a month of the Republican 
victories. While many of the internal fights over the Human Life Amendment were old, few 
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had been resolved with any definite conclusions in the seven years after Roe v. Wade. Should 
the pro-life movement compromise and add exceptions for fetal handicap, rape, incest as well 
as threats to maternal life? Was an amendment calling for states to legislate abortion an 
acceptable compromise? When would the amendment define the start of personhood, and 
how would that affect birth control access? Was it necessary to establish the right to life as 
the paramount right in the Constitution in order to overrule the constitutional right of privacy 
that Roe protected? Jack Wilke posed his own series of practical questions in 1981: Which 
amendment version can pass the Congress? Which version can be ratified by thirty-eight 
states? Which is least likely to be manipulated by the courts? Which is the most acceptable to 
sincere people of all faiths? Which can be better sold to the American people? Wilke then 
asked the ultimate question for pro-life activists: Which amendment will save the most 
babies' lives?493  
Wilke sought to avoid the familiar internal divisions. A brilliant tactician, he 
appointed a Human Life Amendment Committee as his first act as the organization’s 
president in June. It was the second time such a committee would convene; the first occurred 
amid the bitter infighting of the Committee’s first year, 1973 -74. Once again, the 
movement’s top lawyers made up the all-male committee. As activists worked electoral 
campaigns in the summer and fall of 1980, these men engaged in heated intellectual debates 
over the amendment’s language and its ramifications for American law, science and 
medicine. By December, they had drafted a detailed report, and new wording. They added a 
provision to the National Right to Life Committee amendment declaring that the right to life 
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was paramount, but they failed to come to a consensus over the maternal life exception. 
Wilke, optimistic after the November elections, continued to pursue the amendment despite 
the committee’s lack of consensus. He made the report and the debate over the Human Life 
Amendment the centerpiece of the January 23 -24 1981 National Right to Life Board 
meetings in Washington, D.C. He also scheduled a conference with twenty other major pro-
life organizations to take place on January 23 to endorse a pro-life constitutional amendment. 
Soon-to-be-President Reagan aided in Wilke’s efforts. His staff coordinated a short twenty-
minute meeting with fifty leaders of the pro-life movement and Christian Right to discuss 
abortion on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade.494  
While Wilke focused his energies on uniting the movement, Sen. Jesse Helms of 
North Carolina faced cold hard political facts. Though Republicans had taken over the 
Senate, those who sympathized with the pro-life movement were still in the minority. Helms 
and his staff counted forty-eight pro-life votes in the Senate, including moderates who might 
or might not vote for a Human Life Amendment. Helms quickly concluded that there was no 
chance for a Human Life Amendment in the 97th Congress; Passage would require sixty-
seven votes, and no amount of presidential pressure on the twenty pro-choice Republicans in 
the Senate could add the additional seventeen votes needed, nor could a masterful lobbying 
campaign or a compromised amendment. But Helms believed that Congress could pass a pro-
life legislative bill that required a simple majority vote; picking up two to four votes was 
possible, especially with a pro-life president to pressure Congressional representatives.  
Helms proposed the Human Life Bill on Monday, January 19, 1981. The legislation 
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defined the start of “actual human life” at conception, and granted all rights guaranteed by 
the fourteenth amendment to fetuses from that point on. Stephen Galebach, a recent Yale law 
school graduate, broached the idea after analyzing Roe v. Wade. Though the court’s 
declaration that it “need not resolve the difficult decision of when life begins” had alarmed 
most pro-lifers, Galebach viewed those words as an opportunity: the Court had left it for 
someone else to define when life and personhood began, and he argued that it was the right 
and obligation of Congress to make that definition. Moreover, if Congress defined 
personhood, Galebach believed the Court would have a legal basis to overturn the Roe 
decision, paving the way for the criminalization of abortion and the establishment of fetal 
rights. Joseph Witherspoon, one of the pro-life movement’s leading lawyers and a professor 
at the University of Texas Law School, joined in Galebach’s efforts. The two lawyers 
consulted with Sen. Helms throughout December and early January, and notified the National 
Right to Life Committee of their plan. On December 15, Galebach and Witherspoon joined a 
meeting of the Human Life Amendment Committee: Witherspoon also belonged to the 
subcommittee and National Right to Life Committee Board.495 
Jesse Helms’ Human Life Bill was not without controversy. A majority of pro-life 
activists believed it was the time to pass a Human Life Amendment, not what they saw as  a 
weaker legislative bill. Many activists doubted the political calculations Helms, Galebach 
and Witherspoon used to argue for the Human Life Bill. It seemed to them preposterous to 
suggest that the Senate would not vote an amendment through as pro-life leaders and over 
50,000 activists gathered in Washington, D.C. to celebrate Reagan’s inauguration on January 
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20 and to celebrate the March for Life on January 22. Adding to their optimism, Reagan had 
invited pro-lifers as the first special interest group to visit his White House on the 
anniversary of Roe. Wilke himself had a hard time believing a constitutional amendment was 
beyond the power of the pro-life movement. He declared, “What we want is a real 
amendment, not a political compromise with exceptions.”496 The National Right to Life 
Committee Board voted unanimously to endorse the idea of the Human Life Bill on January 
23, but disapproved of the wording of the bill as currently introduced. Board members saw 
Helms’ bill as a version of the states’ rights compromise that the Committee had opposed 
since 1973. Defining personhood was not enough, they argued: the federal government had 
to have the power to legislate abortion.497  
Later that day, the National Right to Life Committee held a meeting with other anti-
abortion and multi-issue organizations, including the Moral Majority. While Wilke described 
the meeting as a success, it was also clear that disagreements were emerging within the pro-
life movement. Many continued to debate the maternal life exception. Wilke admonished 
them, “Let us set aside any of the (incorrect) suspicions that one ‘side’ or the other side was 
more prolife. We all agree on ‘no-compromise.’”498 Other leaders picked up the arguments 
for the Human Life Bill and began an entirely new strategy debate. Convinced by Helms that 
the pro-life movement didn’t have the votes to pass a constitutional amendment, they began 
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to question the value of pursuing movement unity for the sake of an amendment. Some even 
argued for abandoning the idea of a constitutional amendment altogether and urged leaders to 
use whatever political capitol the movement had gained to support the Human Life Bill. John 
Mackey of the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Human Life was foremost among those 
leaders. His monthly newsletter, The Lifeletter, was one of the most popular publications in 
the movement. At the height of the pro-life movement’s power and influence it began to fight 
itself once again. 
The National Right to Life Committee’s elected board and grassroots-based 
organizational structure encouraged the disagreements. Following the January 1981 board 
meeting, the fifty-five representatives on the board returned to their states and local chapters 
to ask for responses to the Human Life Amendment and Human Life Bill. Activists studied 
publications and reports from the various factions, debated the merits of the different 
strategies and amendment wordings, and held votes on what amendment or legislative bill 
they preferred. By April 1981, the National Right to Life Committee Board “took a 
somewhat unexpected turn,” according to the National Right to Life News. Overwhelmed by 
infighting at all levels, the Board endorsed the original 1974 amendment wording, believing 
that any changes to wording were premature; Board members needed more time to study and 
debate the proposed versions of the Human Life Amendment before reaching a new 
consensus. The Committee also refused to endorse the Human Life Bill. Approximately half 
of its state affiliates supported the bill while the other half openly opposed it. Other pro-life 
organizations adamantly opposed the Human Life Bill as a weaker alternative. The National 
Right to Life Committee Board agreed with this position when it re-affirmed its commitment 
 249 
to a constitutional amendment in April, 1981.499  
 Despite the movement’s lack of consensus and what Jack Wilke characterized as deep 
divisions, the Human Life Bill continued to progress in the Senate. Freshmen Republican 
Senator John East of North Carolina scheduled a series of Separation of Powers 
Subcommittee hearings on April 23-24. Two days before the hearings began, a group of 
twelve prestigious legal scholars from the nation’s top law schools and representing a diverse 
array of legal thought drafted a letter to Senators Max Baucus and John East. These scholars, 
despite their differences of opinion on the law and constitution, agreed that the Human Life 
Bill was unconstitutional. Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago joined more liberal 
scholars Laurence Tribe and John Hart Ely of Harvard to attack the bill as an alarming breach 
of the separation of powers between the different branches of government. They claimed that 
Congress could only challenge a Supreme Court decision through the constitutional 
amendment process, not Congressional fiat.500 Six former attorney generals opposed the 
Human Life Bill on the same grounds. Their arguments helped to sway Senator Orrin Hatch, 
the new Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a key ally of the pro-
life movement. Hatch resigned from co-chairing the Human Life Bill hearings and withdrew 
his support of the bill. On April 23 he told his fellow senators, “I am second to no one in my 
opposition to abortion, but I am equally committed to sound constitutional principles.”501  
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 The squabble between East, Helms, and Hatch showcased the pro-life movement’s 
internal divisions. John McKay of the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Human Life and 
other pro-life leaders criticized Hatch and championed Helms in their newsletters. Others 
defended Hatch and criticized Helms for initiating a new legislative strategy that, they said, 
undermined their efforts to pass a constitutional amendment. Pro-life activists on all sides of 
the debate questioned each other’s and the senators’ motives and convictions. Jack Wilke 
was distraught. “Shame on us!” he wrote in June, “These men are our heroes.” He then urged 
the increasingly divided  movement to, “Please, disagree professional when necessary . . . but 
do it with due respect for that person as . . . a fellow worker in the prolife vineyard.”502    
 However prolife activists felt about the Human Life Bill, the Senate hearings it 
generated in April, May and June thrilled them. Senator East organized the hearings to 
answer one question, “When does human life begin?” That was the central question of the 
pro-life movement, and the hearings generated over a thousand pages of testimony from the 
nation’s top legal scholars, scientists, doctors, and medical researchers as they sought to 
answer it or invalidate it as a scientific question.503 Due to the wording of the bill, the expert 
witnesses at the hearings debated the difference between “actual life,” which the bill sought 
to establish from conception, and what scientists and medical experts deemed “biological 
life.” Anti-abortion activists once again confronted the fact that something they held to be a 
self-evident truth -- fetuses constitute an actual human life from the moment of conception – 
was not granted by a majority of the American public. John Cavanaugh-O’Keefe, the father 
of the clinic sit-in movement, wrote, “Is it just our own lack of imagination that makes it so 
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difficult for use to see how either phrases differs from simply ‘life’? What does it mean when 
you say ‘This is life, but not actual life’?”504 He and many pro-life activists could not 
comprehend the testimony from representatives of the American Medical Association and the 
National Academy of Sciences who stated that science could not answer the question of 
when life began; they claimed it was a was a religious, philosophical and moral question, and 
as such it was beyond the bounds of scientific inquiry. Their testimony rebutted the pro-life 
claim that science and biology were the only ways to determine personhood. Pro-life activists 
held that life began when the sperm fertilized the egg, creating a new set of DNA that could 
result in an individual human being approximately nine months later. In an appeal to secular 
authority, activists who were highly motivated by their religious beliefs turned aside 
theological and philosophical questions of “soul,” “mind,” and that special spark that 
differentiated humans from other mammals, when defining “life’ in favor of a strictly 
biological concept. They ignored the difference between personhood, a concept informed by 
law, religion and philosophy, and simple biological life.505 
 On July 9, Senator East’s Separation of Power Subcommittee voted three to two to 
place the Human Life Bill under consideration of the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
Tensions within the pro-life movement ran high around the vote. It seemed that the Human 
Life Bill was gaining more traction in the Senate than a constitutional amendment, which a 
majority of pro-life activists continued to favor over the legislative bill. East worked out a 
compromise with Sen. Hatch, who was also the chairman of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. The Senate would not act on the Human Life Bill until the Judiciary committee 
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had also held hearings on anti-abortion constitutional amendments.506 
 By July, Hatch had also become aware of the political facts that Jesse Helms had 
faced in January. A Human Life Amendment, favored by pro-life activists and the National 
Right to Life Committee, would not pass in the 97th Congress; pro-life lobbyists and 
sympathetic politicians did not have the necessary votes in the Senate or the House. Hatch 
was also fully aware of the movement’s infighting and inability to reach a consensus on a 
Human Life Amendment wording. There was no guarantee that the movement could even 
unite behind a Human Life Amendment that allowed for the exception of maternal life, 
which was the position of every major pro-life senator and of President Reagan. The 
divisions would only multiply as congressmen attempted to include exceptions in the 
amendment for rape, incest and fetal deformity. Hatch also questioned drafting a 
constitutional amendment riddled with exceptions and clarifying clauses aimed at limiting 
judicial interpretation of the amendment. In the summer of 1981 he set out to draft a new 
anti-abortion amendment, with tow goals in mind. He wanted a moderate amendment that 
could attract the additional ten to twelve votes he needed for it to pass in the Senate, and he 
wanted to an amendment that the entire pro-life movement could embrace by avoiding the 
debates over exceptions and fetal personhood that had stymied the movement since 1973.  
 To meet these goals, Sen. Hatch turned to a strategy that had been discussed in pro-
life circles the previous April. It was known as a two-step approach, and it had been 
championed first by David O’Steen of Minnesota Citizens for Life. Like Senators Helms and 
Hatch, O’Steen also had come to accept that a Human Life Amendment was not a political 
reality for the 97th Congress, and he also believed that the Human Life Bill was the wrong 
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approach: not only was it constitutionally questionable, but it also empowered the states, not 
the federal government, to legislate abortion. Instead, O’Steen argued for two amendments. 
The first would state that there was no constitutional right to abortion, and it would empower 
the federal government and the states to regulate abortion. His hope was that once this 
amendment was ratified, the movement could advocate for federal criminal abortion 
statutes.507 After ratifying the first amendment, O’Steen argued, activists could turn their 
attention to the Human Life Amendment, and establish fetal personhood. He sought to follow 
the example of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendment by first outlawing slavery and then 
establishing male African American citizenship.508 O’Steen wanted to stop the killing of 
unborn babies first, and then work to establish their citizenship rights through a second 
amendment. 
 Sen. Hatch introduced what would become known as the Federalist Human Life 
Amendment, or Hatch amendment on September 21, 1981. Following O’Steen, the 
amendment read:  
The right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the 
several States shall have the concurrent power to restrict and prohibit 
abortions; Provided that a law of a State more restrictive than a law of 
Congress shall govern.509  
 
This proposal created a firestorm within the pro-life movement. The outrage and division 
Helms’ Human Life Bill had caused in the previous nine months was minimal compared to 
the responses to the proposed Hatch amendment. It was one thing to propose a legislative 
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bill, but rank heresy to abandon the goal of all pro-life organizations and most Christian 
Right organizations, a Human Life Amendment. Overnight, a schism erupted between those 
who favored the Helms Human Life Bill and proponents of the Hatch amendment. The 
schism drew an irreconcilable line between hard line activists, who wanted the establishment 
of fetal personhood, and incrementalists, who were willing to compromise on the principle of 
fetal personhood to restrict abortion access. This conflict, ten years in the making, now took 
center stage, much to the surprise of activists who had tried in vain all of 1981 to attain some 
workable form of consensus. 
 
“At Each Other’s Throats”510  
 Three days after Hatch introduced the Federalist Human Life Amendment, seventy-
two pro-life and pro-family organizations announced that they had formed the Human Life 
Statute Coalition. As one of their first acts, they lobbied President Reagan to support only 
legislation that defined life as beginning at conception. One of the organizers, Paul Brown of 
the Life Amendment Political Action Committee, told the press that the coalition came 
together in reaction to the proposed Hatch legislation: they were not “willing to 
‘compromise’ on HLA into meaninglessness so as to attract the unscrupulous votes of those 
who would normally vote pro-abortion.” Just six months before some of these activists had 
critiqued Helms’ Human Life Bill for embracing a states’ rights approach in its enforcement, 
but now they backed the legislation because it at least dealt with the question of fetal 
personhood.  For organizations that joined the Human Life Statute Coalition, the Hatch 
amendment represented their worst fears: it was a pro-legislative and states’ rights approach 
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that did nothing to criminalize abortion or acknowledge fetal personhood. Overnight, support 
had coalesced for the Helms bill. 
 Two weeks later, the National Right to Life Committee Board finally came to a 
consensus on the wording of the organization’s own  Human Life Amendment. Nellie Gray 
yielded her “no compromise, no maternal life exception” position at 2:00 AM on the morning 
of October 4, and the maternal life exception stood. When Wilke announced that unity had 
finally been achieved after eight years of movement infighting, the atmosphere was euphoric. 
He wrote “We had prayed, but none of us thought it would happen . . . We have unity,” but 
the Board was too late. Arguments over the Human Life Bill and Hatch amendment had 
already torn the movement apart, and most members had come to the conclusion that 
Congress would not pass the constitutional amendment on which they finally had reached a 
consensus. 511  
 Board members now had to choose which compromised piece of legislation they 
would pursue. In October, the fifty-five-member Board, made up of state representatives and 
five at-large members, was split roughly in half; the Board sought to resolve the division by 
playing to both sides in the conflict. Earlier in August, it had changed its position on the 
Human Life Bill and endorsed it as currently worded; however, it had also had passed a 
resolution urging Helms to re-introduce the bill with stronger language that allowed federal 
enforcement of criminal abortion statutes, and stopped government funding of abortion at all 
levels. At the October 4 meeting the Board also passed a resolution endorsing the Hatch 
amendment hearings “so long as such amendment will not lessen the obligation of Congress 
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and the states to protect human life and restore personhood to the unborn.”512 Jack Wilke 
urged Board representatives to return to their states, study both proposals, and vote on their 
preferences.  
 On October 5, one day after the National Right to Life Committee’s consensus on the 
Human Life Amendment wording, Sen. Hatch began the hearings on his proposed 
amendment. He declared that his goal, was to return abortion to the legislative branches of 
government, where a solution to the controversy that represented the public’s views could be 
reached. “I know that I would be able to tolerate a regime that permitted some abortions 
much better,” he said, “if it were the result of the clear will of the citizenry . . . rather than . . . 
the result of a small elite imposing their own personal views through the pretext of 
constitutional interpretation.”513  
 Helms retaliated. On October 15, he introduced a new version of the Human Life 
Statute; this time, he incorporated new restrictions. In addition to defining the start of “actual 
life” at the moment of conception, the bill now stopped abortion funding at all levels of 
government, banned abortions in any hospitals that received federal funding, and stopped 
abortion coverage in most government health insurance programs. This move brought him 
the support of many pro-life activists. Through a series of parliamentary procedures, Helms 
also ensured that the bill could bypass the Senate Judiciary Committee, where his older 
version had remained captive to the Hatch amendment hearings. Whenever Senate Majority 
Leader Howard Baker wished to do so, the Human Life Bill could be placed on the Senate 
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floor for a full vote.514  
 A month later, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United States 
Catholic Conference rocked the pro-life movement by endorsing the Hatch amendment. At 
senate hearings over the proposed amendment, the president of the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops stated “We cannot in good conscience tolerate the continued destruction of 
unborn human lives at the rate of 1.5 million a year on the hypothetical grounds that someday 
another, theoretically ideal constitutional solution might be found.” The Church hierarchy, 
which seven years earlier had lobbied for the strictest Human Life Amendment possible, had 
reversed its position; the ideal of protecting all fetal persons did not matter as much as 
passing some form of legislation that could stop what one archbishop called the “cumulative 
horror” of abortion. Bishop Joseph A. McNichols of Springfield, Illinois told the press, “We 
say we are for the unborn, and all the while we have been letting the unborn be slaughtered 
because we haven’t had the political insight to fight for what can be accomplished.”515 At the 
same hearings on November 5 Adrian Rogers, the immediate past president of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, also endorsed the Hatch amendment. He argued that there was a growing 
consensus in evangelical circles that a fetus is an unborn human being, deserving of as much 
protection in the womb as a baby in a nursery.516 
 Many Catholic pro-lifers felt betrayed by their hierarchy. That betrayal fueled a series 
of biting critiques of the Hatch amendment by Catholic lawyers and leaders of the Helms 
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Human Life Bill forces. Charles Rice, a professor of law at the University of Notre Dame, 
wrote that the Catholic Bishops’ endorsement of the Hatch amendment was “a betrayal of 
their responsibility.”517 Cardinal Medieros of Boston told the press, “I do not see how I could 
endorse the present bill (which would) destroy some innocent human lives by exclusion.” 
The American Life Lobby, headed by Catholic Judy Brown, issued its own report against the 
Hatch amendment. Supporting any amendment that failed to address fetal personhood, the 
American Life Lobby charged, abandoned the sole contention of the pro-life movement. The 
report charged that ceding power to any legislative body to regulate abortion access 
implicitly denied the fundamental truth of a fetus’ inalienable right to life. Congress and the 
states do not “have the power to prevent or permit the execution of innocent human life.”518  
 These strategy battles became increasingly bitter as National Right to Life Committee 
state affiliates prepared to vote in December 1981. In Massachusetts, Dr. Joseph Stanton 
supported the Human Life Bill, and challenged the seat of Phillip Moran on the National 
Right to Life Committee Board of Directors. Moran was a Hatch supporter and the current 
treasurer of the National Right to Life Committee. Massachusetts Citizens for Life president 
Marianne Rea-Luthin joined Dr. Stanton in opposing the Hatch Amendment.519 In Kansas, 
the conflict was even more intense. A younger group of male pro-life activists who had 
joined the movement between 1978 and 1980 challenged Patricia Goodson, Kansas Right to 
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Life’s representative on the National Right to Life Committee Board, and state president 
Helen De Witt. Goodson, De Witt and other hardliners in Kansas Right to Life favored the 
Helms Human Life Bill because it sought to establish fetal personhood, their core principle. 
In an interview one of the younger activists, Alan Weldon, described the difference between 
the two Kansas factions in 1981 and 1982. There was, according to Weldon, “the all or 
nothing approach” or the “incremental approach.” Weldon believed it was best to “take what 
you can get one step at a time and try to work towards your ultimate goal.”520 Meanwhile, 
Jack Wilke executed a series of power plays behind the scenes to ensure that the undecided 
state representatives on the National Right to Life Committee would endorse the two-step 
Hatch strategy.521 
 At stake in these fights was the role of fetal personhood in the pro-life movement’s 
future. The fact that all agreed that a Human Life Amendment establishing fetal personhood 
could not pass in the 97th Congress raised the question of whether such an amendment would 
ever pass. Pro-life activists asked what was more important, overturning Roe and 
criminalizing abortion, or continuing to try to establish fetal personhood? The two 
approaches had propelled the movement forward since 1973, but had now divided the 
movement, stopping it dead in its tracks. Activists who wanted to criminalize abortion 
realized that the concept of fetal personhood was an ideal, not an established scientific fact. 
A report arguing in favor of the Hatch Amendment stated, “Personhood is a legal concept . . . 
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We must not become so fixated upon this legal concept that we allow it to inhibit us from 
pursuing a politically possible strategy to protect the unborn from abortion.”522 Those 
opposed to the Hatch amendment argued that by granting legislatures the power to regulate 
abortion, including whether to make it legal or illegal, implicitly affirmed that a fetus is a 
non-person under the law. The Hatch amendment, to their thinking, ignored the fundamental 
principle of the pro-life movement.523  
 Leaders who supported the Human Life Bill were even more outraged when the 
National Right to Life Committee voted to endorse the two-step amendment and came out in 
support of the Hatch amendment on December 11, 1981. Wilke’s behind-the-scenes power 
plays had paid off in a close vote of thirty board members for the Hatch amendment to 
twenty-four against. Most of the Board had been persuaded by the same arguments that had 
caused the Catholic hierarchy to change its position in regards to fetal personhood. In 
choosing to support Hatch, they chose “to save almost all the babies now, rather than waiting, 
hoping a culture that kills 1.5 million babies a year now will nevertheless somehow grow 
pro-life enough to stop all of the killing someday through a simple amendment.”524 Jack 
Wilke immediately testified about the organization’s support in the Senate subcommittee 
hearings on the Constitution on the morning of December 16. Later that afternoon, the 
subcommittee voted the Hatch amendment out to the full Senate Judiciary Committee. It was 
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the first anti-abortion amendment to make it as far as that committee.525  
 The same week, a memo leaked from one of Senator Hatch’s top aides. Drafted the 
previous August, the memo argued that a Human Life Amendment would not pass in the 
current Congress, and went on to detail how Hatch could recruit the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and the National Right to Life Committee to back a compromised federalist 
amendment, pointing out that without those two organization’s support, the federalist 
amendment had no chance. Pro-life activists who opposed the Hatch amendment referred to 
the memo as a “smoking gun,” claiming that it proved Sen. Hatch had sought to undermine 
the establishment of fetal personhood by going after two of the nation’s largest pro-life 
organizations. Several major Catholic newspapers used the memo to discredit the Hatch 
amendment, including The National Catholic Reporter and The Wanderer, while 
conservative writer William F. Buckley cited the memo when he wrote an editorial against 
the Hatch amendment. John Mackey of the Lifeletter, the pro-life publication most 
entrenched in the Helms Human Life Bill camp, claimed that the Catholic bishops were 
political novices who had been “had.”    
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Diagram II: Pro-Life Divisions, October 1981 to September 1982526 
The Human Life Bill Coalition The Hatch Federalism Amendment Supporters 
• Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Human 
Life, led by John McFadden  
• March for Life, led by Nellie Gray 
• American Life League led by Judy Brown 
• Life Amendment PAC led by Paul Brown 
• Christian Action Council led by Rev. 
Curtis Young 
• Pro-Life Action League led by Joseph 
Scheidler 
• U.S. Coalition for Life, led by Randy 
Engel 
• Human Life International, led by Father 
Paul Marx 
• LIFE PAC, led by Joseph Barrett 
• Conservative Caucus Led by Howard 
Phillips 
• Richard Viguerie 
• Christian Family Renewal 
• Christian Voice, Evangelical organization 
led by Robert Grant. 
• Coalition for Decency, led by Alabama 
Senator Jeremiah Denton 
• Up with Families 
• Sanctity of Life Foundation 
• Value of Life Committee led by Joseph 
Stanton. 
 
• United States Catholic Conference 
• National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops 
• National Pro-Life PAC, led by Father 
Charles Fiore 
• National Right to Life Committee led 
by Jack Wilke 
• Americans United for Life  
• North Carolina Right to Life, 
Massachusetts Citizens Concerned for 
Life and Minnesota Citizens for Life 
which David O’Steen led 
•  National Committee for a Human Life 
Amendment (lobbying arm of Catholic 
Church) 
•  Committee for the Survival of a Free 
Congress led by Paul Weyrich. 
• National Association of Evangelicals 
• Moral Majority, led by Jerry Falwell 
• Lutherans for Life 
• Religious Roundtable, led by James 
Robison 
• Adrian Rogers, past president of the 
Southern Baptist Convention. 
 
 Ronald Reagan and his White House staff paid close attention to the movement 
infighting throughout the fall. In many ways, they had no choice; the pro-lifers                                    
had become a thorn in president’s side. Both factions in the movement lobbied Reagan to 
endorse their strategy, and only their strategy, throughout the fall, but he refused to pick sides 
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in the fight. In the meantime, Republican senators and representatives looked to Reagan to 
resolve which legislation to take to the Senate first. In the December issue of Conservative 
Digest, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker said he would not place either the Human Life 
Bill or Hatch Amendment on the Senate floor until the president indicated which legislation 
he preferred. Reagan responded that he would not choose either the Hatch amendment or the 
Helms Human Life Bill until the pro-life movement reached a consensus.527 He reiterated his 
neutrality at a White House meeting with anti-abortion leaders on the ninth anniversary of 
Roe v. Wade. Tensions ran high going into the meeting. Sen. Tom Eagleton later reported 
that the president told members of the Pro-Life Congressional Caucus that the movement 
leaders gathered in the cabinet room were “half in favor of one thing and half in favor of 
another and they are tearing at each other’s throats.”528 
 The fight became a matter of numbers to pro-life activists in 1982. Sen. Helms and 
those who supported him claimed he had fifty-one attainable votes and his Human Life Bill 
could pass. Those who supported Hatch argued that Helms had only forty-one definite votes, 
fifty were firmly against the measure, and nine were leaning against it. They also pointed out 
that even though his bill would require a simple majority to pass, pro-choice Republican Sen. 
Bob Packwood had vowed to filibuster the bill. To break the filibuster, Helms would have to 
marshal sixty votes, just seven less than needed to pass a constitutional amendment.  
 Hatch supporters argued that the federalism amendment had a better chance of 
passing the Senate because it deferred the hard questions of personhood and exceptions that 
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continued to divide the movement. Even Ronald Reagan admitted on January 19, 1982 that 
the Senate hearings on the Human Life Bill had shown that there was no consensus in 
America on how to define the beginning of life. The Hatch amendment also appealed to a 
broader selection of conservatives and Southern politicians, supporters claimed, because it 
took power away from what they had come to view as an imperial judiciary, and gave that 
power back to state legislatures and Congress.529 These activists were thrilled when the Hatch 
amendment became the first anti-abortion constitutional amendment to pass out of the full 
Senate Judiciary Committee on March 10. Prior to the vote, however, a group of pro-life 
organizations led by the American Life Lobby and the Christian Action Council lobbied 
against it. The Christian Action Council went so far as to release a statement on March 1 
asking Hatch to withdraw the amendment because it was doomed to fail and was causing 
harmful divisions in the movement.530 
 
“Right to Life Unity” 
 
“Much is being said today about disunity in the movement,” Jack Wilke wrote in 
February 1982, but, he pointed out, the movement was more unified than its members 
thought. He argued that all anti-abortion activists agreed that the ultimate goal was a Human 
Life Amendment, but by 1982 they also agreed that they would not be able to pass such an 
amendment through Congress or the states anytime soon. The Human Life Amendment, 
which had been the main goal of the National Right to Life Committee since 1973, was no 
longer its top priority in action or word. Wilke acknowledged this when he said that the 
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antiabortionists first had to “reverse the Court-decreed private right to kill granted to the 
mother.” Then, it could “return equal rights and equal protection by law to all Americans 
whether they live in or out of the womb.” What pro-life leaders disagreed over, Wilke 
believed, was whether to pursue “one or both of two steps on the way” to passing a Human 
Life Amendment. Wilke was one of the first leaders to grasp that the pro-life movement had 
shifted to an incremental consensus in the midst of the 1981 battles over the Hatch 
Federalism Amendment and the Human Life Bill. From that point on, the major questions 
that would animate the movement’s internal debates were no longer how to establish and 
protect the legal principle of fetal personhood, but which legislation saved the most unborn 
lives. Abortion restrictions had begun to trump fetal personhood just as pragmatism trumped 
principle.531 
 As more and more pro-life leaders and activists came to understand that both pieces 
of legislation aimed at restricting abortion access, a new consensus emerged. On March 27 
and 28, 1981 the National Right to Life Committee Board voted 32 to 16 to support the 
Hatch amendment as worded, the latest version of the Human Life Bill with the National 
Right to Life Committee “unity” amendment.532 The sixteen holdouts continued their 
opposition to the Hatch amendment and favored the Human Life Bill. Following the vote, 
Wilke urged all pro-life leaders to unite behind whichever bill made it to the Senate floor 
first. He immediately wrote to Ronald Reagan claiming the National Right to Life Committee 
had done what he asked pro-life leaders to do in January: they had resolved their differences, 
and were ready to present a united front.  
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 President Reagan responded to the various pro-life factions by writing a letter on 
April 5. “I hope that these differences will be resolved in favor of the common goal,” he 
wrote. He, too, wanted the 97th Congress to pass some form of legislation to “restore 
protection of the law to children before birth.”533 Within ten days, activists from all the major 
Christian Right organizations came down on the side of pro-life unity, and most followed the 
National Right to Life Committee’s example in endorsing both pieces of legislation. Moral 
Majority president Jerry Falwell approved both initiatives on April 14 in order “to help break 
the paralysis that has threatened the successes of the prolife movement.” The National 
Association of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Convention, Prolife Ministries, Lutherans 
for Life, and James Robinson of the Religious Roundtable also supported both measures. By 
May, New Right leaders Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips, Richard Viguerie and Connie 
Marshner joined the ranks of conservatives supporting both measures. On May 24, Jack 
Wilke announced to the press that while the anti-abortion movement had been divided over 
whether to back the Hatch Federalism Amendment or Helms’ Human Life Bill for most of 
1981 and the first half of 1982, now “the movement [was] rapidly coming together in favor 
of both.”534  
 Even then, some national organizations held out and refused to back the Hatch 
amendment. Members from over forty organizations who had formed the original Human 
Life Bill coalition wrote to Jesse Helms on April 19 urging him to support the strongest 
possible version of the Human Life Bill and move it to the floor as soon as possible. They 
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said that if Helms could place the Human Life Bill on the Senate calendar, the pro-life 
movement and the Christian Right would unite behind it. Among those organizations were 
some of the sixteen National Right to Life Committee state leaders who opposed the Hatch 
amendment.535  
 Soon the debate about strategy ceased to matter. In the summer of 1982, Sen. Helms 
came to the conclusion that the Human Life Bill as written would not be able to override a 
filibuster that Senator Packwood and other allies of NARAL and Planned Parenthood had 
already organized; too many senators believed a bill seeking to overturn a Supreme Court 
decision was unconstitutional. In August, Helms proposed a new Human Life Statute as an 
amendment to the debt ceiling bill. The new version was significantly more moderate. Rather 
than defining and protecting fetal personhood, the bill included a non-binding statement that 
fetuses were human beings and that the Supreme Court erred in its 1973 Roe decision. It then 
sought permanently to ban all government funding of abortion and abortion referral services, 
prohibit federal employee’s health insurance for paying for abortions, and stop the use of 
federal funds for abortion-related research. When reflecting on the bill, Peter Gemma of the 
National Pro-Life PAC told the press, “We'll take anything we can get at this point.”  
 As promised, Republican Sen. Robert Packwood filibustered the bill, and under heavy 
pressure from the Christian Right and pro-life movements, President Reagan became 
involved. In a telling August 17 legislative meeting, many of Reagan’s staff urged him not to 
use his political capital on a fight they were sure he was going to lose. They argued that he 
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could stay out of it by maintaining, as he had throughout 1981 that he would not lobby for 
any anti-abortion legislation unless the pro-life movement was united behind it. Reagan 
apparently agreed, for his involvement was limited at best. In the first week of September 
Reagan wrote to nine moderate senators asking them to break Packwood’s filibuster. He did 
not ask them to support the bill, but only to allow a vote to be taken on it. His efforts were 
fruitless. On September 17, fifty senators voted to sustain the filibuster and forty-nine voted 
against it. Helms’ Human Life Bill, even in its weaker form, failed by eleven votes..536 
 Following the bill’s failure, the entire pro-life movement united behind the Hatch 
Federalism Amendment; even hard line activists who had backed Helms’ bill understood that 
establishing fetal personhood was a goal beyond their reach. On June 28, 1983 Hatch’s 
amendment was also defeated on a vote of fifty to forty-nine.537 It fell short by eighteen 
votes. 
 
Aftermath 
Anti-abortion activists from the local to the national level recognized that the failure 
to pass any version of the amendment under President Reagan and a Republican Congress 
was decisive; they would not be able to pass an anti-abortion constitutional amendment in the 
near future, or perhaps in their lifetimes. The result was a terrible loss of direction in the 
movement and great pain and disillusionment from that loss. In response, activists shifted 
their focus back to state and local politics, only turning back to the national level during 
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presidential elections and Supreme Court appointments. It was already apparent in 1983 to 
some anti-abortion activists and abortion-rights proponents that the shift back to the states 
was fraught with complications, as the former created new forms of protest and outlets to 
vent the frustration and pent-up energy that accompanied an incremental approach. Rather 
than resolving the abortion debate, the Human Life Amendment failure escalated the stakes 
and emotional tenor of the abortion war. Leaders of the anti-abortion movement sought to 
understand and live with a contradictory and creative tension: grassroots anti-abortion 
activists became more militant in their rhetoric and actions by a shift to clinic protests and 
violence even as the national leadership embraced an incremental and gradualist political 
approach.  
 In 1984, J.C. Wilke and Ronald Reagan released two key publications, now anti-
abortion classics, which sought to encourage a new militancy while also embracing an 
incremental approach prior to Reagan's re-election campaign. Both publications drew on the 
problematic abortion - slavery analogy.  Since the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, black and 
white anti-abortion leaders had used that analogy to dispute charges of racism, point to larger 
systems of black oppression, recruit members of the black clergy, and launch a critique of 
some abortion-rights organizations' roots in and alliances with the eugenics movement. The 
analogy was politically potent, and it served many purposes. Reagan and Wilke, however, 
rearranged the analogy to meet the needs of the contemporary mainstream movement in 
1984. In Abortion and Slavery, Wilke posited the anti-abortion movement as the heir to the 
abolitionist legacy, while in Abortion and the Conscience of a Nation Reagan tied Wilke's 
abolitionist and anti-abortion legacy to a Republican Party that had honored human life and 
dignity since its 1860 founding. Wilke and Reagan compared Roe to the 1857 Dred Scott 
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decision, arguing that both Supreme Court decisions turned on a question of personhood. 
Wilke wrote that fetuses, like the slaves in the Dred Scott, case were unjustly considered 
non-persons under the law.538 Reagan emphasized the long process of justice in order to 
encourage activists after the 1983 Human Life Amendment failure. He wrote that the Dred 
Scott decision “was not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a decade. At first, only a 
minority of Americans recognized and deplored the moral crisis brought about by denying 
the full humanity of our black brothers and sisters; but that minority persisted in their vision 
and finally prevailed.”539 Taken together, Wilke’s and Reagan's statements helped pro-lifers 
move from a mindset that sought to overturn Roe v. Wade in one to ten years to an 
incremental movement that would span forty to sixty years, or whatever time period was 
necessary to defeat legal abortion. Reagan also made clear that the Republican Party would 
continue to support the cause during that long period.   
Reagan wrote, “Abraham Lincoln recognized that we could not survive as a free land 
when some men could decide that others were not fit to be free and should therefore be 
slaves.” He concluded that, “Likewise, we cannot survive as a free nation when some men 
decide that others are not fit to life and should be abandoned to abortion or infanticide.”540 
These were bold and divisive words from a president rallying supporters on the eve of his re-
election campaign. If activists could not reconcile the conflict through civil discourse, as 
Reagan urged, his rhetoric pointed to and arguably justified the use of violence to achieve the 
moral good. As the Civil War freed the slaves, some anti-abortion activists argued, so too 
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would they have to use violence to save the unborn. 
 Violence had already erupted prior to Reagan’s release of Abortion and the 
Conscience of a Nation in 1984. Incidents of bombing and arson increased from four in 1982 
to twenty-six in 1984.541 For the first time, a small but highly organized group of pro-life 
activists planned a series of clinic bombings and arsons to stop abortion on the grounds that 
the political process was failing. Led by Michael Bray, who would eventually establish the 
Army of God, they would become the anti-abortion underground. In 1982, Don Benny 
Anderson and Matthew Moore set fire to two abortion clinics in Florida and bombed a clinic 
in Virginia. The same year, Matthew Moore and his brother Wayne kidnapped an Illinois 
abortion provider and his wife. Following the Human Life Amendment failure, the number of 
clinic arsons and bombings increased. In 1984, Kenneth Shields and Thomas Finks set fire to 
seven clinics in Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland and bombed another three clinics in 
Virginia and Maryland. Curtis Beseda also set fire to three abortion clinics in Washington 
that year while ten other unsolved clinic arsons occurred in Texas, Georgia, and California. 
The year came to a close when Matthew Goldsby and James Simmons bombed three clinics 
in Florida on Christmas morning.542  
 A more militant clinic sit-in movement that also participated in clinic property 
damage rose alongside the clinic violence. In 1985, Illinois Right to Life member and Pro 
Life Action League founder Joseph Scheidler published Closed: 99 ways to stop Abortion. In 
it, Scheidler urged grassroots activists to save as many fetuses as possible by targeting 
abortion providers through legal and illegal activities. For example, Scheidler recommended 
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placing glue in the locks of abortion clinic doors, an action that delayed a clinic’s opening 
and gave more time to anti-abortion “sidewalk counselors” to approach a woman waiting for 
her abortion and potentially change her mind. "Pro-life activists cannot wait for the 
legislative and judicial process that will make abortion illegal,” wrote Scheidler following the 
Human Life Amendment failure. “The activist has to save lives now."543 The same year that 
Scheidler released his book, eighty-five percent of abortion providers in the United States 
reported some form of anti-abortion protest and harassment.544 These activities varied from 
clinic pickets and illegal clinic sit-ins to hate mail and harassing phone calls.  
Clinic protests also helped to mobilize the fundamentalist Christians who were 
relatively new to the pro-life movement and impatient with the incremental political 
strategies that the National Right to Life Committee had begun to champion. In 1986, Terry 
Randall founded Operation Rescue. To save as many fetuses as possible, he wanted to 
organize what he called clinic blockades. By gathering hundreds of activists willing to risk 
arrest, Randall hoped to shut down an abortion provider for a day, a week or however long 
Operation Rescue could maintain a pro-life siege. At that point in time, the largest clinic sit-
in occurred in St. Louis when police arrested 106 people. On November 28, 1987 Operation 
Rescue launched its first blockade at Cherry Hill Women's Clinic in New Jersey. Three 
hundred right to life activists blocked the clinic's entrance. In 1988, it laid siege to clinics in 
Atlanta, Georgia during the Democratic National Convention in Atlanta Georgia.545 By that 
point in time, Operation Rescue had gained the endorsements of Christian Right leaders Jerry 
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Falwell and Pat Robertson. "I believe that non-violent civil disobedience is the wave of the 
future for the pro-life movement in this country," wrote Jerry Falwell In 1988. "After fifteen 
years of various efforts to judicially and legislatively reverse Roe v. Wade, Operation Rescue 
is a breath of fresh air."546 The organization achieved its greatest success in Wichita, Kansas 
during the “Summer of Mercy” in 1991, a sixty-day protest aimed at later term abortion 
provider Dr. George Tiller. Wichita police arrested 2,700 people during the protest, many of 
whom police arrested multiple times. 
The momentum of the clinic violence and sit-ins that had been building throughout 
the 1980s culminated in a series of murders of abortion providers in 1993 and 1994. On 
March 10, 1993, Michael Griffin shot and killed David Gunn, a Pensacola, Florida abortion 
provider. In August 1993, Rachelle Ranae (Shelley) Shannon attempted to kill Dr. George 
Tiller in Wichita, Kansas. The two shootings prompted Congress to pass the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act in May 1994. The federal law prohibited any attempts to 
physically stop a person from entering a clinic and any activities that made it dangerous to 
enter a clinic. Trespassing on clinic grounds, a stable of sit-in activism since 1975, was now a 
federal crime. The law also made threats of violence, incidents of clinic arson and bombing, 
and stalking of clinic staff federal crimes.547 
The violence continued anyway. On July 29, 1994, Paul Hill murdered Dr. John 
Bayard Britton and his escort, James Barrett, while severely wounding Barrett’s wife, June. 
Britton had taken over Dr. David Gunn’s position at the Pensacola Clinic. President Clinton 
called the murder an act of domestic terrorism. Still, the year closed with another series of 
clinic staff murders. On December 30, 1994, John C. Salvi III shot and killed a receptionist at 
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Planned Parenthood’s Brookline, Massachusetts’ clinic. Salvi injured three other clinic staff 
before he fled the scene and drove two miles down the road to Brookline’s Preterm Health 
Service, where he shot and killed another clinic receptionist and injured two more clinic staff. 
He then drove one hundred and eighty miles south to Norfolk, Virginia where he fired two-
dozen rounds into a building that housed that city’s Planned Parenthood clinic before police 
caught him. Since then, there have been five attempted murders of abortion providers and 
three more murders. On January 29, 1998, Robert Sanderson died of injuries sustained during 
a bombing of the New Woman All Health Care in Birmingham, Alabama. Nurse Emily 
Lyons was also wounded in the bombing. The same year, on October 23, anti-abortion 
activist James Kopp fired a rifle shot into the home of Dr. “Bart” Slepian, an abortion 
provider for Buffalo GYN Womenservices, Inc in New York. Dr. Slepian died two hours 
later.548 On May 31, 2009, Scott Roeder walked into Wichita’s Reformation Lutheran Church 
and shot Dr. George Tiller, who was ushering, in the head. Dr. Tiller died instantly.549  
The violence against clinics by a small but militant group of anti-abortion activists 
was closely related to the mainstream movement’s inability to make abortion illegal and 
establish fetal personhood. For the small minority of Americans who believed that a fetus 
was a person from the moment of conception and that all abortion was murder, nothing less 
than a total ban on abortion would suffice. What was striking, however, was that the violence 
against clinics has continued despite the pro-life movement’s numerous incremental policy 
victories since 1983. Social movements typically resort to violent tactics when shut out of the 
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political process or if activists face severe government repression for attempting to change 
the system. The mainstream pro-life movement has made more inroads into the Republican 
Party and was a more pivotal actor in American politics in the 2000s than it was in 1983. But 
clinic protests and violence are not aimed specifically at the government, but at the public 
actions of private citizens. Taken together, the clinic protests and violence were a strategy of 
political harassment designed to change the behavior of clinic staff and abortion providers. 
As such, they have complimented incremental political efforts aimed at stopping the practice 
of abortion through public regulation. Both “streams” of pro-life activism thus have 
attempted to stop abortion in the here and now regardless of its legality.550 
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 CONCLUSION 
“Personhood is the Pro-Life Battleground of the Twenty-First Century”551 
In 2011, Georgia Right to Life president Daniel Becker published Personhood: A 
Pragmatic Guide to Prolife Victory in the 21st Century and the Return to First Principles in 
Politics. Becker’s goal was to introduce a younger generation of pro-life activists to what he 
believed was the movement’s first principle: fetal personhood.552 The situation was desperate 
because the younger activists, who now made up the majority of the movement, had little or 
no knowledge of the history of the movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Few of these new 
activists questioned the pro-life movement’s alliance with the Republican Party and the 
social conservative coalition. They also took for granted that the pro-life movement’s major 
political efforts focused on making abortion illegal or difficult to obtain, not a constitutional 
amendment establishing fetal personhood. Becker pointed out that knowledge of the 
movement’s history and its founding principles were passing away as the pro-life 
movement’s founders died: Mildred Jefferson passed away in 2010, Ellen McCormack in 
2011, and Nellie Gray in 2013. “I firmly believe that the predominant prolife movement 
failed to achieve its desired legal, political, and cultural objectives when it abandoned 
Personhood as a strategy in the late 1970s,” Becker wrote. “Personhood is the prolife
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battleground of the twenty-first century.”553 
In order to bring the pro-life movement back to this fundamental issue, Becker 
resurrected the Human Life Amendment in 2005. This time, he and activists from Arkansas, 
Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, and Montana would pursue the 
amendment at the state level. To pass state Human Life Amendments, Becker urged pro-life 
activists to tighten their anti-abortion demands on Republican politicians. If the politicians’ 
opposition to abortion was grounded in the belief that abortion took an innocent fetal life, as 
most pro-life politicians claimed, Becker reasoned that these politicians should not allow any 
rape or incest exceptions for abortion. Becker believed that a fetal life should not be forfeited 
due to the nature of its conception. His new challenge to candidates was meant to sort the 
true pro-life Republicans from those who were pro-life in name only. 
Becker was not the only pro-lifer looking for ways to make the Republican Party 
more responsive to hard-line anti-abortion demands in the early 2000s; pro-family icon and 
organizer Phyllis Schlafly had also come to Becker’s conclusions. While Becker focused on 
implementing his strict campaign test in Georgia, Schlafly began to coordinate a national 
campaign: “We must strive for 100 percent pro-life candidates, no exceptions, no 
compromise,” she wrote in 2003.554 To accomplish this goal, she instructed the Republican 
National Coalition for Life, an organization she founded in 1990, to endorse only Republican 
candidates willing to support fetal personhood and a constitutional amendment that outlawed 
all abortions with no exceptions. If what Schlafly referred to as a nominal pro-life 
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Republican ran in the primaries, National Coalition for Life members were to defeat that 
candidate by electing a Republican who supported fetal personhood. Recent scientific 
advances, especially the possibility of human cloning, helped to fuel Schlafly’s defense of 
fetal personhood in the early 2000s. “Our cause is greater than abortion alone,” Schlafly 
asserted. “We must establish once and for all that our objective is to restore respect and 
protection to each and every human life from conception, or in the case of a human clone, 
from inception.”555  
Becker’s and Schlafly’s strategies shook the pro-life movement between 2001 and 
2010, and shattered a consensus that had ruled the National Right to Life Committee since 
the failure of the Human Life Amendment. That consensus was built on two pro-life 
strategies that brought grassroots initiatives of the 1970s into the present: to outlaw later-term 
abortions, creating a foothold for legal efforts seeking to overturn Roe v. Wade by making 
some abortions illegal, and to target abortion providers through regulations and constant 
clinic picketing. The best way to stop legal abortion, National Right to Life Committee 
Executive Director Dr. David N O’Steen and legal counsel James Bopp, Jr. argued, was to 
regulate the procedure to death. If right to life activists could not make abortion illegal again, 
they were going to do everything possible to make it unavailable.  
These incremental strategies have been, and continue to be, successful. Today 
abortion providers worry most about what they call TRAPS (Targeted Regulation of 
Abortion Providers).556 TRAPS vary in form and enforcement. As of May 2013, thirty-five 
states have passed informed consent laws that follow the example first set in the Akron, Ohio 
                                                
555 Ibid., 170. 
 
556 Carol Joffe. Dispatches from the Abortion Wars: The Costs of Fanaticism to Doctors, Patients and 
the Rest of Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 63. 
 
 279 
city ordinances of 1979. Twenty-seven of these states require that providers give women 
specific details about abortion and fetal life. Of these states, six mandate that providers give 
women information that inaccurately portrays the risk of abortion to their future fertility, and 
five states inaccurately assert a link between abortion and an increased risk of breast cancer. 
Thirty-three states require that providers tell a woman the gestational age of the fetus before 
her abortion.557 Twelve states require providers to include information on accessing 
ultrasound services, two of which require a woman to view an ultrasound of the fetus.558 In 
addition to informed consent laws, twenty-six states mandate a waiting period between 
eighteen and seventy-two hours between the counseling and the actual procedure. 559 Thirty-
eight states also require parental involvement in a minor's abortion. Of these states, twenty-
one require parental consent to the procedure, twelve require parental notification only, and 
five require both.560  
Right to life activists continue to pursue these regulations today for the same reasons 
they did in the 1970s: by placing as many barriers between a woman and an abortion 
provider, the activists hope to make abortion so difficult to obtain that a woman facing an 
unintended pregnancy will choose to carry her pregnancy to term, thus saving a fetus. These 
regulations continue to affect poor, minority, rural and underage women's access to abortion 
disproportionally compared to American women living in major cities and with more 
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financial resources. As they have in the past, right to life activists today draw upon charges of 
minority genocide and population control to justify TRAPS. They continue to position their 
movement as champions of poor and minority communities because they champion the rights 
of poor and minority fetuses. 
Since these incremental tactics have been so successful, movement leaders did not 
anticipate the mid-2000s hard line challenge and the re-emergence of the Human Life 
Amendment.  Former National Right to Life Committee President Jack Wilke wrote with 
confidence in 2003 that “The vast majority of pro-life leadership today sees such a single 
step as an impossible task, that if pursued relentlessly, would bear no fruit except full defeat 
and therefore the continuation of abortion-on-demand.” According to Wilke, most pro-lifers 
understood that, “the battle can only be won by incremental victories, which will slowly 
change the mind of our nation.” Jack Wilke fully expected what he called a “committed, 
vocal, and sincere minority” that championed fetal personhood and a total ban on abortion to 
remain a minority with little to no power in the larger right to life movement.561 
Georgia Right to Life President Daniel Becker was one of those minority members at 
the outset of the 2000s. When he first shared the state Human Life Amendment strategy with 
National Right to Life Committee leaders in 2001, one leader quickly warned him off it. To 
incremental leaders, Becker’s arguments for state Human Life Amendments showed a 
dangerous political naiveté about the movement and American society reminiscent of the 
1970s.562 They had since learned better, and expected younger anti-abortion activists not to 
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repeat their mistakes. These leaders remembered the bitter internal fights over fetal 
personhood, and why the Human Life Amendment failed in 1983. Even if the movement had 
remained united, they claimed, it was as clear in 2001 as it was in 1981 that the general 
American public would not support an amendment establishing fetal personhood from the 
moment of conception. The leaders pointed out that public opinion polls in 1973 showed that 
twenty percent of Americans believed that abortion was wrong in all situations and would not 
allow it in cases of rape and incest. In 2008, polls continued to show the same percentage, a 
constant that was remarkable after more than thirty years of pro-life education and political 
mobilization.563 Any abortion ban that did not include exceptions for rape and incest, 
incrementalists were certain, would fail when opposed by eighty percent of the population. 
Why were Becker and Schlafly re-popularizing the hard line abortion position that insisted 
on fetal personhood? they asked. Shouldn’t they be focusing on drafting restrictive 
legislation that could gain the support of the majority of Americans who were not polarized 
by the issue? Becker and Schlafly, in reply, pointed to the same Gallup poll numbers to prove 
that the incremental strategies were not working: abortion was still legal and in their minds 
largely available after thirty years of pro-life activism, twenty of which focused on 
incremental restrictions. It was time to shake things up and re-evaluate the political trajectory 
of the movement they argued. 
Perhaps what was most upsetting to National Right to Life Committee leaders in 2001 
was that Becker's arguments for more extreme goals had the potential to seduce a younger 
generation of pro-life activists away from the incremental strategy just when the movement 
was about to pass the “partial-birth abortion” ban. The ban on partial-birth abortion (a phrase 
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coined by National Right to Life Committee leader Douglas Johnson in 1995), outlawed a 
form of second semester abortion that medical experts referred to as “intact dilation and 
extraction.” Abortion providers and the medical community argued that the procedure was 
the safest for women in certain situations. The pro-life campaign against this particular 
method was about something bigger than the actual procedure, according to Douglas 
Johnson. “As the public learns what a 'partial-birth abortion' is, they might also learn 
something about other abortion methods, and . . . this would foster a growing opposition to 
abortion."564 Unlike previous pro-life legal challenges that used incremental legislation to 
restrict a woman’s access to abortion, the partial-birth abortion ban sought to outlaw a 
specific abortion procedure. If the ban passed and the Supreme Court approved it, right to life 
lawyers believed it would lay the foundations for a legal challenge to Roe precisely because 
it criminalized a type of abortion rather than restricting access to the procedure.  
 Beginning in 1995, pro-life leaders in various states passed partial-birth abortion 
bans, including Ohio and Nebraska. Then in 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a 
Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban statute for being too vague in the 5-4 Stenberg v. Carhart 
decision. That same year, Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush promised he 
would appoint pro-life Supreme Court Justices and would sign the federal ban on partial-
birth abortion that President Clinton had vetoed in 1995 and 1997.565 When Bush won the 
presidency in 2000, incremental leaders fully expected the federal abortion ban to pass. Many 
Republican insiders and conservative leaders thought that Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Conner might retire, and pro-life leaders hoped that Bush would replace her with a 
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staunchly pro-life justice. Since O’Connor cast the crucial swing vote in the Stenberg v. 
Carhart decision, her replacement could change the court’s make-up profoundly. With a 
favorable changes in Washington pending, incremental leaders felt it would be a tragedy of 
the highest proportion if history repeated itself and the movement erupted into divisions over 
fetal personhood again and failed to pass any anti-abortion legislation under George W. 
Bush. To discourage Daniel Becker from introducing a Human Life Amendment, National 
Right to Life Committee leaders told him that the press and their Republican allies would 
label him an "extremist," and that he would do more harm to the movement than good. 
Becker ignored their advice and continued to lay the groundwork for a Human Life 
Amendment campaign in Georgia. While working for the partial-birth abortion ban campaign 
held the pro-life movement together between 2001 and 2007, tensions were again mounting 
between hard line and incremental activists as other states also began to ask for constitutional 
amendments. In November 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the Partial-birth 
Abortion Ban after a Republican-controlled Senate and House passed the legislation. Pro-
choice activists immediately challenged the ban. In 2005, right to life activists in Mississippi 
introduced the Ultimate Human Life Amendment as a ballot initiative and lost. One year 
later, Cal Zastrow of Michigan Citizens for Life, a National Right to Life Committee 
affiliate, introduced another state version of the Human Life Amendment. It too failed.566 In 
2005, Sandra Day O’Connor announced her resignation from the Supreme Court, and three 
months later Chief Justice William Rehnquist passed away. Bush appointed John Roberts to 
replace Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Samuel Alito to replace O’Connor. In 2007, the new 
court upheld the federal partial-birth abortion ban in Gonzolez v. Carhart. Roberts and Alito 
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joined the five-member majority in the opinion. 
Following that victory, the pro-life movement divided over the issue of fetal 
personhood for the third time in its history. On March 20, a month before the Supreme Court 
released Gonzolez v. Carhart, Daniel Becker and Georgia Right to Life sponsored a 
resolution calling for the adoption of a Paramount Human Life Amendment in the state 
constitution, using the same wording that the National Right to Life Committee had adopted 
in October 1982. A few months later, activists in Colorado, Montana, and Oregon placed 
Human Life Amendment initiatives on their 2008 state ballots. Kristi Burton of Colorado for 
Equal Rights led her state’s ballot initiative, which caused a schism in Colorado Right to 
Life. Burton held that state activists were either for fetal personhood and a total abortion ban 
or they were not truly pro-life. Burton and her allies then created a sensation in pro-life and 
conservative circles when they criticized Focus on the Family leader James Dobson for not 
endorsing her ballot initiative because the amendment did not provide exceptions for rape 
and incest. In response to Burton’s attacks, James Bopp, Jr., a legal counsel for the National 
Right to Life Committee, Focus on the Family, and the Family Research Council, published a 
paper in the summer of 2007 attacking any and all state constitutional efforts.567 The National 
Right to Life Committee Board refused to endorse the state amendment strategy.568 By taking 
a position that only a minority of the population shared, and without full pro-life movement 
support, all of the 2008 ballot initiatives failed. In Colorado only twenty-seven percent of 
voters supported the state Human Life Amendment. 
The animosity of the National Right to Life Committee’s board towards state Human 
Life Amendments caused Keith Mason, a young South Dakota activist, and Cal Zastrow of 
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Michigan Citizens for Life to found Personhood USA in 2008. The new organization 
promised to introduce and pass personhood amendments using state ballot initiatives. In a 
campaign reminiscent of Ellen McCormack’s 1977 constitutional convention call, 
Personhood USA is currently working to pass Human Life Amendments in two-thirds of the 
states through ballot initiatives or legislation. According to Becker, they are not adopting the 
“all or nothing” approach of earlier hardliners; he called state amendments the “all-or-
something” approach, and considered them in line with incremental strategies. While 
awaiting a federal Human Life Amendment, Becker argued, states could pass their own 
amendments acknowledging fetal personhood and banning abortions. This line of reasoning 
eventually won over the National Right to Life Committee Board, which endorsed the state 
Human Life Amendment strategy in 2010, paving the way for another incremental consensus 
within the movement.569  
Recent legislation in various states shows the results of this emerging period of pro-
life consensus. In February 2013, the Arkansas legislature adopted a law restricting access to 
abortion past the twelfth week of pregnancy, when doctors could first detect a fetal heartbeat. 
In March 2013, the North Dakota legislature passed and the governor signed into law a series 
of anti-abortion bills. One outlawed most abortions past the sixth week of pregnancy. The 
second law banned all abortions past the twentieth week of pregnancy except those intended 
to save the life of a woman. A third bill severely restricted the use of tax money for family 
planning in government-mandated insurance plans. The fourth and final piece of legislation 
placed the Human Life Amendment on the 2014 state ballot initiative.570  
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However, tensions have continued between hard line and incremental activists. In 
April 2013, incremental state leader and National Right to Life Committee affiliate Kansans 
for Life successfully lobbied for and passed a sweeping anti-abortion bill. Rather than pursue 
an outright abortion ban, as activists in North Dakota and Arkansas had done, Kansans 
passed legislation similar to Jesse Helms’ Human Life Bill. The legislation states as a 
principle that human life begins at fertilization and does not include exceptions for rape or 
incest, but it provides no means of enforcement. In an attempt to ensure the law’s 
constitutionality, it includes a clause that any rights conferred by fetal personhood will be 
limited by the Supreme Court’s rulings over questions of abortion access. Kansans for Life 
representatives told the national press that they didn’t think the Arkansas and North Dakota 
laws were the best strategy for the pro-life movement. They believed it was better to pass 
legislation that the courts could potentially uphold rather than directly challenge Roe v. 
Wade. Kansans for Life leaders said that pro-life activists should keep chipping away at the 
decision, and keep piling on regulations for abortion providers. The North Dakota and 
Arkansas laws cannot be enforced due to court injunctions.571 
Today, forty years after the Roe v. Wade decision, the American public continues to 
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favor legal abortion. A January 2013 Pew Research Center report and public opinion poll 
found that despite forty years of pro-life mobilization, a majority of Americans and 
Republicans approve of the Roe v. Wade decision. Fifty-five percent of Americans polled 
said that abortion should be legal in most if not all cases, compared to forty percent who 
believed it should be illegal in all cases. The same poll found that forty-eight percent of 
Republicans wanted to uphold the Roe decision compared to forty-four percent of 
Republicans who wanted the decision overturned.572  
To overcome the public’s support for abortion, pro-life activists continue to ask and 
debate the series of questions many pro-life leaders first raised in the days after Roe v. Wade. 
What is the best way to overturn the decision? Should the movement seek to establish fetal 
personhood or pursue abortion restrictions? Should the movement stand on principle, or 
compromise to save more unborn children’s lives? The questions remain as contentious now 
as they were in 1973. While most pro-life activists believe that a fetus is a person, endowed 
with the right to life from the moment of conception, there has been and continues to be little 
agreement within the pro-life movement over how to implement what they claim as a self-
evident and scientific truth in public policy. Most people inside the pro-life movement take 
the division over fetal personhood and abortion restrictions for granted, but few outside the 
movement pay attention to it, including the press and pro-choice activists. This raises the 
question of what would happen if more Americans understood the pro-life movement’s 
internal divisions and their impact on politics and women’s lives in the past and present? 
One thing is clear. The pro-life movement’s divisions over fetal personhood and 
abortion restrictions are not going away anytime soon. “The prolife movement is torn 
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between following two different ‘maps,’” wrote Daniel Becker in 2011. “Since the early 
1970s the movement has been split over which map to follow – legal protections for human 
life as defined by government or Personhood as defined by God and recognized by 
government.”573 A few weeks before her death in 2010, Mildred Jefferson shared a similar 
sentiment, but she had little hope that the pro-life movement would ever reconcile the divide 
between fetal personhood and abortion restrictions. “There was intense, pitched opposition 
from the beginning. Those divisions have never disappeared. They have never been glossed 
over. There has never been any attempt to pretend they aren't there so they have just existed 
from the beginning. . . . Divisions that exist, exist.”574 
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